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Abstract 
Philosophical discussion of the value of knowledge, inspired by Plato’s seminal 
discussion in the Meno, typically focuses on the question why it is better to know 
that p than to have a mere true belief that p. This question is notoriously difficult to 
answer in a satisfactory way. I argue that the difficulty we experience in trying to 
solve this problem is a symptom of the fact that we are approaching issues about the 
value of knowledge in the wrong way. Beneath the traditional problem there lurks a 
more fundamental issue about the aim of enquiry, namely, why should an enquirer 
who wants the truth about whether p aim to find out (i.e. acquire knowledge of) 
whether p, and not merely aim to arrive at a true belief about whether p? Identifying 
respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief is only one way of trying 
to answer this question, and, I argue, it is difficult to see how this approach to the 
question can succeed. An alternative is called for. Central to my alternative proposal 
is the idea that an enquirer will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether 
p until he takes himself to have acquired knowledge of whether p. It is because this 
is so that an enquirer cannot make life easier for himself by merely aiming to arrive 
at true beliefs instead of knowledge. I justify this proposal by developing an account 
of belief according to which outright belief involves a disposition to judge that p, 
where judging that p is distinct from merely supposing that p for the sake of 
argument or guessing that p.  
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Introduction 
The basic claim of this thesis is that to resolve philosophical issues about the value 
of knowledge, we need to pay attention to the position of an enquirer, i.e. someone 
seeking the truth about the answer to a question. This claim stands in marked 
contrast to the traditional approach to these issues. According to that approach, 
rather than thinking about the position of an enquirer, we should instead compare 
and contrast two subjects, one of whom knows and the other of whom is in some 
‘lesser’ cognitive state (e.g. that of having a mere true belief), and try to identify 
respects in which the former subject is in a superior position to the latter. It turns out 
to be very difficult to do this in a satisfactory way. But is this the right approach to 
adopt? What do we presuppose in setting up issues about the value of knowledge in 
this way? I will be contending that the traditional approach to these issues is 
misguided, and that the correct approach to the value of knowledge is one that brings 
questions about the enquirer to the fore.  
In this introduction, I want to set the stage for the arguments to come by doing three 
things. Firstly, I will introduce the idea that attention to the position of the enquirer is 
required to resolve philosophical puzzles about knowledge in more detail, by tracing 
its origin in the work of Bernard Williams. Aspects of Williams’ work will receive 
further discussion in Chapters 1 and 4. Secondly, I will argue that, when thinking 
about the value of knowledge, it is crucial to clearly distinguish two questions. The 
first, which corresponds to the traditional approach, is the question of why it is better 
to know that p than it is to merely be in some ‘lesser’ cognitive state with respect to 
the proposition that p—e.g. that of having a mere true belief that p. The second is the 
question of why an enquirer should want to know the answer to a question, and not 
merely to arrive at some ‘lesser’ cognitive state with respect to the answer to that 
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question—e.g. that of having a true belief about the answer. Concerning the relation 
between these questions, I wish to make two major claims. The first, as I have 
already indicated, is that we really do have two distinct questions here, and not 
merely two different ways of expressing the same question. My second claim is that 
the activity question is the more basic question in the sense that, in advance of 
identifying specific respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief, the 
only general reason we have for thinking that knowledge must be superior to mere 
true belief is that this claim is required to explain why knowledge, and not merely 
true belief, is the aim of enquiry. Thus, if it is possible to answer the activity 
question in a satisfactory way without appealing to the idea that knowledge is 
superior to mere true belief, we are relieved of the pressure of having to identify 
respects in which knowledge is better than mere true belief. Thirdly and finally, I 
will conclude the chapter with an overview of the argument of the thesis by 
providing brief synopses of the central claims of the remaining chapters. This should 
prepare the reader for what is to come.  
1. Williams on Knowledge and the Enquirer 
In two papers from the early 1970s, ‘Deciding to Believe’ and ‘Knowledge and 
Reasons’, Bernard Williams draws attention to what he calls ‘the examiner 
situation’, and make a series of bold claims about the role of this situation in 
philosophical reflection about knowledge. In ‘Deciding to Believe’ the introduction 
of the examiner situation is prompted by discussion of a machine which, Williams 
claims, could be attributed knowledge but not beliefs. Having made this claim about 
the machine, Williams provides the following in the way of comment: 
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This [i.e. the claim that the machine knows without believing] goes against 
what is a rather deep prejudice in philosophy, that knowledge must be at least 
as grand as belief, that what knowledge is, is belief plus quite a lot; in 
particular, belief together with truth and good reasons. This approach seems 
to me largely mistaken. It is encouraged by concentrating on a very particular 
situation which academic writings about knowledge are notably fond of, that 
which might be called the examiner situation: the situation in which I know 
that p is true, this other man has asserted that p is true, and I ask the question 
whether this other man really knows it, or merely believes it. I am 
represented as checking on someone else’s credentials for something about 
which I know already. That of course encourages the idea that knowledge is 
belief plus reasons and so forth. But this is far from our standard situation 
with regard to knowledge; our standard situation with regard to knowledge 
(in relation to other persons) is rather that of trying to find somebody who 
knows what we don’t know; that is, to find somebody who is a source of 
reliable information about something. In this sense the machine could 
certainly know something. Our standard question is not ‘Does Jones know 
that p?’ Our standard question is rather ‘Who knows whether p?’ (1973: 146) 
When we try to find somebody who knows what we don’t know so that we can find 
it out from them, we are seeking the truth about the answer to that question, and so 
are engaged in enquiry. Thus, although Williams doesn’t put the point in quite these 
terms, the proposal he is making is that reflection on the position of the enquirer acts 
as a corrective to the mistaken approach to knowledge, encouraged by focussing on 
the examiner situation, according to which ‘knowledge must be at least as grand as 
belief, that what knowledge is, is belief plus quite a lot; in particular, belief together 
4 
 
with truth and good reasons’. There is a parallel between the claims Williams makes 
here and the claims I wish to make about the value of knowledge. According to 
Williams, issues about the nature of knowledge are traditionally approached in a way 
that neglects the position of the enquirer, and this has led to mistaken claims about 
the nature of knowledge. In order to correct these errors, we need to reorientate our 
thinking towards the enquirer. I wish to claim that something similar, but more 
radical, holds of philosophical thinking about the value of knowledge. Issues about 
the value of knowledge have been approached in a way that ignores the perspective 
of an enquirer, and this has distracted philosophers from the fundamental problem in 
this area.  
My argument does not depend on any of the specific claims that Williams makes in 
the quoted passage, but it is independently interesting to consider the plausibility of 
Williams’ proposals. To begin with, it should be noted that in his description of the 
mistaken approach Williams runs together two different claims. The claim that 
‘knowledge must be at least as grand as belief’ is naturally understood to express the 
widely accepted thesis that believing that p is necessary for knowing that p. The 
claim that ‘what knowledge is, is belief plus quite a lot; in particular, belief together 
with truth and good reasons’ is much stronger: it says not only that believing that p is 
necessary for knowing that p, but that it is possible to give a non-circular analysis of 
knowing that p as a conjunction of believing that p with further factors—in 
particular, truth and good reasons. It is possible to accept the first claim without 
accepting the second; this is the position of Williamson (2000).1 Once the two claims 
are distinguished, we can raise two questions about Williams’ account of the role of 
the examiner situation in philosophical thinking about the nature of knowledge. 
                                                 
1 There is some further discussion of this point in Chapter 1, § 3.2. 
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Firstly, has a tendency to concentrate on the examiner situation encouraged the view 
that believing that p is necessary for knowing that p? Secondly, has a tendency to 
focus on the examiner situation encouraged the stronger view that it is possible to 
give a non-circular analysis of knowing that p as a conjunction of believing that p 
with further factors?  
I shall consider only the first of these questions here. The claim that we can give a 
non-circular analysis of knowing that p as a conjunction of believing that p with 
additional factors presupposes that believing that p is necessary for knowing that p: 
if believing that p is not even required for knowing that p, then we obviously can’t 
analyse knowing that p as a conjunction of believing that p with further elements. 
Thus, if the former view has not been encouraged by focussing on the examiner 
situation, neither has the latter. Furthermore, in both ‘Deciding to Believe’ and 
‘Knowledge and Reasons’, Williams’ discussion of the role of the examiner situation 
in philosophical thinking about knowledge is intended to bolster his rejection of 
certain widely accepted necessary conditions on knowing that p, by providing a 
diagnosis of why these allegedly spurious conditions on knowing may nevertheless 
appear to be genuine. Whilst ‘Deciding to Believe’ rejects the view that knowing 
requires believing, ‘Knowledge and Reasons’ is concerned to show that ‘it is 
possible for A to know that q without its being the case that A can rehearse reasons, 
or at least adequate reasons, for q’ (2006: 50). Thus, in considering whether 
preoccupation with the examiner situation has encouraged mistaken views about the 
conditions that are necessary for knowing that p, we also fasten onto the issue that is 
Williams’ target. 
Is it the case, then, that a tendency to focus on the examiner situation has encouraged 
the view that believing that p is necessary for knowing that p, as Williams alleges? 
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To answer this question, attention is needed to how Williams specifies the examiner 
situation. In ‘Deciding to Believe’ the description of the examiner situation contains 
a peculiar emphasis on assertion: the situation is the one in which ‘I know that p is 
true, this other man has asserted that p is true, and I ask the question whether this 
other man really knows it, or merely believes it’. This emphasis jars with the claim 
that academic writings on knowledge are ‘notably fond’ of the examiner situation: if 
memory serves, most articles on the nature of knowledge, at least in the post-Gettier 
literature, do not ask us to imagine that Smith, Fred Jones (or whoever else) has 
asserted that p. Why, then, does Williams build this into his specification of the 
examiner situation? Presumably, he is motivated here by the view, expressed earlier 
in ‘Deciding to Believe’, that ‘our very concept of assertion is tied to the notion of 
deciding to say something which does or does not mirror what you believe’ (1973: 
146). If the examinee is described as having asserted that p, then it is being taken for 
granted that the examinee is a believer; and given that the sincerity of the examinee’s 
assertion is not in question, it is further being taken for granted that the examinee 
believes that p in particular. Thus, focussing on the examiner situation, so 
understood, does introduce into our thinking about knowledge an extraneous 
element—namely, the idea that the person who potentially knows that p has 
sincerely asserted that p—that would encourage the view that knowing that p 
requires believing that p even if that view were, in fact, false. As I have pointed out, 
however, the evidence simply does not bear out the idea that the examiner situation, 
so understood, is one that ‘academic writings about knowledge are notably fond of’. 
Williams’ diagnosis of the source of the view that knowledge requires belief is 
accordingly unconvincing.  
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We cannot get around this problem by omitting from the description of the examiner 
situation the idea that the subject has asserted that p, as Williams does in 
‘Knowledge and Reasons’. There, the ‘examiner’s situation’ is introduced as ‘the 
case where A is admittedly convinced of the truth that p, and the question is whether 
that conviction is adequately based’ (2006: 48).2 It is true, I think, that philosophical 
writings on knowledge have been preoccupied with the examiner situation, so 
understood. But this is just to say that epistemologists have tended to take it for 
granted that knowledge requires true belief, and have then enquired into what further 
conditions must be satisfied for the subject not only to truly believe, but to know. 
This can hardly be offered as a diagnosis of why philosophers have been attracted to 
the view that ‘knowledge must be at least as grand as belief’: it is because they are 
already convinced that knowledge requires true belief that epistemologists have 
focussed on the examiner’s situation, so understood. Williams is caught in a 
dilemma here. If he includes the idea that the subject has asserted that p in his 
specification of the examiner situation, then it is false that writings on knowledge 
have tended to focus on the examiner situation, so this cannot be what explains the 
currency of the allegedly mistaken view that knowledge requires belief. If, on the 
other hand, he omits assertion from the specification of the examiner situation, the 
situation reduces to the one in which the subject has a true belief, but then there is no 
extraneous element present in the situation that could misleadingly encourage the 
view that knowledge requires belief. Philosophers will have focused on that situation 
only because they are independently persuaded that knowledge requires true belief. 
                                                 
2 I do not mean to imply that Williams omits assertion from his specification of the examiner’s 
situation in ‘Knowledge and Reasons’ in a vain attempt to avoid this problem. On the contrary, the 
difference is presumably due to the fact that, in that paper, Williams is not concerned to dispute the 
view that knowledge requires belief, but only the view that knowledge requires the subject to able to 
rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of his belief. 
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What of the claim that knowledge requires the subject to be able to rehearse reasons 
in favour of the truth of his belief? Has this view been encouraged by a 
preoccupation with the examiner situation? The problem here is that the ability of an 
examinee to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of his belief seems to be at most 
one way in which we might check that he really knows, and is not merely guessing. 
Suppose, for example, that we ask our examinee to state the product of 12 and 23; 
after a moment, he responds ‘276’. Does he know that the product of 12 and 23 is 
276, or was his answer just a lucky guess? One way to settle this question would be 
to request reasons, by asking (e.g.) ‘how do you know that 12 x 23 = 76?’ If the 
examinee was able to explain how he worked out the answer, this might convince us 
that he really knows. But this is not the only way of checking whether he knows. 
Alternatively, we might ask the examinee to solve a series of similar arithmetical 
problems. Once he has got a sufficient number of these further problems right, this 
might convince us that he knows the answers to the questions—the odds of him 
getting so many of them right by sheer chance are so small that the possibility can 
safely be ignored.3 Here it might be objected that the ability of the examinee to 
answer related questions correctly convinces us that he knows only because it 
convinces us that he must be able to rehearse reasons in favour of his arithmetical 
beliefs. This, however, is dubious. Imagine it turned out that, although he was able to 
answer all of our questions correctly, the examinee was apparently unable to 
rehearse reasons in favour of his arithmetical beliefs; when asked ‘how do you know 
that 12 x 23 = 276?’, he responds by saying ‘It just is’, or ‘Isn’t it obvious?’. Would 
we now be inclined to judge that he doesn’t really know that 12 x 23 = 276, despite 
his evident ability to answer a range of arithmetical questions correctly? I don’t think 
                                                 
3 A similar case has been taken to impugn the claim that knowledge requires belief; see Radford 
(1966).  
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that we would; rather, I think that we would be inclined to judge that this person has 
a special way of knowing the answers to such questions, that he can ‘just see’ the 
answers to relatively complex arithmetical problems in something like the way 
ordinary people can see, without conscious calculation, that 5 – 3 = 2, or that 3 + 1 = 
4. Even if one disagrees with this verdict, it must at least be admitted that reflection 
on the examiner situation does not specially encourage the view that knowledge 
requires the subject to be able to rehearse reasons for the truth of what he believes: 
the pull of the view that knowledge requires only the satisfaction of what Williams 
calls ‘external conditions’ can also become apparent in the examiner situation. 
So far, I have considered only Williams’ diagnostic claim that preoccupation with 
the examiner situation has encouraged certain mistaken views about what is required 
for knowledge—in particular, the view that knowledge requires belief, and the 
ability to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of one’s belief. I have been arguing 
that a tendency to focus on the examiner situation does not provide a plausible 
diagnosis of either view. The other half of Williams’ proposal is that these views 
cease to be plausible once we turn our attention to the position of an enquirer who 
wants to find out whether p, and who is looking for someone who knows whether p. 
This second part of his proposal is, on the face of it, independent of the first part; it 
remains to be seen, then, whether we should endorse what he has to say here.  
Regarding the claim that attention to the enquirer discredits the view that knowledge 
requires the subject to be able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of what he 
believes, the following passage, from Edward Craig’s book Knowledge and the State 
of Nature, is apposite: 
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Why should we want more of a potential informant than that his views on the 
point at issue should be true, and at least confident enough for him to be 
prepared to come out with them? Then we come to hear the truth, which is 
what we wanted. But this overlooks a crucial point. It is not just that we are 
looking for an informant who will tell us the truth about p; we also have to be 
able to pick him out, distinguish him from others to whom we would be less 
well advised to listen. How is that to be done? Well, it will be easy enough to 
find out what he believes about p; and if we ourselves knew whether p that 
would suffice to tell us whether he has a true belief. But ex hypothesi we do 
not know whether p—we are in the position of inquirers, not of examiners (to 
borrow Bernard Williams’s way of putting it); the informant is to be our 
means of access to that knowledge, and if we already had it, we would not be 
inquiring. Obviously, we have to detect the right informant without benefit of 
prior knowledge. So we need some detectable property—which means 
detectable to persons to whom it is not yet detectable whether p—which 
correlates well with being right about p; a property, in other words, such that 
if the informant possesses it he is (at least) very likely to have a true belief on 
that matter. (1990: 18–19)  
What could this detectable property be? One answer is that the informant must be 
able to provide adequate reasons in support of his belief. This, one might think, is a 
property that correlates well with being right about whether p, and which the 
enquirer can detect without being able to detect whether p. Thus, reflection on the 
conditions under which someone will be a good informant about whether p for an 
enquirer who doesn’t know whether p can encourage the thought that knowledge 
requires the subject to be able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of his belief. 
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That said, it certainly isn’t the case that this is the only detectable property that 
correlates well with having a true belief about some matter. As Craig goes on to 
point out, ‘[i]f you want to know the way it will always be a good idea to ask a taxi-
driver’ (1990: 26), because being a taxi-driver correlates well with having accurate 
beliefs about directions. Furthermore, for some classes of beliefs (e.g. beliefs about 
salient features of one’s autobiography, such as where one was born), ‘the mere fact 
of being willing to offer an opinion [is] correlated excellently with being right’ 
(ibid.). It would therefore appear that more careful reflection on the conditions under 
which someone will be a good informant about whether p should lead us to reject the 
view that knowledge requires the subject to be capable of rehearsing reasons in 
favour of the truth of his belief; the ability to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth 
of one’s belief is at most one way of fulfilling the more general requirement of 
having some property, detectable to an enquirer who does not know whether p, that 
correlates well with having a true belief about whether p.  
Although Craig is clearly influenced by Williams’ general proposal that reflection on 
the position of an enquirer is important when it comes to gaining a philosophical 
understanding of the nature of knowledge, his argument relies on the more specific 
assumption that, to a first approximation, the conditions under which a person knows 
whether p are the conditions under the person would be a good informant about 
whether p. It is only if this more specific assumption holds that one can infer 
conclusions about what is required for S to know that p from premises about the 
conditions under which S would be a good informant about whether p. The basis on 
which Craig advocates this claim is that the concept of knowledge serves a certain 
function, and this function is to flag good informants. One issue raised by Craig’s 
argument, then, is whether we should regard the concept of knowledge as having a 
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function, and, if so, whether its function is the one identified by Craig. Further 
discussion of this issue lies beyond the scope of the present work. However, there is 
another aspect of Craig’s assumption I wish to comment on. Our conception of the 
conditions under which someone will be a good informant about whether p for an 
enquirer obviously depends on our conception of what the enquirer is after. If we 
think that the enquirer is after knowledge of whether p, then a person will not be a 
good informant about whether p for the enquirer unless the enquirer can come to 
know whether p on the basis of the person’s testimony about whether p. It is 
significant that Craig’s conception of what the enquirer is after falls short of 
knowledge: in particular, Craig assumes that the aim of an enquirer who wants the 
truth about whether p is merely to arrive at a true belief about whether p.4 Thus, put 
more explicitly, the assumption his argument relies on is that the conditions under 
which a person knows whether p approximate to the conditions under the person 
would be a good informant about whether p for an enquirer seeking a true belief 
about whether p. It is not at all clear why we should accept this more minimal 
conception of the enquirer’s aim. As Williamson points out, ‘[i]t is no reply that 
believing truly is as useful as knowing, for it is agreed that the starting point [i.e. our 
conception of the enquirer’s aim] should be more specific than ‘useful mental state’; 
why should it be more specific in the manner of ‘believing truly’ than in that of 
‘knowing’?’ (2000: 31, note 3).5  
If we assume that the enquirer’s aim is not merely to arrive at a true belief about 
whether p, but to acquire knowledge of whether p, the worry is that appealing to the 
                                                 
4 Attentive readers will notice that the passage I have quoted from Craig’s book therefore contains a 
slip. He writes that ‘we are in the position of inquirers, not of examiners…the informant is to be our 
means of access to that knowledge, and if we already had it, we would not be inquiring’. This implies 
that the enquirer’s aim is the acquisition of knowledge. However, it is clear both from his explicit 
earlier statement of the enquirer’s aim, and the logic of his overall argument, that his real view is that 
the enquirer’s aim is the acquisition of true beliefs.  
5 I will make a similar objection to an argument of Williams’ in the next chapter.  
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conditions under which a person would be a good informant about whether p in 
order to refute the claim that knowledge requires the subject to be able to rehearse 
reasons in favour of the truth of his belief threatens to be question-begging. The 
following principle about the acquisition of knowledge via testimony is prima facie 
plausible: for hearer H to acquire knowledge that p via speaker S’s testimony that p, 
S must know that p.6 Bearing this principle in mind, imagine now that someone tries 
to argue in a way analogous to Craig: ‘S is a good informant about whether p, but S 
is unable to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of his belief that p; therefore, 
knowing that p does not require S to be able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth 
of his belief that p’. Someone who is convinced that knowledge requires the ability 
to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of one’s belief can now respond as follows: 
‘S is a good informant about whether p only if an enquirer can come to know 
whether p on the basis of S’s testimony about whether p, but given the 
aforementioned principle, this condition will be satisfied only if S himself knows 
whether p. Since S cannot rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of his belief, by my 
lights he does not know whether p. Hence, contrary to your argument, S is not a 
good informant about whether p’. No doubt the person who initially made the 
argument would now wish to further contest the idea that knowledge requires the 
ability to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of one’s belief, but the present point 
is merely that, once we think of the enquirer’s aim as being the acquisition of 
knowledge, to argue that someone might be a good informant about whether p 
without being able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of their belief is 
tantamount to assuming that knowing whether p does not require the subject to be 
able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of their belief. Reflection on what 
                                                 
6 For further discussion of this principle, including purported counterexamples, see Lackey (1999). 
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makes a good informant is not neutral ground from which we can mount a non-
question-begging challenge to internalism.  
What about Williams’ further claim that considering the position of the enquirer 
discredits the idea that knowledge requires belief?7 His argument for this claim 
occurs in the final part of the passage quoted earlier from ‘Deciding to Believe’. To 
repeat: ‘our standard situation with regard to knowledge (in relation to other persons) 
is…that of trying to find somebody who knows what we don’t know; that is, to find 
somebody who is a source of reliable information about something. In this sense the 
machine could certainly know something’. The problem with the argument in this 
passage is that knowing something is not equivalent to being a source of reliable 
information about it; a book can be a source of reliable information about a certain 
subject matter, but a book cannot literally know anything about that subject matter. 
To assume that these two things are equivalent is to smudge the distinction between 
knowers and mere sources of information. It seems to me that the plausibility of 
Williams’ argument depends on us overlooking this distinction. It is undeniable that 
a machine of the sort he describes might be a source of reliable information about 
something, and, provided we are not mindful of the distinction between being a 
source of reliable information and being a knower, this might persuade us that the 
machine knows about that thing. Once this distinction is drawn, however, it not clear 
that such a machine can be anything more than a source of information. 
Consequently, it is not clear that the machine knows, despite being incapable of 
having beliefs.  
In summary, Williams’ proposal that a tendency to focus on the examiner situation 
has led to mistaken claims about the nature of knowledge, and that these views cease 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of this point see Craig (1990), especially Chapter II: 12–16.  
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to be plausible once we turn our attention to the enquirer, seems to me largely 
without merit. Such a tendency is not the source of the view that knowledge requires 
belief, and neither does it specially recommend the view that knowledge requires the 
subject to be able to rehearse reasons in favour of the truth of what he believes. 
Craig’s argument that reflection on the position of an enquirer should lead us to 
reject the view that knowledge requires the subject to be able to rehearse reasons in 
favour of his truth of his belief relies on the assumption that the aim of an enquirer 
who wants the truth about whether p is merely to arrive at a true belief about whether 
p. It is not clear why we should accept this assumption, and I will argue in the next 
chapter that we should reject it on the grounds that the assumption generates an 
insoluble difficulty when it comes to explaining why enquirers engage in the pursuit 
of knowledge. Williams’ suggestion that reflection on the position of an enquirer 
undermines the view that knowledge requires belief is implausible once we mark the 
distinction between knowers and mere sources of information. Fortunately, these 
difficulties for Williams’ proposal do not undermine the central claim of this thesis, 
which is that we need to pay attention to the position of an enquirer to resolve 
philosophical issues about the value of knowledge. Although puzzles about the value 
of knowledge are closely related to puzzles about the nature of knowledge, issues 
about why knowledge matters to us are clearly distinct from issues about what 
knowledge is. Even if one is sceptical about the suggestion that reflection on the 
enquirer can help to illuminate issues about the nature of knowledge, then, it is a 
further question whether it is useful in the context of thinking about the value of 
knowledge. But how might thinking about the position of an enquirer contribute 
towards the resolution of the philosophical issues about the value of knowledge? 
This is the question I shall be taking up in the next section. 
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2. Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge 
In thinking about whether reflection on an enquirer can help to resolve issues about 
the value of knowledge, it is helpful to return to Plato’s original presentation of a 
problem about the value of knowledge in the Meno. In that dialogue, Socrates 
famously compares a guide who knows the way to Larissa with a guide who merely 
has a true belief about the way. He claims that the latter guide is just as good as the 
former, and, more generally, that true belief ‘is just as good a guide as knowledge, 
when it comes to guaranteeing correctness of action’ (97b). Furthermore, true belief 
is, of course, just as true as knowledge. These observations provoke puzzlement in 
Meno: 
All this is making me wonder, Socrates, why, if this is so, knowledge is so 
much more highly valued than true belief and on what grounds one can 
distinguish between them. (97c—97d) 
What does Meno mean in asking why ‘knowledge is so much more highly valued 
than true belief’? There are at least two different ways of understanding this part of 
Meno’s question. On one interpretation, Meno is here alluding to the fact that human 
beings desire and seek knowledge, and not merely true beliefs. (As Aristotle later put 
it, ‘All men by nature desire to know’ (Metaphysics: I.980a20).) Following this line, 
we can summarize Meno’s question by asking, why do we desire and seek 
knowledge, and not merely true beliefs, given that true belief is just as true, and just 
as useful, as knowledge? Call this question the activity question. Notice that the 
activity question is one that concerns us in the role of enquirers, i.e. as subjects 
engaged in the pursuit of truth. However, the Meno problem is often formulated in a 
way that does not bring in the idea of a subject engaged in enquiry. According to this 
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second understanding of Meno’s question, the problem is to explain why it is better 
to know that p than to have a mere true belief that p. Call this question the 
comparative state question.8 When the problem is expressed in this way, the 
predicament of an enquirer who neither knows nor truly believes that p, but who 
wants to know whether p, disappears from view. The exercise becomes one of 
comparing and contrasting two subjects, one of whom knows that p and the other of 
whom merely truly believes that p, and trying to identify respects in which the 
former subject is in a better position than the latter. This second interpretation of the 
question is encouraged by the subsequent direction of Plato’s original discussion, 
which proceeds in precisely this way. (Plato’s solution to the problem is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 1 § 4.1.) 
Here someone might object that the activity question and the comparative state 
question express essentially the same problem—the fact that the second question no 
longer mentions an enquirer, someone who is engaged in the pursuit of truth, is 
merely a cosmetic difference. After all, they may go on to say, if we can explain why 
the person who knows that p is in a better position than someone who merely truly 
believes that p, then we have explained why ordinary human beings desire and seek 
knowledge, and not merely true belief: there is no mystery in the fact that people 
prefer what is better to what is worse. Even if this is right, however, it misses the 
crucial point that this is only one way of responding to the activity question. 
Suppose, for example, that it could be shown that merely desiring or seeking true 
belief, without desiring or seeking knowledge, was impossible. Then there would be 
a straightforward answer to the question of why we desire and seek knowledge, and 
not only true belief, even though true belief is just as true, and just as useful, as 
                                                 
8 These names for the two questions were suggested to me by a conversation with Hemdat Lerman. 
18 
 
knowledge—namely, that we cannot merely desire or seek true belief. In answering 
the activity question in this way, though, we wouldn’t have answered the question of 
why someone who knows that p is in a superior state, other things being equal, to 
someone who merely truly believes that p. Indeed, answering the activity question in 
this way is consistent with the admission that knowledge is not in any way superior 
to true belief. If this is right, then we really do have two questions here, and not 
merely two different ways of expressing the same question.  
Here it may be objected that the supposition that it is impossible to merely desire or 
seek true belief is very implausible. Can’t I now form the intention of acquiring a 
true belief about where Jane Austen was born, and do a Google search to arrive at 
one? What could possibly prevent me from doing so? The point that the supposition 
is implausible is right, but beside the point. My purpose in introducing the 
supposition was not that it is a serious candidate for truth, but rather to show that the 
activity question really is distinct from the comparative state question, by giving an 
example of a claim which, if true, would provide an answer to the activity question 
without providing an answer to the comparative state question. Once it is clear that 
we have two questions here, we might wonder what else we take for granted about 
enquiry, beyond the bare possibility of seeking true beliefs without seeking 
knowledge, in assuming that the correct way to tackle the activity question is by 
tackling the comparative state question.  
Having distinguished the activity question from the comparative state question, a 
further issue we can consider is to which question, if either, we should assign 
priority in a philosophical investigation of the value of knowledge. I have already 
pointed out that a solution to the activity question needn’t issue in a solution to the 
comparative state question. But it should also be noted that if the activity question is 
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answered in a way that doesn’t issue in a solution to the comparative state question, 
it is far from clear that we have good independent reasons to think that it will be 
possible to identify respects in which knowing that p is superior to merely truly 
believing that p. Suppose, for example, that it turned out that it really was impossible 
to merely desire or seek true belief without desiring or seeking knowledge. This 
would explain why we desire and seek knowledge and not merely true beliefs, 
provided it is granted that we are rightly interested at least in arriving at true beliefs. 
It would be odd at this point if someone continued to press the question of why 
someone who knows that p in a superior state, other things being equal, to someone 
who merely truly believes that p. We already have a perfectly good explanation of 
why we desire and seek knowledge of the answers to the questions that interest us, 
and not merely true beliefs about the answers; why think it will be possible, in 
addition, to identify features of knowledge in virtue of which the state of someone 
who knows is superior to the state of someone who merely truly believes? What is it 
that is meant to be justified or explained by reference to such features? There is no 
obvious answer to these questions. Note that the claim here is not that there are no 
respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief. The claim is only that, in 
advance of identifying specific respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true 
belief, the only general reason we have for thinking that it must be possible to do so 
is that this is required to answer the activity question. It seems to me, therefore, that 
the activity question should not only be distinguished from the comparative state 
question, but that it should also be regarded as the more basic question, in the 
following sense: insofar as we think that the comparative state question is one that 
we need to answer, this will be because we think that we need to answer that 
question in order to provide a satisfying response to the activity question.  
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The points I have just made are absolutely fundamental to the argument of this 
thesis, so I want to reiterate them in a slightly different way, elaborating in places.  
Another way into the issues here is to ask what is presupposed by the activity 
question and the comparative state question. The former question asks why we desire 
and seek knowledge, and not merely true beliefs, given that true belief is just as true, 
and apparently just as true, as knowledge. This question clearly presupposes that 
when we are interested in having the truth on some matter we are at least sometimes 
interested in having the truth, more specifically, in the manner of knowing the truth. 
This presupposition is difficult to deny. We frequently profess that we want to know 
things, from the trivial (e.g. ‘I want to know when the next train departs’) to the 
momentous (e.g. ‘I want to know who my real father is’). We also speak of wanting 
to work out/find out/discover/determine etc., whether…, or who…, or when…, or 
what…, or why…, or where…, or how…, and working out/finding 
out/discovering/determining the answer to a question of any of these forms is 
plausibly a matter of acquiring knowledge of the answer to that question.9 Given that 
we often express our desires and aims in more or less explicitly epistemic terms, it 
seems undeniable that we do in fact desire and seek knowledge of the answers to 
many questions. By contrast, the comparative state question presupposes something 
quite different. That question asks why a subject who knows that p is in a superior 
position, ceteris paribus, to a subject who merely truly believes that p. Obviously, 
this question presupposes that a subject who knows that p is in a superior position, 
ceteris paribus, to a subject who merely truly believes that p. Is this presupposition 
correct? It is not clear that we have any pretheoretical commitment to the truth of 
                                                 
9 I owe my formulation of this point to Soteriou (2013: 351). See that passage for further 
considerations that support the idea that, when a subject’s aim can be expressed by saying that he 
wants to work out/find out/discover/determine etc. the answer to some question, his aim is the 
acquisition of knowledge of the answer to that question. 
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this claim. Neither is there any obvious respect in which knowledge is superior to 
mere true belief, as the Platonic Socrates makes clear. Why, then, have philosophers 
tended to accept this presupposition without argument? In general, one way of 
explaining why an agent has X as his aim, rather than Y, is to identify respects in 
which X is superior to Y, given the agent’s broader objectives. I suspect that 
philosophers have assumed that the explanation of why we are interested in 
knowledge, and not merely in true belief, must conform to this pattern. Once this 
assumption is in place, the question of why we seek knowledge and not just true 
belief reduces to the question of why knowledge is superior to mere true belief. 
Hence, the tendency to accept the presupposition of the comparative state question, 
and also the failure to distinguish the comparative state question from the activity 
question. In principle, however, there are ways of explaining why an agent seeks X 
rather than Y that do not appeal to the idea that X is superior to Y. One way to do this, 
as I explained earlier, would be to demonstrate that it is impossible for an agent to 
merely seek Y without seeking X. This raises the possibility that we might solve the 
problem of why enquirers are interested in knowledge, and not just in true belief, 
without solving the ‘problem’ of why knowledge is superior to mere true belief. And 
this possibility invites a further, more radical, proposal. If, as I suggested, we have 
no pretheoretical commitment to the truth of the claim that knowledge is superior to 
mere true belief, and the only theoretical purpose for which this claim is required is 
to explain why knowledge rather than true belief is the aim of enquiry, then the fact 
that we can explain why knowledge is the aim of enquiry without appealing to its 
relative superiority leaves us free to reject the claim that it is superior without 
violating any of our intuitive beliefs. In fact, I do not think that we should reject the 
claim that knowledge is superior to mere true belief, because philosophers have 
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succeeded in identifying respects, albeit rather limited ones, in which knowing is 
better than merely truly believing. But I shall be arguing that the rather limited 
respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief do not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of why knowledge, rather than true belief, is the aim of 
enquiry. Thus, the traditional approach to the value of knowledge fails to identify the 
basic problem philosophers should be concerned with in this area, and has indeed 
distracted us from the real issues.  
To avoid misunderstanding, I must emphasize that I have not yet attempted to 
vindicate the claim that attention to the position of the enquirer is required to resolve 
philosophical puzzles about the value of knowledge. I have argued only that, beneath 
the traditional approach to the value of knowledge, embodied in the comparative 
state question, there lies a more basic problem about why, at least sometimes, 
knowledge, and not just true belief, is the aim of enquiry. The traditional approach, 
according to which this issue is to be resolved in a way that does not require 
attention to the position of the enquirer, remains on the table as one possible 
response to this problem; it therefore remains to be shown that this response is 
inadequate, and that the correct response is one that brings issues about the enquirer 
to the fore. To make further progress here, we need a deeper understanding of the 
thinking that lies behind the activity question. Why should the (alleged) facts that 
true belief is just as true, and just as useful, as knowledge, make our interest in 
knowledge at all puzzling? This question will be the focus of Chapter 1. 
3. Chapter Summaries 
It may be helpful, at this point, to provide the reader with a brief overview of the 
argument of the rest of this thesis.  
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Chapter 1 considers the activity question in more detail. The question challenges the 
rationality of seeking knowledge on the basis of considerations that purport to show 
that we ought to be interested only in arriving at true beliefs. In particular, true belief 
is claimed to be just as true, and just as useful, as knowledge. But why might these 
alleged facts about true belief be taken to impugn the rationality of seeking 
knowledge? The answer to this question is not obvious, and in Chapter 1 I identify 
two different ways in which they might be held to do so. The first, which can be 
traced to Williams’ discussion of the method of doubt in his book Descartes, is as 
follows. The enquirer is someone who is seeking the truth about the answer to a 
question. Trivially, true belief is just as true as knowledge. Therefore, the enquirer 
will have got what he wants if he merely arrives at a true belief about the answer to 
his question; why, then, should he ever want any more than that? Seductive as it 
might seem, I shall argue that this reasoning is badly flawed, and therefore does not 
pose a serious challenge to the rationality of pursuing knowledge. There is, however, 
another way in which the possibility of merely pursuing true beliefs might be taken 
to undermine the rationality of seeking knowledge. Knowledge is harder to come by 
than true belief. If true belief is just as good as knowledge, why should enquirers 
bother themselves with the more demanding objective? I present this challenge in the 
form of a paradox, which I refer to as ‘the problematic reasoning’. I spend the bulk 
of Chapter 1 arguing that various responses to the problematic reasoning are in fact 
inadequate, and that, by process of elimination, the right response is to argue that a 
certain principle of rationality on which it depends does not apply in the case of true 
belief and knowledge. To see why the principle does not apply in this case, however, 
it is necessary to first acquire a better understanding of the nature of belief itself.  
24 
 
I take up this task in Chapter 2. My investigation of the nature of belief occurs in the 
context of concerns about the aim of enquiry. This point is significant. An enquirer is 
a cognitively sophisticated subject. He is capable of recognizing that he does not 
have the truth about the answer to a certain question, and of adopting purposive 
means in order to obtain it. It follows from this, I shall argue, that the enquirer is 
capable of engaging in practical reasoning and theoretical deliberation (capacities 
which in turn imply that he is able to make conscious judgements and decisions), and 
also that the enquirer is capable of engaging in forms of acceptance besides belief. 
Once it is clear that we are dealing with a sophisticated kind of believer, certain 
issues about the nature of belief come to the fore. In particular: how are the beliefs of 
an enquirer related to his conscious thinking, and how are we to distinguish belief 
from other forms of acceptance that the enquirer is capable of engaging in? In 
relation to the first issue, I argue that having a disposition to consciously judge that p 
is necessary for an enquirer to have the outright (as opposed to the repressed) belief 
that p. This is relevant to the activity question, because the kind of belief that is 
relevant to that question is precisely outright belief. In considering the conditions 
under which someone who is enquiring into the question of whether p will acquire 
an outright belief about whether p, then, one thing it is relevant to consider is the 
conditions under which they will acquire a state that involves a disposition to 
consciously judge whether p. Relevant to this issue, in turn, is the question of what it 
is to judge that p. The nature of conscious judgement is far from obvious, but an 
apparently secure starting point is the thought that judging that p contrasts with other 
ways of consciously affirming the proposition that p, such as supposing that p for the 
sake of argument. How, then, should we distinguish judging that p in one’s 
reasoning from supposing that p for the sake of argument? One simple proposal is 
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that judgement, unlike supposition, involves the acquisition/manifestation of the 
corresponding belief, but I argue that this proposal cannot explain why it is hard to 
make sense of the idea that a subject might be in error about the nature of his own 
conscious thinking. I consider and reject Shah and Velleman’s (2005) claim that 
different ways of consciously affirming a proposition are to be distinguished by 
appealing to the intention with which the subject affirms a proposition. I go on to 
argue that, in order to explain why it is hard to make sense of the idea that a subject 
might be in error about the nature of his own conscious thinking, we should appeal 
to Soteriou’s (2013) proposal that when the subject supposes that p for the sake of 
argument, the constraint of treating p as true in his reasoning is self-imposed. This is 
not the case when the subject judges that p in his reasoning. This is also relevant to 
distinguishing the state of believing that p from the state a subject is in when he is 
merely assuming that p for practical purposes. Although a subject who is merely 
assuming that p for practical purposes is disposed to act as though p is the case, and 
to plan on the assumption that p, when he plans on the assumption that p the 
constraint of treating p as true in his reasoning is self-imposed. This is not the case 
when the subject believes that p. A subject who believes that p is disposed to plan on 
the assumption that p by judging that p in his reasoning, where this involves treating 
the constraint of treating p as true as a non-self-imposed constraint.  
Chapter 3 considers the nature of guessing. Guessing has not received much 
attention in the philosophical literature. However, Roy Sorensen (1984) proposes an 
analysis, and more recently David Owens (2003) has criticized the claim that belief 
aims at the truth by appealing to the idea that guessing also aims at the truth. One 
objective of Chapter 3 is to uncover inadequacies in these ideas. Thus, I argue that 
satisfying the conditions identified by Sorensen is insufficient for a subject to guess 
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that p, and also that satisfying his two main conditions—the ‘nondomination 
condition’ and the condition that believing is incompatible with guessing—is 
unnecessary for guessing. Furthermore, it is possible, contrary to Owens, for a 
subject to guess that p without the purpose of guessing truly. Another objective of 
Chapter 3 is to suggest how we might improve upon these ideas. One proposal I 
make here that we should conceive of the relationship between guessing and 
knowing at least partly in higher-order terms: when a subject guesses that p, he 
believes himself not to be answering that p knowledgeably, or at least suspends 
judgement about whether he is answering that p knowledgeably. These higher-order 
attitudes are absent when the subject judges that p. Thus, one difference between 
guessing that p and judging that p consists in the subject’s take on the epistemic 
status of his affirmation that p: when he judges that p, there is at least a purely 
negative respect in which he takes himself to know that p: he neither believes 
himself not to be affirming that p knowledgeably, nor suspends judgement about 
whether he is affirming that p knowledgeably.  
Chapter 4 returns to the problematic reasoning set out in Chapter 1, with the aim of 
showing how the claims about belief and judgement made in Chapters 2 and 3 can be 
used to explain why that form of argument cannot be used to show that an enquirer 
ought at most to adopt the aim of arriving at true beliefs. Two claims are particularly 
important here. The first is that having the outright belief that p involves being 
disposed to judge that p. The second is that when a subject judges that p, he neither 
believes himself not to be affirming that p knowledgeably, nor suspends judgement 
about whether he is affirming that p knowledgeably. I argue that a subject who is 
capable of engaging in enquiry is a subject who has the capacity to adopt higher-
order attitudes about his epistemic standing—e.g. to hold beliefs about what he does 
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and doesn’t know—and that in a subject of this kind, the absence of such attitudes 
when the subject affirms that p suffices for the subject to take himself to know that p. 
In other words, the absence of certain negative higher-order epistemic attitudes is 
sufficient for an enquirer to manifest a positive higher-order attitude concerning his 
epistemic standing with respect to a proposition he has affirmed. Since outright 
belief involves a disposition to judge that p, it follows, I argue, that an enquirer will 
not have arrived at so much as an outright belief about the answer to his question 
until he takes himself to have found out the answer. This, I suggest, is the real reason 
why the enquirer cannot make life easier for himself merely by going after true 
beliefs. Even if he were only to adopt the aim of arriving at true beliefs, he would not 
have achieved his aim until he took himself to have achieved the more ambitious aim 
of knowledge. The correct response to the activity question, then, does not lie in the 
idea that knowledge is superior to mere true belief. The correct response, rather, is 
that, contrary to Williams, it is an error to think that an enquirer’s interest in truth is 
basically only an interest in arriving at true beliefs, and, contrary to the problematic 
reasoning, it is an error to think that the enquirer can avail himself of more efficient 
methods by adopting only the aim of true belief.  
4. Summary 
In this chapter I have introduced the central idea of this thesis, which is that we need 
to pay attention to the position of an enquirer to resolve philosophical puzzles about 
the value of knowledge. I approached this idea by outlining a somewhat similar 
proposal that has been made by Bernard Williams. According to Williams, 
philosophical theorizing about the nature of knowledge has been led into error by a 
tendency to focus on the examiner situation, and the way to remedy this is to draw 
attention instead to the position of an enquirer. Although there appeared to be serious 
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objections to Williams’ proposal, these objections do not undermine the suggestion 
that attention to the position of an enquirer is required to resolve philosophical 
puzzles about the value of knowledge, because issues about the value of knowledge 
are clearly distinct from (though related to) issues about the nature of knowledge. 
But how might considerations about enquiry be relevant to questions about the value 
of knowledge? I argued that it is important to distinguish the comparative state 
question that usually receives attention in philosophical discussions from what I 
called the activity question. The comparative state question asks why knowing that p 
is better than merely truly believing that p, whereas the activity question asks why 
enquirers desire and seek knowledge instead of merely caring about true beliefs. 
That these two questions are distinct is shown by the fact that an answer to the latter 
question needn’t amount to an answer to the former. Furthermore, I argued that the 
activity question is the more basic question, in the sense that the only good general 
reason to accept the presupposition of the comparative state question, that 
knowledge is superior to mere true belief, is that this presupposition provides the 
only plausible response to the activity question. The basic problem in this area, then, 
is one that concerns enquirers, and even if tackling the comparative state question is 
one way of tackling the activity question, it is not clear that it is the only way of 
tackling that question. The next chapter undertakes a more detailed analysis of the 
activity question, with a view to clarifying what further options we have in 
responding to it.     
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Chapter 1 
The Activity Question 
In the Introduction I argued that philosophical reflection about the value of 
knowledge should begin with a question about enquiry: why do enquirers want to 
know the answers to questions, and not merely to arrive at some ‘lesser’ type of 
cognitive state with respect to the answers, e.g. that of having true beliefs about the 
answers? I contrasted this question, which I called ‘the activity question’, with the 
question of why it is better to know that p than to be in some ‘lesser’ cognitive state 
with respect to the proposition that p, e.g. that of having a mere true belief that p. I 
called this the ‘comparative state question’. The traditional approach to issues about 
the value of knowledge focuses on the comparative state question, but this is a 
mistake: the activity question identifies the more fundamental issue, and tackling the 
comparative state question is only one way of tackling the activity question. How 
else, then, might we respond to the activity question? To answer this question it is 
necessary first to know exactly why the assumption that true belief is just as true and 
just as useful as knowledge might be taken as a reason to think that enquirers should 
at most be in the business of seeking true beliefs. There is more than one line of 
thought that might be at work here. The main aim of this chapter is to present two 
different strands of thinking that might be operative at this point, and to indicate how 
we should respond to them.  
Here is the plan. § 1 identifies and rejects an argument, found in Williams’ 
discussion of the method of doubt in his book Descartes, that might lead someone to 
press the activity question. § 2 underlines the verdict that this argument is 
30 
 
problematic by showing that there are apparently insuperable obstacles in the way of 
an adequate solution to the puzzle it generates. § 3 identifies an alternative 
motivation for pressing the activity question. I express this motivation in the form of 
a paradoxical argument that purports to establish the conclusion that it is rationally 
sub-optimal for an enquirer to seek knowledge of whether p, given that he could 
merely seek a true belief about whether p. § 4 argues that three responses to the 
problematic reasoning are inadequate; in particular, I argue that it is hard to see how 
we can come up with an answer to the comparative state question capable of 
defusing the problematic reasoning. § 5 identifies a more serious difficulty with the 
problematic reasoning. In general terms, the difficulty is that the problematic 
reasoning invokes a principle of rationality whose application depends on the 
satisfaction of conditions that may not be met in the case of true belief and 
knowledge. I conclude that the right response to the reasoning is indeed to press this 
kind of challenge.  
1. Williams’ Challenge 
The version of the activity question I wish to focus on is the following: why do 
enquirers sometimes want to know the answers to questions, given that true belief is 
just as true, and apparently just as useful, as knowledge? So baldly put, the question 
invites the retort, ‘Well, why shouldn’t they?’ This response, though flippant, brings 
out the point that, if someone is to be doing something philosophically interesting in 
pressing the activity question, he must have in mind some consideration, or set of 
considerations, which suggest that an enquirer should at most be interested in 
arriving at true beliefs. To answer the activity question in a satisfactory way, 
therefore, it is necessary for us first to know what these considerations are. I will not 
try to anticipate every possible consideration that might motivate someone here. I 
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shall merely identify, and respond to, what seem to me to be the two most obvious 
kinds of consideration that might be at work.  
The first kind of consideration is raised by Bernard Williams in his discussion of the 
method of doubt in his book Descartes. There, he considers the question of ‘what 
reason Descartes has for regarding this unobvious strategy as straightforwardly the 
rational course’ (2005: 22). After all, Williams reasons, ‘we constantly want the truth 
about various matters, but hardly ever demand the indubitable’ (ibid.). In pursuing 
this question, Williams suggests that we should begin by considering the question of 
whether a subject who wants the truth should want so much as knowledge; if this can 
be established, ‘then anything peculiar in Descartes’s strategy will lie in a second 
step, from the search for knowledge to the search for certainty’ (ibid.: 23). Williams 
proposes that we should approach this question in the following way: 
Let us take a person, call him ‘A’, who is in the most primitive situation of 
wanting the truth. He has no elaborate or reflective demands—it is not, for 
instance, that he wants to acquire or found a science (as Descartes does, or at 
least will want to do). He merely wants the truth on certain questions. Such 
questions can of course take many forms, ‘when…?’, ‘who…?’, etc.; we 
shall simplify, and take A as in each case wanting the true answer to a 
question of the form whether p. What exactly is it that A wants? What state 
does he want to arrive at? He wants, at the very least, to have a belief on the 
question whether p, and that belief to be true. That is to say, he wants at least 
to be in this state: 
(i) if p, A believes that p, and if not p, A believes that not-p. 
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He wants at least to be in that state; why should he want any more? (2005: 
23) 
In this passage Williams apparently argues as follows. The enquirer is someone who 
wants the truth about the answer to some question. Trivially, true belief is just as true 
as knowledge. Insofar as all the enquirer wants is to have the truth, then, he will have 
got what he wants even if he arrives at no more than a true belief about the answer to 
his question. Why, then, should an enquirer ever want to know the answer to a 
question? 
The correct response to this question is to challenge the assumption that an enquirer 
who wants the truth about whether p will have got what he wants if he arrives at a 
mere true belief about whether p. To see what is objectionable about this assumption, 
we need to begin by considering the question of what the enquirer wants in wanting 
the truth about whether p. An initial answer to this question is that what he wants is 
to have or possess the truth. However, talk of ‘having’ or ‘being in possession of’ the 
truth about whether p is metaphorical. How are we to specify what the enquirer 
wants in literal terms? The most natural way of understanding such talk is, I think, 
epistemic. Relevant here is Williams’ remark that ‘[o]rdinary speech…effortlessly 
expresses the thought that A wants the truth on the question ‘is p true or not?’ in the 
form of saying that A wants to know whether p’ (2005: 23). But this interpretation 
clearly won’t do for the purposes of the present argument for the claim that the 
enquirer will have got what he wants if he arrives at a mere true belief about whether 
p. The argument now reads as follows: ‘The enquirer is someone who wants to know 
the answer to a question. Trivially, true belief is just as true as knowledge. Insofar as 
all the enquirer wants is to know the answer to a question, then, he will have got 
what he wants even if he arrives at no more than a true belief about the answer to his 
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question’. On this interpretation, far from establishing the conclusion that the 
enquirer will have got what he wants if he arrives at a mere true belief about whether 
p, the premise actually contradicts that conclusion, provided we assume that true 
belief is insufficient for knowledge. An alternative specification of what the enquirer 
wants in wanting the truth about whether p is clearly required.  
It is not difficult to find one. The point that true belief is just as true as knowledge 
invites us to understand talk of ‘wanting the truth’ in a more minimal way: the 
enquirer is someone who merely wants to arrive at a true belief about the answer to 
his question. When this interpretation of ‘wanting the truth’ is plugged into 
Williams’ argument, it reads as follows: ‘The enquirer wants a true belief about the 
answer to some question. Trivially, true belief is just as true as knowledge. 
Therefore, the enquirer will have got what he wants even if he arrives at no more 
than a true belief about the answer to his question.’ It seems impossible to disagree 
with this argument, although, heroically, Williams tries to refute it. The problem 
now, however, is that the argument fails to generate a puzzle about why an enquirer 
should sometimes want to know the answer to a question. If all the enquirer wants is 
to arrive at a true belief about whether p, why on earth should he want to know 
whether p? Haven’t we just built it into the case that he would be satisfied by a mere 
true belief?  
There is no need to explain why someone who wants the truth about whether p wants 
to know whether p. The correct response to this challenge is ask what the enquirer 
wants in wanting the truth about whether p. If what the enquirer wants is to know 
whether p, then it is false that the enquirer will have got what he wants if he merely 
arrives at some state that falls short of knowledge, hence no puzzle arises about why 
he wants to know. If, on the other hand, what the enquirer wants is merely to arrive 
34 
 
at a true belief about whether p, then there is no reason to think that he does want to 
know, hence no puzzle can arise about why he does. Williams’ challenge should be 
rejected. 
Having raised the question of why an enquirer who would be satisfied, on the face of 
it, with a mere true belief about whether p would not in fact be satisfied with less 
than knowledge of whether p, Williams goes on to provide an answer. Although I 
take this to be a bad question, for the reasons I have indicated, I nevertheless wish to 
indicate why I think that Williams’ answer is inadequate, for two main reasons. The 
first is that considering Williams’ answer raises a number of points of philosophical 
interest. The second is that it is hard to see what other kind of strategy, aside from 
the one Williams pursues, someone might employ in trying to answer this question. 
The fact that there are apparently decisive objections to Williams’ answer therefore 
suggests that no explanation of why an enquirer wants to know, given that he would 
be satisfied with mere true belief, can be given. This underlines the point that the 
argument that leads Williams to attempt to provide an explanation of this must be 
flawed.  
2. Williams’ Solution 
As we saw, Williams begins by introducing ‘A’ as the name for an enquirer ‘who is 
in the most primitive situation of wanting the truth’ (2005: 23) on certain questions. 
For simplicity, Williams assumes that A’s question is of the form ‘Is p true or not?’, 
and he goes on to suggest that what A wants, at the very least, is to have a true belief 
about whether p—that is, to be in the following state of affairs: 
(i) if p, A believes that p, and if not p, A believes that not-p. 
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The puzzle is therefore to explain why someone who is initially specified only as 
wanting a true belief about whether p will in fact want to know whether p. 
In Williams’ words, the ‘basic point here…concerns the methods available to A to 
get even into state (i)’ (ibid.: 24). As an enquirer, A wants, and not merely wishes, to 
be in state (i); given that he has no reason to believe that he will get into state (i) just 
by waiting and hoping, ‘he must adopt purposive means to get into (i)’ (ibid.). What, 
in general outline, do such means involve? Here Williams contrasts the situation of 
an enquirer seeking a true belief about whether p with the situation of a flint 
collector who wants to acquire a collection of prehistoric flints, and only prehistoric 
flints. A procedure the flint collector might employ is to collect flints 
indiscriminately and then determine which, if any, of the flints he has collected are 
prehistoric. But ‘the analogous process with acquiring true beliefs would be not just 
inefficient, but incomprehensible’, because ‘to acquire a belief is already to assume 
an answer to the question of whether it is true’ (ibid.: 25). Thus, ‘a method which A 
uses as an enquirer to get into state (i) must be a method of acquiring beliefs which 
itself makes it likely that the beliefs A acquires by it will be true ones; or, 
equivalently, is such that he is unlikely to acquire beliefs by that method unless they 
are true’ (ibid.). As shorthand for this, we can say that A must try to use a reliable 
method of acquiring beliefs. The requirement that A’s method of acquiring a true 
belief about whether p should be reliable is itself equivalent to the following 
requirement on A’s belief about whether p: that it should be ‘produced in such a way 
that one is unlikely to acquire beliefs in that way unless they are true’ (ibid.). 
Williams dubs this property of beliefs, conceived of as states of particular 
individuals, ‘E’. If A succeeds in acquiring a true belief about whether p by means of 
the kind he must try to use, A will be in the following state: 
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(iv) if p, A believes that p, and if not-p, A believes that not-p, and in either 
case A’s belief has the property E. 
Furthermore, Williams claims, ‘we can put his [A’s] wants together’ (ibid.: 26)—that 
is, his desire to be in (i) and his desire to use a reliable method to acquire a true 
belief about whether p—to arrive at the conclusion that (iv), and not merely (i), is the 
state of affairs the enquirer wants to end up in. Suppose that p is in fact the true 
answer to A’s question. It follows that if A is successful he will be in the following 
state of affairs: 
 (v) A truly believes that p, and his belief has the property E. 
Is being in (v) sufficient for A to know that p? ‘If so’, Williams says, ‘we will have 
shown how it is that in wanting the truth, A wants to know’ (ibid.: 27). Williams 
stresses that the notion of knowledge in play, unlike Descartes’, is ‘an absolutely 
minimal everyday conception of knowledge’ (ibid.), and plausibly does not require A 
to know that he knows that p, to feel specially certain that p is true, or even to have 
conscious reasons for believing that p. Nevertheless, Williams thinks that the 
insufficiency of (v) for knowing that p, even in an absolutely minimal everyday 
sense of the term, is demonstrated by Gettier cases.10 Thus, the present argument has 
not yet succeeded in explaining why, in wanting the truth about whether p, A wants 
to know whether p. 
The issue we are now confronted with resolves itself into two questions: (a) what, in 
addition to being in (v), is required for A to know that p, and (b), assuming that we 
can specify the additional condition required for knowledge, is it the case that an 
enquirer who wants the truth about whether p will want to have a true belief about 
                                                 
10 See Gettier (1963).  
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whether p, possessing the property E, that satisfies this condition? Williams does not 
attempt to provide a detailed answer to (a). He says only that, in broad terms, the 
additional factor required for knowledge absent in Gettier cases is that ‘the truth of 
the belief be non-accidental relative to the method or way by which it [was] 
produced’ (ibid.: 30). A more detailed specification of the requirement would of 
course be desirable, but for the purposes of his argument Williams takes it to be 
unnecessary: however exactly it is spelt out, A will want his true belief about 
whether p to satisfy this further condition: 
While what he wants are true beliefs, as a conscious enquirer in a non-
magical world [A] has to commit himself to a policy of acquiring them in 
reliable ways. Accidentally true beliefs, though they might seem welcome 
merely as true beliefs, are in fact only a sub-class of beliefs to which his 
methods are irrelevant; relative to his strategies of enquiry, they might as 
well have been false, and this state of affairs he cannot want. (ibid.) 
If this is right, we can now say that A wants to arrive at state (v), but where ‘E’ is 
interpreted as the property of a belief’s having been ‘appropriately produced in a 
way such that beliefs produced in that way are generally true’ (ibid.: 31), i.e. 
produced in such a way that the truth of the belief is non-accidental relative to the 
use of the method. Williams suggests that, so understood, ‘(v) surely is sufficient for 
knowledge’. Thus, ‘starting merely from the idea of pursuing truth in a non-magical 
world, and so of the truth-seeker’s using methods of enquiry, we do arrive at the 
conclusion that the search for truth is the search for knowledge’ (ibid.).  
Although Williams’ argument raises a number of issues, its central contention is 
clear enough: a rational enquirer who wants a true belief about whether p must want 
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to have a true belief about whether p that satisfies certain further conditions, such 
that a true belief about whether p that satisfies those conditions necessarily 
constitutes knowledge of whether p. Before I consider this contention, however, I 
want to make a more basic point about the argument which is connected with the 
concern I raised, in the previous section, about whether the problem Williams sets 
himself is well motivated.  
Following his initial set up—i.e. the introduction of A as an enquirer who wants the 
truth on a question of the form ‘Is p true or not?’—Williams’ first move is to claim 
that, in wanting the truth about whether p, A wants at the very least to arrive at a true 
belief about whether p. I have already objected to this idea on the grounds that it is 
not clear why we should specify what A wants in a way that falls short of him 
wanting to know whether p. It is worth noting, however, that one can also object to 
this idea from the opposite direction: why should we specify what A wants as so 
much as a true belief about whether p? It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which a subject who ‘wants the truth about whether p’ would be satisfied with less 
than a true belief. For example, a contestant in a quiz show might want the truth 
about whether p in the more specific sense of wanting to give the true answer to the 
question of whether p. But in order to give the true answer she doesn’t need to have 
a true belief about the answer, for she can give the true answer by correctly guessing 
whether p. Correctly guessing whether p does not require the acquisition of 
knowledge of, or a true belief about, whether p. (I will be discussing this kind of 
guessing in more detail in Chapter 3.) If this is right, then it is false that a subject 
who is described only as wanting the truth about whether p must be specified as 
wanting at least a true belief about whether p. 
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The effect of this objection is to reinforce the dilemma, raised in the previous 
section, about how we should specify A’s desire to have the truth about whether p. If 
we wish to say, with Williams, that what A wants is at least to have a true belief 
about whether p, we now need to explain not only why we should not specify A’s 
want as a desire to know whether p, but also why we should not specify A’s want as 
a desire to correctly guess whether p. And if we should not specify A’s desire merely 
as a desire to correctly guess whether p, why should we stop short of specifying it as 
a desire to know whether p?  
Even if we are convinced of the arbitrary nature of the task Williams sets himself, 
we can still ask whether he manages to complete that task successfully. Does he 
succeed in showing that a rational enquirer who wants a true belief about whether p 
must want to have a true belief about whether p that satisfies certain further 
conditions, such that a true belief about whether p that satisfies those conditions 
necessarily constitutes knowledge of whether p? Williams’ argument for this claim 
relies on the assumption that, since A is an enquirer and thus genuinely wants (and 
not merely wishes) to arrive at a true belief about whether p, A ‘must’ adopt 
purposive means to acquire a true belief about whether p. However, there does not 
appear to be any significant sense in which a subject who wants a true belief about 
whether p, and who has no reason to believe that he will arrive at one just by waiting 
and hoping, ‘must’ adopt purposive means in order to arrive at one. This is so even if 
we suppose, as seems plausible, that desiring that p disposes the subject to behave in 
ways that he believes are conducive to making p true. We often do adopt purposive 
means to obtain the things we desire, but this is not a matter of binding necessity. 
For example, consistently with my wanting it to be the case that p I may recognize 
that were I to try to make it the case that p then other aims I have would be 
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jeopardised. This might be because I recognize that devoting time and resources to 
making it the case that p would compromise the time and resources I can devote to 
other objectives (think of the choice a sportswoman might make to focus on just one 
of the sports she excels at), or because I recognize that, were it to be the case that p, 
other objectives of mine would be undermined or put at risk (if I eat the ice cream 
then it is less likely that I will succeed in losing weight). The recognition that 
adopting purposive means to realize one of my desires would jeopardise other aims I 
have in either of these ways might lead me to suppress that desire, so that I don’t act 
on it, but suppressing a desire in this sense does not make it go away. Thus, it seems 
perfectly consistent with my having a certain desire that, although I am disposed to 
act on it, I suppress this disposition and do not adopt purposive means to bring about 
the desired state of affairs. This needn’t involve any irrationality on my part: on the 
contrary, the kind of self-control I exhibit when I suppress one of my desires in order 
to focus my efforts on other ends that I value more highly is often an expression of 
rationality.  
We can avoid this objection by supposing that A not only wants to have a true belief 
about whether p, but has decided to arrive at a true belief about whether p—or at 
least to try to do so—and has set about adopting means of arriving at one. Must A 
now want to arrive at a true belief about whether p in such a way that it constitutes 
knowledge of whether p? It is here, I think, that we encounter the fatal flaw in 
Williams’ argumentative strategy. Suppose that A must indeed try to use a reliable 
method, and, moreover, one that is sufficiently reliable for a true belief about 
whether p produced by that method to constitute knowledge of whether p, provided 
that the anti-Gettier condition is also satisfied. Does it follow that we can ‘put his 
two wants together’ and says that his objective is to arrive at true belief about 
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whether p that was produced by a reliable method—i.e. that his objective is to be in 
state of affairs (iv)? The problem with this inference is that A is interested in using a 
reliable method only as a means of arriving at a true belief about whether p. If I 
desire something merely as a means to some further end, it does not follow that what 
I desire is to arrive at the end by those means. Intuitively, if I fail to use the means 
but still get the end I will be perfectly satisfied with the outcome, for I was interested 
in the means only as a means to the end.  
An example reinforces the general point that arriving at an end by reliable means 
confers no additional value on the end: 
Imagine two great cups of coffee identical in every relevant respect—they 
look the same, taste the same, smell the same, are of the same quality, and so 
on. Clearly, we value great cups of coffee. Moreover, given that we value 
great cups of coffee, it follows that we also value reliable coffee-making 
machines—i.e. machines which regularly produce good coffee. Notice, 
however, that once we’ve got the great coffee, then we don’t care whether it 
was produced by a reliable coffee-making machine…In order to see this, note 
that if one were told that only one of the great identical cups of coffee before 
one had been produced by a reliable coffee-making machine, this would have 
no bearing at all on the issue of which cup one preferred; one would still be 
indifferent on this score. (Pritchard 2010: 9)11 
Precisely the same point appears to apply to A. Even if he must aim to use a reliable 
method to arrive at a true belief about whether p, it does not follow that his aim is to 
arrive at a true belief about whether p by a reliable method. If this is correct, then no 
                                                 
11 Pritchard’s discussion at this point follows Zagzebski (2003), who also uses a coffee-based 
example—specifically, an espresso.  
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argument of the kind Williams advocates can possibly succeed. Considerations about 
the kind of means a rational agent would have to use to achieve a certain end cannot 
be used to justify an augmented conception of his end.  
In this section I have made three main critical points about Williams’ argument. The 
first was that it is not clear why we should specify A’s desire to have the truth about 
whether p as a desire for so much as a true belief about whether p. This point is 
connected with the concerns I raised in the previous section about whether the 
problem Williams addresses is well motivated. The second point was that it is not the 
case that a subject who merely desires a certain objective ‘must’ adopt purpose 
means to obtain that objective. I suggested, on Williams’ behalf, that we might avoid 
this difficulty by specifying that A does not merely want a true belief about whether 
p, but has decided to (try to) arrive at a true belief about whether p. The third point 
was that there is, in any case, a fundamental flaw in the argumentative strategy 
Williams employs. It cannot be inferred from the fact that an agent must pursue an 
end by means of a certain type that his objective is to achieve the end by means of 
that type. The assumption that this kind of inference is legitimate is integral to 
Williams’ argument. Since it is hard to see how we might try to solve the problem 
Williams sets for us other than by appealing to an inference of this kind, it appears 
that this problem is insoluble. It is therefore fortunate that the line of thought that 
leads to this problem is badly flawed.  
3. The Problematic Reasoning 
The point that there are ways of having or possessing the truth besides knowing 
cannot be used to show that a truth-seeker will have got what he wants even if he 
arrives at a state that falls short of knowledge. There is therefore no need to explain 
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why an enquirer should want to know given that, on the face of it, he will have got 
what he wants even if arrives at only (e.g.) a true belief. However, the point that 
there are non-epistemic ways of specifying what the enquirer wants in wanting the 
truth raises the possibility of another kind of challenge to the rationality of seeking 
knowledge. Why should an enquirer ever want to have the truth in the manner of 
knowing the truth? Why doesn’t he restrict himself to aiming at the truth in more 
modest ways?  
Once again, put so baldly, the question invites the retort, ‘Well, why shouldn’t he?’ 
The word ‘modest’ hints at an answer to this question. Knowledge, one might think, 
is difficult to attain; it is easier to come by true beliefs. However, it is difficult to 
identify respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief. Why, then, 
should an enquirer bother himself with the acquisition of knowledge? Why not make 
life easier by sticking to the simpler task of acquiring true beliefs? This argument is 
crude as things stand, but it should already be clear that it does not depend on the 
assumption that all a truth-seeker basically wants is to arrive at true beliefs. An 
analogy helps to bring this out. Imagine an archer confronted with two targets, one 
significantly further away, and so harder to hit, than the other. Asking Williams’ 
question is a bit like asking, ‘Why should the archer want to hit the target that’s 
further away, given that he will have got what he wants if he only hits the closer 
target?’ This question is odd: if all he wants to do is hit the closer target, why should 
the archer want to hit the one that’s further away? Asking the current question, by 
contrast, is more like asking, ‘Why should the archer shoot at the target that’s further 
way, instead of merely shooting at the one that’s closer, given that hitting either of 
them is sufficient to win the competition?’ This question does not depend on the 
assumption that all the archer basically wants is to hit the closer target. It relies only 
44 
 
on the assumption that, relative to the archer’s broader objective of winning the 
competition, hitting the closer target is just as good as hitting the further target. The 
analogue of this assumption in the case of true belief and knowledge isn’t obviously 
false. As the Platonic Socrates points out, it isn’t easy to identify respects in which 
knowledge is any better than true belief relative to our broader objectives. True 
belief appears to be just as good as knowledge for any practical purpose.  
Before I go any further, I want to set out the argument for the claim that enquirers 
should restrict themselves to aiming at true beliefs in more detail. The argument 
relies on two basic assumptions. The first is that true belief is just as good, given the 
enquirer’s broader objectives, as knowledge. The second is that it is more difficult 
for the enquirer to arrive at knowledge than true beliefs. What is the justification for 
the premise that it is more difficult for an enquirer to arrive at knowledge than at true 
beliefs? It is natural here to appeal to the claim that truly believing that p is 
necessary but insufficient for knowing that p. It can then be argued that because 
knowledge is, in this sense, a more demanding condition than true belief, it is more 
difficult for the enquirer to bring about. There is then a further general assumption, 
to the effect that if objective X is just as good as objective Y, but objective Y is harder 
to achieve than objective X, then the agent shouldn’t aim to achieve objective Y; he 
should, at most, aim to achieve objective X. If these assumptions hold, it follows that 
it is rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to adopt the aim of acquiring knowledge; 
at most, he ought to adopt the aim of arriving at true beliefs. 
Since I will be discussing this argument extensively in what follows, it will be 
helpful to have it set out in a formal way. I will refer to it as ‘the problematic 
reasoning’, to indicate that its conclusion is one that we have at least prima facie 
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reason to reject. (Following Williams, I will assume, for simplicity’s sake, that the 
enquirer wants the truth on a question of the form ‘Is it the case that p?’.) 
The Problematic Reasoning 
1. Having a true belief about whether p is just as good for the enquirer as 
knowing whether p, because true belief is just as true, and just as useful, as 
knowledge. 
2. Having a true belief about whether p is necessary but insufficient for 
knowing whether p. 
3. Therefore (from (2)), it is more difficult for an enquirer to arrive at 
knowledge of whether p than it is for an enquirer to arrive at a true belief 
about whether p. 
4. If objective X is just as good as objective Y, but it is more difficult for the 
agent to achieve objective Y than objective X, then it is rationally sub-optimal 
for the agent to adopt Y as his aim; he should, at most, adopt X as his 
objective. 
5. Given (1), (3) and (4), it is rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to adopt the 
aim of arriving at knowledge of whether p; he should, at most, adopt the aim 
of arriving at a true belief about whether p.  
Notice that the conclusion does not merely say that it is sometimes rationally sub-
optimal to adopt the aim of acquiring knowledge. It is not obvious that this claim 
contradicts anything we ought to accept. When knowledge is not in the offing it is 
sometimes sensible to hazard a guess. Rather, the conclusion is that it is always 
rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to seek knowledge of the answer to a question. 
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This claim does seem at odds with what we naturally believe, for it implies that 
ordinary human beings violate standards of rationality whenever they search for 
knowledge. If we wish to avoid this conclusion, some way to resist the problematic 
reasoning must be found.  
We have various options here. The reasoning assumes that having a true belief about 
whether p is just as good as knowing whether p, and thus that a subject who knows 
that p is not in a superior state to a subject who merely truly believes that p. Thus, 
those who take themselves to have a solution to the comparative state question will 
reject premise (1). But it is important to appreciate that this is only one way of 
responding to the reasoning. An alternative response would be to reject the premise 
that having a true belief about whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing 
whether p. One might also object to the inference from (2) to (3), or to the principle 
of rationality expressed by premise (4). 
In the next section I will argue that we cannot adequately respond to the problematic 
reasoning by rejecting premises (1) or (2), or by arguing that the inference from (2) 
to (3) is invalid. This is not because I think that these premises are entirely 
unobjectionable, or because I think that (3) is a straightforward logical consequence 
of (2); on the contrary, I shall be arguing, regarding (1), that there is a respect in 
which knowledge is superior to mere true belief, and that the inference from (2) to 
(3) is clearly invalid. However, though correct, these objections fail to go to the heart 
of the matter; it is possible to modify the reasoning so that it avoids these objections 
whilst still entailing that, in a worryingly wide range of cases, it is rationally sub-
optimal for the enquirer to engage in the pursuit of knowledge.  
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4. Some Inadequate Responses to the Problematic Reasoning 
4.1 Is True Belief Just as Good as Knowledge? 
The first premise of the problematic reasoning asserts that having a true belief about 
whether p is just as good as knowing whether p. Some will object that this claim is 
false. According to them, it is possible identify respects in which knowledge is 
superior to mere true belief, and once this is appreciated the problematic reasoning 
ceases to pose a challenge to the rationality of our interest in knowledge. Obviously, 
I cannot pretend to have anticipated every possible answer to the comparative state 
question, or even to have studied all of the extant proposals about its solution. Thus, 
I certainly cannot prove that there is no solution to the comparative state problem 
that defuses the problematic reasoning. All I shall try to show is that one prominent 
response to the comparative state question—Williamson’s (2000) elaboration of 
Plato’s original solution—is inadequate when it is considered as a response to the 
problematic reasoning. Furthermore, it fails for a reason that casts doubt more 
generally on the idea that we can adequately respond to the problematic reasoning by 
denying its first premise.  
Williamson’s proposal refines the old Platonic suggestion that knowledge is superior 
to mere true belief because it is more stable. Plato introduces the proposal using the 
metaphor of the statues of Daedalus, which run away unless they are tied down: 
SOCRATES:  There’s as little point in paying a lot of money for an 
unrestrained statue of his as there is for a runaway slave: it doesn’t stay put. 
But Daedalus’ pieces are so beautiful that they’re worth a great deal if they’re 
anchored. What am I getting at? I mean this to be an analogy for true beliefs. 
As long as they stay put, true beliefs too constitute a thing of beauty and do 
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nothing but good. The problem is that they tend not to stay for long; they 
escape from the human soul and this reduces their value, unless they’re 
anchored by working out the reason. And this anchoring is recollection, 
Meno, my friend, as we agreed earlier. When true beliefs are anchored, they 
become pieces of knowledge and they become stable. That’s why knowledge 
is more valuable than true belief, and the difference between the two is that 
knowledge has been anchored. (97e–98a) 
The account of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief that Plato 
offers in this passage—that the subject who knows has ‘worked out the reason’—is 
obscure, but the basic idea that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief 
because it is more durable or stable seems clear enough independently of further 
elaboration of that proposal. At this point, then, there are two questions we need to 
consider. Firstly, is it true, as Plato says, that knowledge is more stable—i.e. less 
likely to be lost or extinguished—than mere true belief? Secondly, if knowledge is 
more stable than mere true belief, does this identify a respect in which knowledge is 
superior to mere true belief that undermines the problematic reasoning? My answers 
to these questions will be ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively.  
In thinking about ways in which knowledge might be more stable than mere true 
belief, it helps to begin by considering a passage from the discussion of Williams’ 
that I criticized earlier, in which he reflects on the relation between his problem and 
the Meno problem: 
This question [i.e. why should A want to know whether p, given that he is 
initially specified only as wanting a true belief about whether p?] is 
superficially like a very old one, raised in Plato’s dialogue, the Meno: 
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wherein lies the superiority of knowledge over true belief? It does not lie, as 
Socrates quickly points out to a confused Meno (97c), in knowledge’s always 
being true—true belief is just as true as knowledge. Rather, Socrates 
suggests, knowledge—which he connects with systematic understanding—
will not run away: a point which we may take in the sense more interesting 
for the theory of knowledge, that knowledge cannot rationally be rendered 
doubtful, rather than as the blankly psychological proposition (in any case, 
surely, very dubious) that one is more disposed to forget what one merely 
believes than what one knows. (2005: 24) 
The crucial point in this passage is that there is more than one way in which true 
belief can be lost. One can simply forget what one truly believes; alternatively, one 
can be led to abandon one’s true belief in the face of evidence that suggests that it is 
false, or at least not adequately supported. As Williams says, the suggestion that one 
is more likely to forget what one merely truly believes than what one knows is 
doubtful at best. Suppose, for example, that we think of the difference between 
knowledge and true belief in something like the way that Plato appears to in the 
Meno, so that knowing that p requires (very roughly) understanding why it is true 
that p. Understanding why a proposition is true can be an aid to remembering it. One 
might think, for example, that someone who has followed Socrates’ diagrammatic 
‘proof’, in the Meno, that the square constructed on the diagonal of a square is 
double in area is more likely to remember that proposition than someone who has 
simply been told it is true, without being given any further understanding of why. 
However, understanding why a proposition is true is only one way of cementing that 
proposition in memory, and perhaps not even the most effective way. As Craig 
points out, ‘effect of early upbringing, emotive ties or Humean psychological 
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mechanisms may be just as good, and better’ (1990: 7). It is far from clear that, in 
general, knowledge is less likely to be forgotten than mere true belief. This suggests 
that if there is to be anything in Plato’s claim at all, it must rather concern the 
differential tendencies of knowledge and true belief to be undermined in some other 
way—e.g. by being rationally rendered doubtful.  
The proposal that Williams makes on Plato’s behalf at this point is the strong one 
that ‘knowledge cannot rationally be rendered doubtful’. On the face of it this claim 
is too strong: it does not seem difficult to imagine cases in which a subject who 
knows that p can be led, rationally, to doubt that p.12 But even if this claim cannot be 
sustained, one might still maintain the weaker one that knowledge is less likely than 
mere true belief to be undermined by future evidence. This is indeed what 
Williamson suggests: 
Present knowledge is less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational 
undermining by future evidence, which is not to say that it is completely 
invulnerable to such undermining. If your cognitive faculties are in good 
order, the probability of your believing p tomorrow is greater conditional on 
your knowing p today than on your merely believing p truly today (that is, 
believing p truly without knowing p). Consequently, the probability of your 
believing p tomorrow is greater conditional on your knowing p today than on 
your believing p truly today. (2000: 79) 
Williamson illustrates his proposal by adapting Plato’s own example: 
One can lose a mere true belief by discovering the falsity of further beliefs on 
which it had been essentially based; quite often, the truth will out. One 
                                                 
12 For a plausible counterexample, see Kripke (2011: 35–36).  
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cannot lose knowledge that way, because a true belief essentially based on 
false beliefs does not constitute knowledge. For example, I might derive the 
true belief that this road goes to Larissa from the two false (but perhaps 
justified) beliefs that Larissa is due north and that this road goes due north; 
when dawn breaks in an unexpected quarter and I realize that this road goes 
south, without having been given any reason to doubt that Larissa is due 
north, I abandon the belief that this road goes to Larissa. Since that true belief 
was essentially based on false beliefs, it did not constitute knowledge. (2000: 
78) 
The point that mere true belief is more vulnerable to being rationally undermined by 
future evidence does not show that the probability of your believing p tomorrow is 
greater conditional on your knowing p today than on your merely believing p truly 
today if your belief that p is ‘profoundly dogmatic’—i.e. if you are not disposed to 
revise your belief that p in response to new evidence. This is why Williamson 
imposes the condition that the subject’s ‘cognitive faculties’ must be in ‘good order’. 
Furthermore, to establish the thesis that the probability of your believing p tomorrow 
is greater conditional on your knowing p today than on your merely believing p truly 
today we also need the assumption that there is at least some chance of the kind of 
evidence that could rationally undermine a mere true belief that p, but not knowledge 
that p, coming into your possession. This assumption does not seem problematic. 
Provided, then, that we are dealing with subjects who are by and large rational, it 
seems reasonable to accept the hypothesis that the probability of a subject believing 
that p tomorrow is greater conditional on him knowing that p today than it is on him 
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merely believing that p truly today. This is to endorse, in a somewhat qualified way, 
Plato’s claim that knowledge is more stable than mere true belief.13 
Haven’t I just conceded that there is a respect in which knowledge differs from mere 
true belief? And isn’t this difference of obvious value to us? After all, it is only for 
as long as true beliefs stick around that they can continue to guarantee correctness of 
action, and we have just seen that true beliefs that constitute knowledge are more 
stable than those that don’t. So hasn’t the paradoxical conclusion that we ought to be 
interested only in acquiring true beliefs been avoided? I don’t think that it has. The 
problem is that, even conceding Williamson’s point, our interest in knowledge 
appears to be far more widespread than it ought to be given only the rather minor 
respect in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief that has been identified. 
This point is not a novel one; it is eloquently expressed, for example, by Craig: 
Whether the stabilisation of true beliefs is important or not depends on which 
beliefs we are considering, and the circumstances of the agent—many beliefs 
are required for the guidance of single, ‘one-off’ actions under circumstances 
which will not recur, and once the particular occasion is past there is no 
obvious value at all in their persistence. (I might now need a true belief about 
the time; but that this belief should persist, so that tomorrow I will still know 
                                                 
13 Jonathan Kvanvig has objected to Williamson’s proposal on the grounds that ‘there are other ways 
in which knowledge can be undermined but true belief remains unaffected. In particular, knowledge 
can be undermined at a later time by future changes of which one is unaware, where true belief is 
retained. For example, my mathematical knowledge might be undermined tomorrow by the sincere 
testimony of a renowned mathematician to the effect that what I believe is false. Until such testimony 
is rendered, I have such knowledge, but I lose it when the defeating testimony is given, even though I 
am unaware that such testimony has occurred. I thereby lose my knowledge but not my true belief’ 
(2003: 15). But the point that there are ways of losing knowledge that are not ways of losing (true) 
belief is irrelevant, because Williamson’s claim is only that the probability of my believing that p 
tomorrow is greater conditional on my knowing that p today than it is on my truly believing that p 
today. 
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what the time was today, at the moment when I wanted to know it, may be of 
no interest to me whatever.) (1990: 7) 
In terms of the problematic reasoning, the issue is that we often seek knowledge of 
the answers to questions even in situations in which arriving at stable true beliefs 
about the answers is not important. But in such scenarios, for all that has been said, 
true belief is just as good as knowledge. Consequently, we can run a modified form 
of the problematic reasoning to show that, at least in these scenarios, it is rationally 
sub-optimal for enquirers to seek knowledge and not merely true beliefs.  
Perhaps it will be objected here that enquirers can rarely be certain that the 
persistence of true belief is unimportant. Tomorrow someone might offer me £100 if 
I can remember what the time was yesterday, at the moment I wanted to know it. 
This being so, caution recommends seeking knowledge. The problem with this line 
of argument is that it shows at most that rational enquirers ought to balance the cost 
of seeking a more demanding objective, knowledge, against the possible benefit of 
arriving at more stable true beliefs. It is implausible that the balance of costs and 
benefits will always recommend the cautious strategy of seeking knowledge. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the need to balance the cost of seeking a more 
demanding objective, knowledge, against the benefit of arriving at more stable true 
beliefs is one that finds no trace in the thinking of ordinary enquirers: one never 
thinks, ‘Given that circumstances in which a true belief about whether p would be 
useful to me are highly unlikely to recur, perhaps I ought only to seek a true belief 
about whether p, and not knowledge of whether p’.  
Although this objection has arisen here specifically as an objection to Williamson’s 
proposal, it should be clear that it is merely a particular application of a much more 
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general argument. A solution to the comparative state question will have to identify 
some feature, F (e.g. greater stability), that knowledge possesses but mere true belief 
lacks, in virtue of which knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. If there 
are cases in which enquirers seek knowledge without violating standards of 
rationality, but have no interest in F, then that solution to the comparative state 
question will fail to defuse the problematic reasoning when it is run for those cases. 
Hence, we will be forced to accept the conclusion that, in those cases at least, it is 
rationally sub-optimal for enquirers to seek knowledge. Given the generality of this 
kind of challenge, I think we should be sceptical of the idea that we can adequately 
respond to the problematic reasoning by denying its first premise. 
4.2 Is True Belief Necessary but Insufficient for Knowledge? 
According to premise (2) of the problematic reasoning, having a true belief about 
whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p. This follows from the 
claim that truly believing that p is necessary but insufficient for knowing that p, 
provided we accept the further assumptions that (a) knowing whether p is a matter of 
knowing that p, if p, and knowing that not-p, if not-p, and (b) that having a true 
belief about whether p is a matter of believing that p, if p, and believing that not-p, if 
not-p. The argument for the insufficiency claim is now as follows. Suppose that S 
has a true belief about whether p. It follows from (b) that S either truly believes that 
p or truly believes that not-p. Given that truly believing that p is insufficient for 
knowing that p, however, S may fail to know that p or to know that not-p. Since 
knowing that p or knowing that not-p is necessary for knowing whether p, S may 
therefore fail to know whether p, despite having a true belief about whether p. The 
argument for the necessity claim proceeds in a similar fashion. Suppose that S knows 
whether p. It follows from (a) that S either knows that p or else knows that not-p. If 
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true belief is necessary for knowledge, then S either truly believes that p or else truly 
believes that not-p. Given (b), S must therefore have a true belief about whether p. 
So having a true belief about whether p is necessary for knowing whether p.  
I will not here go into the question of whether we should accept assumptions (a) and 
(b). However, I do wish to say a little more about the assumption that truly believing 
that p is necessary but insufficient for knowing that p. Should we accept this claim? 
In considering this question, a simple but important point is that, in saying that truly 
believing that p is necessary but insufficient for knowing that p, one doesn’t commit 
oneself to the further claim that it is possible to specify non-circular necessary and 
sufficient conditions for knowing that p. As Williamson points out, ‘a necessary but 
insufficient condition need not be a conjunct of a non-circular necessary and 
sufficient condition’ (2000: 3). The example Williamson uses to demonstrate this 
point is that of being coloured and being red. Being coloured is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for being red, but we cannot specify a non-circular necessary 
and sufficient condition for something to be red by conjoining being coloured with 
other conditions that are stated without reference to red. (The most obvious 
suggestion—that x is red if and only if (a) x is coloured and (b) x is not green, or 
blue, or yellow, or pink, etc.—is clearly objectionable. Even supposing the account 
to be adequate in other respects (for example, that the open-endedness of (b) is 
unobjectionable, or can be repaired), it is circular. In specifying condition (b) we use 
other colour concepts—e.g. being green—so the question arises of whether we can 
specify necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of these other colour 
concepts without using the concept of being red. Using the same strategy we used in 
the case of red—x is green if and only if (a) x is coloured and (b) x is not red, or 
blue, or yellow, or pink, etc.—immediately results in circularity.) Thus, the much 
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advertised failure of philosophers to succeed in specifying a non-circular necessary 
and sufficient condition for knowing that p, by conjoining truly believing that p with 
further conditions, is not a reason to doubt the claim that truly believing that p is 
necessary but insufficient for knowing that p.  
The premise that truly believing that p is necessary but insufficient for knowing that 
p is equivalent to the following conjunction: necessarily, if S knows that p then S 
believes that p and p, but it is not the case that, necessarily, if S believes that p and p, 
then S knows that p. Thus, one can deny the premise either by denying the former 
necessity claim, or by denying the latter insufficiency claim, or by denying both. The 
claim that truly believing that p is necessary for knowing that p has been denied by 
some philosophers on the basis that believing that p is unnecessary for knowing that 
p.14 I do not want to go into these arguments here, however, because even if there are 
cases of knowledge without belief, it is not clear that merely denying the necessity of 
true belief for knowledge permits an adequate response to the problematic reasoning. 
In that reasoning, the assumption that true belief is necessary but insufficient for 
knowledge is used to establish the further claim that it is more difficult to acquire 
knowledge of whether p than it is to acquire a true belief about whether p. Suppose 
one thinks that the following form of argument is valid: if the obtaining of condition 
C is necessary but insufficient for the obtaining of condition C*, then it is more 
difficult for an agent to bring about condition C* than condition C. (I consider the 
validity of this form of inference in § 4.3.) If one thinks that truly believing that p 
isn’t necessary for knowing that p, then one cannot establish the claim that it is more 
difficult to acquire knowledge of whether p than it is to acquire a true belief about 
whether p simply by appealing to the validity of this form of argument. However, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Radford (1966). Armstrong (1969) objects to Radford’s argument.  
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one can still establish the claim that it is more difficult to acquire knowledge of 
whether p than it is to acquire either knowledge of whether p or a true belief about 
whether p; trivially, having a true belief about whether p or knowing whether p is 
necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p, provided we assume that having a 
true belief about whether p is insufficient for knowing whether p. We can then run 
the problematic reasoning much as before, to establish the modified conclusion that 
it is rationally sub-optimal to seek knowledge of whether p rather than merely 
seeking either knowledge of whether p or a true belief about whether p. This 
conclusion also seems unacceptable. Thus, denying premise (2) will only provide a 
satisfying response to the reasoning if it is denied, more specifically, on the grounds 
that true belief is actually sufficient for knowledge. 
The usual way to argue for the claim that true belief is insufficient for knowledge is 
to describe examples in which a subject putatively truly believes that p without 
knowing that p. The following passage from the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy is illustrative: 
Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to 
identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief 
might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William 
flips a coin, and confidently believes on no particular basis that it will land 
tails. If by chance the coin does land tails, then William's belief was true; but 
a lucky guess such as this one is no knowledge. (Ichikawa and Steup 2014: 
§1.3) 
Crispin Sartwell has argued, contrary to orthodoxy, that such examples are 
inconclusive. He makes two main points. The first is that in at least some examples 
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of this kind it is not clear that the subject really does believe the proposition at issue. 
Thus, he says, 
[A]rguments to the effect that some third condition is required for knowledge 
often play on an insufficiently rich notion of belief. Such arguments, again, 
often take the form simply of pointing out that a lucky guess does not count 
as knowledge. But of course, in the usual case, a lucky guess is not even a 
belief. (1991: 159) 
Relatedly, he points out that it is not sufficient for a subject to believe that p that she 
is merely disposed to produce some conventional sign of assent in response to 
utterances that express the proposition that p, or disposed to act as though p is the 
case. Secondly, in cases in which the subject is conceded to have a true belief that p 
despite the fact that she apparently fails to know that p, Sartwell tries to explain 
away the intuition that the subject does not know that p by identifying factors that 
make it natural to judge that the subject doesn’t know that p, despite the fact that on 
his view she does. For example, the intuition that a mental patient who believes that 
2 + 2 = 4 because the voices in her head have told her so doesn’t know that 2 + 2 = 4 
is explained away on the grounds that, in saying that she doesn’t know, we are 
‘reaching for a truth by means of a literal falsehood. The truth we are reaching for is 
that knowledge-claims made by the mental patient on controversial matters ought to 
be regarded as highly suspect’ (1991: 162). They are suspect because the procedures 
the patient uses to arrive at beliefs include a procedure, listening to the voices in her 
head, which is liable to produce false beliefs, and false beliefs cannot constitute 
knowledge.  
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Sartwell is quite right to point out that lucky guesses are not beliefs, and that merely 
acting as though p is the case, or producing conventional signs of assent in response 
to expressions of the proposition that p, is not sufficient for believing that p. 
However, these claims show at most that philosophers ought to be a bit more careful 
in their choice and description of counterexamples to the sufficiency of true belief 
for knowledge, to make sure that it is clear that the relevant subjects really do satisfy 
the conditions for belief. Furthermore, Sartwell’s explanation of why it is intuitive to 
judge that the ‘mental patient’ does not know that 2 + 2 = 4 clearly doesn’t apply 
across the board. There are scenarios in which we are inclined to judge that the 
subject doesn’t know that p, despite the fact that she truly believes that p, in which 
there is no insinuation that the subject has a general tendency to arrive at beliefs by 
unreliable methods. Gettier cases are an obvious example. It seems to me, therefore, 
that Sartwell fails to identify compelling reasons to question our intuitions about 
purported counterexamples to the thesis that truly believing that p is insufficient for 
knowing that p.  
As an aside, it is interesting to note that in the course of evaluating an argument for 
the claim that knowledge is at least justified true belief, Sartwell inadvertently brings 
to light a consideration that suggests that true belief is insufficient for knowledge. 
The argument for the claim that knowledge is at least justified true belief is that ‘it is 
always legitimate, when someone claims to know something, to ask how she knows 
it’ (1991: 159). Although Sartwell doesn’t spell out the argument explicitly, 
presumably the idea is that when you ask someone how she knows that p you are 
asking her to justify her belief that p, and it wouldn’t always be legitimate to ask her 
to do this unless knowing that p entailed having a justified belief that p. In response 
to this argument, Sartwell questions the assumption that it is always legitimate to ask 
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someone who claims to know something how she knows it, but he also argues that, 
even if this assumption were true, it ‘would not in itself establish a disanalogy 
between knowledge and mere true belief, or even between knowledge and mere 
belief, or even between knowledge and mere assertion’ (ibid.). In all these cases, he 
says, the request for justification is equally legitimate—it is quite familiar, after all, 
to ask ‘Why do you believe that?’, or ‘What’s your reason for saying that?’ Sartwell 
notes a further disanalogy, however, between the case of knowledge and the case of 
belief or assertion. If someone cannot adequately answer the question ‘How do you 
know that p?’, it might be appropriate to respond by saying, ‘You don’t know after 
all!’ However, if someone cannot adequately justify his belief or assertion it is not 
normally appropriate to respond by saying ‘You didn’t really assert that p after all!’, 
or ‘You don’t really believe that p!’ If someone cannot adequately respond to the 
request for justification this may show that he does not know that p, but it does not 
show that he does not believe that p or has not asserted that p. Sartwell insists, 
though, that ‘no disanalogy is established between knowledge and true belief [my 
emphasis], if the demand for a justification is thought of as a demand that the 
proposition which one claims to know be supported, that is, that reasons should be 
given to regard it as true’ (ibid.). This is where Sartwell inadvertently brings to light 
a consideration that speaks in favour of the insufficiency of true belief for 
knowledge. Suppose, for example, that I wish to know whether p, and upon asking 
you about the matter you confidently assert to me that p. When I ask you how you 
know that p, however, the reasons you give are quite inadequate. Your failure to 
provide an adequate response to the request for justification raises doubts both about 
whether you know that p and about whether you truly believe that p, but there is an 
important difference: whereas your failure to provide an adequate justification may 
61 
 
show, quite decisively, that you do not really know that p, it shows at most that I 
ought to suspend judgement about whether you truly believe that p. If truth belief 
really were sufficient for knowledge, this difference would not exist. Things are even 
clearer in the situation in which I know that p and I wish to check whether you know 
that p—that is to say, when I am in the situation of the examiner. Upon establishing 
that you take yourself to know that p, I may ask, ‘How do you know that p?’, or 
‘Why do you believe that p?’ Your failure to answer either question in a satisfactory 
way may show that you do not really know that p, but it does not speak against the 
fact that you truly believe that p. So, contrary to what Sartwell says, there is an 
important disanalogy between knowledge and true belief with respect to the request 
for justification, which suggests that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. 
In this subsection I have argued that we cannot respond to the problematic reasoning 
by rejecting its second premise, that having a true belief about whether p is necessary 
but insufficient for knowing whether p. Merely rejecting the claim that having a true 
belief about whether p is necessary for knowing whether p is inadequate, because 
even if this is right it remains the case that having a true belief about whether p or 
knowing whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p (assuming 
that true belief is insufficient for knowledge). It can still be argued, therefore, that an 
enquirer ought at most to adopt the disjunctive objective of arriving at a true belief 
about, or knowledge of, whether p. The more important claim for the purposes of the 
problematic reasoning is that having a true belief about whether p is insufficient for 
knowing whether p. Sartwell contends that the standard argument for this claim—
that a subject’s belief about whether p might be true by luck, and so fail to constitute 
knowledge of whether p—is inconclusive. However, Sartwell’s objections, as we 
have just seen, are unconvincing. It is true that philosophers sometimes lazily choose 
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examples (e.g. a coin toss) in which it is implausible that the subject genuinely 
believes the target proposition (e.g. that the coin will land tails), but it is not difficult 
to construct cases in which the subject clearly believes the target proposition. 
Sartwell’s diagnosis of why it sometimes sounds right to say that a subject who truly 
believes that p does not know that p—that the knowledge claims made by the subject 
are suspect because she is arriving at beliefs by unreliable methods—does not apply 
in all cases, because sometimes it sounds right to deny that a subject knows that p 
(e.g. in a Gettier case) even when there is no insinuation that the subject is arriving at 
beliefs by unreliable methods. Thus, for all Sartwell says, the standard argument for 
the claim that true belief is insufficient for knowledge remains compelling. 
Furthermore, in his attempt to explain why, even supposing that it is correct that ‘it is 
always legitimate, when someone claims to know something, to ask how she knows 
it’, this still would not show that true belief is insufficient for knowledge, Sartwell 
inadvertently brings to light a further consideration that supports the insufficiency 
claim.  
4.3 Does (3) Follow From (2)? 
In the problematic reasoning, the role of the assumption that having a true belief 
about whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p is to establish 
the further thesis that it is more difficult for an enquirer to arrive at knowledge of 
whether p than it is for the enquirer to arrive at a true belief about whether p. It is 
only if we have this further thesis, alongside the claim that having a true belief about 
whether p is just as good as knowing whether p, that we can exploit the principle 
about rationality expressed by (4) to obtain the conclusion that it is rationally sub-
optimal for an enquirer to aim at the acquisition of knowledge. Let us say that 
condition C is more demanding than condition C* just in case, necessarily, if 
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condition C obtains then condition C* obtains, but it is not the case that, necessarily, 
if condition C* obtains then condition C obtains. If having a true belief about 
whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p, the condition that one 
knows whether p is more demanding, in this sense, than the condition that one has a 
true belief about whether p. But does it follow from this that it is harder for an 
enquirer to arrive at knowledge of whether p than it is for an enquirer to arrive at a 
true belief about whether p? Are more demanding conditions necessarily more 
demanding on the agent? 
The correct response to this question is ‘No, of course not’. My bedroom has white 
walls. Suppose that R is the condition that BW’s bedroom has red walls and PC is 
the condition that BW’s bedroom has walls of a primary colour. The obtaining of 
condition PC is necessary but insufficient for the obtaining of condition R: 
necessarily, if R obtains then PC obtains,15 but it is not the case that, necessarily, if 
PC obtains then R obtains. Thus, R is a more demanding condition than PC in the 
sense identified above. However, it obviously does not follow from this that it is 
more difficult for me to paint my walls red than it is for me to paint my walls a 
primary colour, in the ordinary sense of ‘difficult’. A more demanding condition is 
not necessarily more demanding on the agent.  
It does not follow from the fact that true belief is necessary but insufficient for 
knowledge that it is more difficult for an enquirer to arrive at knowledge of whether 
p than it is for an enquirer to arrive at a true belief about whether p. The routes to 
knowledge may be no more demanding than the routes to true belief. However, it is 
                                                 
15 This claim depends on the assumption that red is necessarily a primary colour, but the point I am 
making does not depend on this assumption; if someone wishes to dispute the claim that red is 
necessarily primary, they should simply understand PC to be the disjunctive condition that BW’s 
bedroom has walls that are red, blue or yellow.   
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important to distinguish the claim that finding out (i.e. acquiring knowledge of) 
whether p is always more difficult than acquiring a true belief about whether p from 
the claim finding out whether p is sometimes more difficult than acquiring a true 
belief about whether p. The first claim, as we have just seen, is not entailed by the 
premise that the condition that one knows whether p is more demanding than the 
condition that one has a true belief about whether p. Furthermore, it is not obvious 
how else one might argue for this general claim. One might still think, however, that 
this premise can be used to argue for the weaker claim that finding out whether p is 
sometimes more difficult than acquiring a true belief about whether p. After all, if 
one can have a true belief about whether p without knowing whether p, then 
presumably there will at least sometimes be procedures one can follow that would 
result in one having a true belief about whether p but not in one knowing whether p. 
Furthermore, presumably at least sometimes these procedures will also be easier for 
an enquirer to follow than any procedure the enquirer could follow to arrive at 
knowledge of whether p.  
It is fairly straightforward to think of examples in which these conditions are met. 
Imagine that May’s calculator malfunctions in the following way: although the other 
buttons work normally, pressing the ‘=’ sign causes it to display the figure ‘56,088’. 
May does not know this—as far as she is concerned, her calculator works just like 
any other. Wanting the truth about the product of 123 and 456, May taps the problem 
into the calculator and, upon reading the display, forms the true belief that 123 x 456 
= 56,088. I take it that, although May now truly believes that 123 x 456 = 56,088, 
she does not know that 123 x 456 = 56,088; it is pure luck that the belief she has 
acquired from the calculator is true. Furthermore, the procedure May used to arrive 
at a true belief was easier for May to follow than any procedure she could have 
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followed that would have resulted in her knowing that 123 x 456 = 56,088. Working 
out the problem on paper would have required significantly more time, skill and 
mental effort, for example. Although the example is an artificial one, it is plausible 
that it will quite often be the case that there are procedures available to an enquirer 
that would result in him holding a mere true belief about the answer to some 
question, and which are in some sense easier for him to follow than any procedure he 
could follow that would result in him knowing the answer. Often, for example, the 
easiest way for an enquirer to arrive at a true belief about the answer to a question 
will be by consulting another person, but if this other person has a mere true belief 
about the answer to the question, then it is plausible that the enquirer will not acquire 
knowledge that p in forming the true belief that p in response to the speaker’s 
assertion that p.  
What are the implications of these points for the problematic reasoning? (3), as it 
stands, is unjustified: we cannot infer from the premise that true belief is necessary 
but insufficient for knowledge that, quite generally, it is more difficult for an 
enquirer to arrive at knowledge of whether p than it is for an enquirer to arrive at a 
true belief about whether p. However, (2) can be used to support a weaker version of 
(3): at least sometimes, there is a procedure available to an enquirer that would result 
in him having a mere true belief about whether p that is easier for the enquirer to 
follow than any procedure that would result in him knowing whether p. We can then 
run the reasoning as before to obtain the weaker conclusion that, at least in cases of 
this kind (in which, we might add, the stability of true belief is unimportant), it is 
rationally sub-optimal for the enquirer to adopt the aim of acquiring knowledge of 
whether p.  
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Is this weaker conclusion still problematic? The idea that it isn’t worth seeking 
knowledge of the answer to some question in certain circumstances is not an 
unfamiliar one. Sometimes a mere estimate about the answer to the question will do. 
However, I think there is something odd about the idea that an enquirer shouldn’t 
seek knowledge of the answer to some question because it is easier for him to arrive 
at a true belief about the answer. Like considerations to do with the stability of true 
belief, there does not appear to be any trace of this consideration in our ordinary 
thinking about enquiry. I shall be arguing that we should not accept even this weaker 
conclusion.  
5. Does (4) Apply in the Case of True Belief and Knowledge? 
My aim in this section is to highlight what seems to me the most significant 
objection to the problematic reasoning. In general terms, the objection is that certain 
conditions whose satisfaction we presuppose in assenting to (4) cannot be satisfied in 
the case of knowledge and true belief. It follows that (4) cannot be used to force the 
conclusion that it is rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to seek knowledge, given 
that he could merely aim to acquire true beliefs. Why these conditions cannot be 
satisfied in the case of knowledge and true belief is not something I will attempt to 
explain just yet. This is because the correct explanation of why this is so depends on 
claims about the nature of belief and judgement that I haven’t established so far. I 
will return to this issue in Chapter 4, after I have discussed the relevant issues in 
Chapters 2 and 3. For now, my aim is just to show that there are further conditions 
whose satisfaction we take for granted in accepting (4), and that it is at least not 
obvious that these conditions are satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge.  
For ease of reference, here is principle (4) again: 
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If objective X is just as good as objective Y, but it is more difficult for the 
agent to achieve objective Y than objective X, then it is rationally sub-optimal 
for the agent to adopt Y as his aim; he should, at most, adopt X as his 
objective. 
(4) is made attractive by cases like the following. I am taking part in an archery 
competition. It is almost the end of the match. My opponent, who has used all his 
arrows, is slightly ahead of me, but I still have one more shot. I have a choice of two 
targets, one closer than the other. Hitting the farther target earns me more points, but 
I will get enough points to beat my opponent if I hit only the closer one. Which 
target should I aim for? It seems obvious that I should shoot at the closer one; that 
way, I maximize my chances of winning. This verdict is in line with principle (4). 
Hitting the closer target is just as good as hitting the farther target, from the point of 
view of winning the match, but it is more difficult for me to hit the farther target; 
hence, I should aim for only the closer one. Before we conclude that this principle 
can be used to obtain the conclusion that in some circumstances enquirers ought to 
aim only for true beliefs, however, we should consider whether the application of the 
principle in this case depends on features that are absent in the case of true belief and 
knowledge.  
One very basic feature of the archery example is that I recognize that there are ways 
in which I can attempt to achieve the more modest objective that are not ways in 
which I can achieve the more demanding objective. In particular, I recognize that 
shooting at the closer target is a way of hitting the closer target but not a way of 
hitting the farther target. It is because I am capable of recognizing that there are ways 
in which I can attempt to achieve the more modest objective that are not ways in 
which I can achieve the more demanding one that I can potentially avail myself of 
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less exigent means by adopting only the more modest end. Is this condition satisfied 
in the case of true belief and knowledge? That is to say, can I recognize that a certain 
procedure is potentially a way of arriving at a true belief about whether p but not a 
way of finding out whether p? In a theoretical sense, I can. I recognize that inferring 
that p from premises that include one or more propositions that I falsely believe to be 
the case is a way in which I might arrive at a true belief about whether p, but not a 
way in which I might find out whether p. However, it does not follow from this that I 
can follow this procedure thought of as such in an attempt to arrive at a true belief 
about whether p. There appears to be something in the thought that I can use a 
certain procedure to attempt to arrive at a true belief about whether p only if I regard 
that procedure as a potential way of finding out whether p. If this is right, then in the 
case of true belief and knowledge I cannot avail myself of less exigent means by 
adopting the less demanding end; even if I merely adopt the aim of true belief, I can 
pursue my aim only by using methods that I regard as potential ways of discovering, 
or finding out, the truth.  
The example I described in the previous section provides an illustration of this point. 
If May knew that her calculator was malfunctioning in the way I described, she 
could not use the calculator to arrive at beliefs about the answers to arithmetical 
questions. One might think that May can arrive at beliefs about the answers to 
arithmetical questions using her calculator only because she regards the calculator as 
a way of finding out the answers to those questions. This is why she cannot make life 
easier for herself by adopting only the aim of arriving at a true belief about the 
answer. Even if she adopts this aim, the only way she can attempt to achieve her aim 
is by using methods that she regards as ways of finding out the answer. It is easier 
for her to arrive at a true belief about the answer than knowledge only because she 
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mistakenly regards a certain method as a way of finding out the answer, which in 
fact happens to yield a true belief about the answer. Although it can be argued, on 
the basis of the claim that true belief is necessary but insufficient for knowledge, that 
it is sometimes easier for an enquirer to arrive at true beliefs than at knowledge, it 
does not follow that it is possible for an enquirer to recognize as such the more 
efficient procedures that deliver only true belief.  
To forestall misunderstanding, I should emphasise that I am not here endorsing the 
claim that I can use a certain procedure to arrive at a true belief about whether p only 
if I regard that procedure as a way of finding out whether p. As we will see in 
Chapter 4, there appear to be counterexamples to this claim. All I mean to assert is 
the following. Firstly, one thing we take for granted in appealing to (4) to explain 
why an agent should adopt only a more modest objective is that the agent is able to 
recognize that there are ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more modest 
objective that are not ways in which he can achieve the more demanding objective. 
Secondly, it is not obvious that this condition can be satisfied, at least in a 
straightforward way, in the case of true belief and knowledge. In fact, the proposal 
that an enquirer can use a certain procedure to arrive at a true belief about whether p 
only if he regards that procedure as a way of finding out whether p is too simple. 
Nevertheless, it gets at something important, and helps us to see why something that 
we take for granted in applying principle (4) may be problematic in the case of true 
belief and knowledge. To make further progress here, however, we need to have a 
deeper understanding of the nature of belief and judgement. This is what I shall 
attempt to provide in the next two chapters. 
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6. Summary 
In this chapter I have distinguished two different challenges someone might have in 
mind in pressing the activity question. The first, which is raised by Williams in 
Descartes, was based on the argument that since true belief is just as true as 
knowledge, an enquirer will have got what he wants if he merely arrives at a true 
belief about the answer to his question. We saw that this argument is fallacious. 
There is therefore no need to explain why an enquirer who is initially specified only 
as wanting a true belief about whether p in fact wants to know whether p. 
Furthermore, Williams’ attempt to explain why this is so appears to be decisively 
flawed. We should reject Williams’ challenge. The second challenge that someone 
might have in mind in pressing the activity question is more interesting. I expressed 
this challenge in the form of a paradoxical argument, the problematic reasoning. I 
went on to argue that various responses to this argument are inadequate. Although 
there is a respect in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief—it is less likely 
to be undermined by future evidence, and therefore more stable—this feature of 
knowledge is not always of value to enquirers. Disputing the claim that having a true 
belief about whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p does not 
appear to be promising either. The inference from this claim to the further idea that it 
is harder for an enquirer to arrive at knowledge than at true beliefs is problematic, 
but it is still possible to defend on this basis the weaker claim that there is at least 
sometimes a procedure an enquirer can use to arrive at a true belief about whether p 
that is easier for him to follow than any procedure he could use to arrive at 
knowledge of whether p. The real problem with the reasoning, I proposed, lies in the 
idea that the principle expressed by (4) can be applied in the case of true belief and 
knowledge. I argued that, in applying that principle, one thing we presuppose is that 
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it is possible for an agent to recognize that there are ways in which he can attempt to 
achieve a more modest objective that are not ways in which he can achieve a more 
demanding objective. I went on to suggest that it is not obvious that this 
presupposition holds in the case of true belief and knowledge. The correct response 
to the reasoning lies in questioning this presupposition in relation to enquiry. To 
make further progress here, however, we need a deeper understanding of the nature 
of belief and judgement.  
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Chapter 2 
Believing, Assuming and Judging 
In the Introduction I argued that philosophical investigation of the value of 
knowledge should begin with the activity question: why do we desire and seek 
knowledge, and not merely true beliefs, given that true belief is just as true, and just 
as useful, as knowledge? It is not entirely obvious why the (alleged) facts that true 
belief is just as true, and just as useful, as knowledge, should be taken to show that 
enquirers should at most be interested in acquiring true beliefs. In the previous 
chapter I suggested that someone might be motivated to press the activity question 
by the problematic reasoning. After considering several different replies to this 
reasoning, I concluded that the most promising response is to question a principle of 
rationality on which the reasoning depends. According to that principle, embodied in 
the fourth premise of the reasoning, if objective X is just as good as objective Y, but 
it is more difficult for an agent to achieve objective Y than objective X, then it is 
rationally sub-optimal for the agent to adopt objective Y as his aim; he should, at 
most, adopt X as his objective. We seem to be disposed to appeal to this principle (or 
something like it) in explaining why, in certain circumstances, an agent ought to 
adopt one objective rather than another. It is consistent with this, however, that the 
application of the principle in these circumstances depends on certain conditions 
being met that aren’t satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge. If these 
conditions aren’t satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge, then the principle 
cannot be used to show that enquirers ought only to be interested in acquiring true 
beliefs.  
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Whether or not it is legitimate to appeal to principle (4) in relation to true belief and 
knowledge is not a straightforward matter to determine. Rather than tackling this 
question head on, I want to begin by considering a closely related issue that is also of 
considerable independent interest, namely, the nature of belief. Issues about the 
nature of belief and judgement will occupy us for the next two chapters. My ultimate 
aim in developing an account of belief and judgement is to show how it can be used 
to explain why principle (4) does not apply in the case of true belief and knowledge. 
But this will have to wait until Chapter 4. Until then, our attention will be directed 
away from the problematic reasoning onto more basic issues about the metaphysics 
of belief, judgement, and related cognitive mental states and events. 
Although I will be allowing the problematic reasoning to recede into the background 
for the time being, the more general theme of the importance of considering the 
position of an enquirer will continue to play a major role in my discussion. Enquirers 
are cognitively sophisticated subjects, and, as I explain in § 1, focussing on 
cognitively sophisticated subjects in a philosophical investigation of the nature of 
belief brings certain issues to the fore. In particular, issues arise about how the 
beliefs of such subjects are related to the sophisticated forms of mental activity they 
are able to engage in, including forms of practical reasoning and theoretical 
deliberation, and about how we are to mark distinctions between belief proper and 
other forms of acceptance that such subjects are capable of adopting. § 2 considers 
the relationship between believing that p and consciously judging that p. I argue that 
a necessary condition of an enquirer having the outright (as opposed to the 
repressed) belief that p is that he is disposed to judge that p. §§ 3–5 examine the 
nature of conscious judgement by investigating the difference between judging that p 
in one’s reasoning and supposing that p for the sake of argument. In § 3 I argue that 
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we cannot account for the difference simply in terms of the idea that judgement, 
unlike supposition, involves the acquisition/manifestation of the corresponding 
belief. Such an account cannot explain why it is hard to make sense of the idea that a 
subject might be in error about the nature of his own conscious thinking by, for 
example, taking himself to be supposing that p for the sake of argument when he is 
really judging that p in his reasoning. § 4 considers the proposal, made by Shah and 
Velleman (2005), that the difference between judging that p and supposing that p for 
the sake of argument is a matter of a difference in the aim with which the subject 
affirms the proposition that p in his reasoning. Although this proposal is, on the face 
of it, well-placed to explain the ‘privileged’ first-person epistemology of conscious 
thinking, it is implausible that when a subject judges that p he affirms that p with a 
distinctive type of intention—e.g. the intention to affirm that p only if p, or to affirm 
that p only if he knows that p. § 5 introduces Matthew Soteriou’s (2013) account of 
the difference between judgement and supposition for the sake of argument, and 
shows how this account can be used to explain why it is hard to make sense of the 
idea that a subject might be in error about the nature of his own conscious thinking. 
The key thought here is that whether one is judging that p in one’s reasoning or 
supposing that p for the sake of argument is partly a matter of what one regards as 
the source of the constraint of treating p as true in one’s reasoning (in particular, on 
whether or not one regards the constraint of treating p as true as a self-imposed 
constraint), and how one regards that constraint will be constitutively connected with 
one’s higher-order beliefs about what one is up to in reasoning on the assumption 
that p. This is why it is hard to make sense of the idea that a subject might be in error 
about whether he is judging that p or supposing that p for the sake of argument in 
reasoning on the assumption that p. § 6 returns to the issue of how we are to 
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distinguish belief from other forms of acceptance that a sophisticated enquirer is 
capable of engaging in. Although it may be possible to account for the ‘beliefs’ of 
more primitive, non-judging subjects in terms of what Velleman (2000) calls the 
‘purely motivational conception’ of belief, this conception is inadequate as an 
account of the beliefs of enquirers. When we speak of belief in relation to enquirers, 
we normally intend to pick out a state that is distinct from the state one is in when 
one merely assumes for practical purposes that a certain proposition is true, but the 
state of assuming that p for practical purposes also plays the motivational role 
identified by the purely motivational conception of belief. I suggest that one 
important difference between believing that p and assuming that p for practical 
purposes is that when one reasons on the assumption that p because one is assuming 
that p for practical purposes, one once again regards the constraint of treating p as 
true as a self-imposed constraint. By contrast, when one reasons on the assumption 
that p because one believes that p one judges that p in one’s reasoning, and when one 
judges that p in one’s reasoning one does not regard the constraint of treating p as 
true as a self-imposed constraint.  
1. Enquiry and Belief 
Our present interest in the nature of belief stemmed from an interest in resolving 
philosophical issues about the value of knowledge. If the claims I have made about 
the relationship between the activity question and the comparative state question are 
correct, then the kind of believer we should be focussing on, in considering the 
nature of belief in the context of concerns about the value of knowledge, is a 
cognitively sophisticated enquirer. This is an important point, so let me say a little 
more about what I mean in saying this, and why I take it to be true. 
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In the Introduction I argued that the activity question (‘why do we desire and seek 
knowledge, and not merely true beliefs, given that true belief is just as true, and just 
as useful, as knowledge?’) is more basic than the comparative state question (‘why is 
it better to know that p than to have a mere true belief that p, given that true belief is 
just as true and just as useful as knowledge?’). The only obvious reason to accept the 
presupposition of the comparative state question, that it is better for a subject to 
know that p than it is for the subject to have a mere true belief that p, is that we have 
to make this claim in order to provide an adequate response to the activity question. 
Since, however, it is not obvious that we do have to endorse this claim in order to 
respond to the activity question (and, indeed, hard to see how this claim can be 
vindicated, in a sufficiently strong form, to provide an adequate response to that 
question), philosophical reflection about the value of knowledge should begin with 
the activity question. Now, unlike the comparative state question, which can be 
posed in relation to any subject for whom we can mark a distinction between mere 
true belief and knowledge, the activity question explicitly concerns an enquirer. 
Enquirers are cognitively sophisticated subjects. A subject who is capable of 
engaging in enquiry is a subject who is capable of recognizing that he lacks the truth 
about the answer to a certain question, and of adopting purposive means in order to 
obtain it. These general capacities plausibly entail the enquirer’s possession of more 
specific abilities. An enquirer is capable of adopting higher-order attitudes about his 
own mental states—e.g. of recognizing that he does not know whether p, or have a 
true belief about whether p. He is also capable of adopting purposive means in order 
to arrive at a true belief about, or knowledge of, whether p. Arguably, this implies 
the capacity to engage in forms of practical reasoning and theoretical deliberation, 
which in turn imply that the enquirer has the capacity to make conscious decisions 
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and judgements. It might be thought, furthermore, that given that the enquirer is 
capable of recognizing that he does not know, or have a belief about, the answer to a 
certain question, he will have the capacity to engage in forms of acceptance besides 
believing and knowing. Recognizing that he does not know the answer to a question, 
an enquirer may, for example, decide to make a certain assumption about the answer 
to that question for practical purposes, or decide to accept a certain assumption about 
the answer for the sake of argument, or decide to hazard a guess about the answer.  
There are large issues here. To give a more detailed philosophical account of how 
these various capacities are related to one another—e.g. of how the capacity for 
higher-order epistemic attitudes is related to the capacity to engage in forms of 
acceptance besides believing and knowing, or of how the capacity for conscious 
judgement and decision is related to the capacity to engage in theoretical reasoning 
and practical deliberation—would require much further work. I shall have more to 
say about some of these issues later. For now, however, the important point is that a 
subject capable of engaging in enquiry is a subject who has these capacities, and it 
seems plausible, on the face of it, to think of these capacities as being related to one 
another in significant and interesting ways.  
Focussing on cognitively sophisticated enquirers brings certain issues about the 
nature of belief to the fore. Here, I will concentrate on two such issues in particular. 
Firstly, as I said, an enquirer is a subject who has the capacity to engage in forms of 
conscious thinking, such as practical reasoning and theoretical deliberation. One 
question we can ask, then, is how an enquirer’s beliefs are related to his conscious 
thinking. A number of authors have suggested, in connection with this issue, that 
there is an intimate connection between believing that p and consciously judging that 
p. I shall be considering this matter in the next section. Secondly, an enquirer is a 
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subject who has the capacity to engage in forms of acceptance besides knowing, 
believing and judging. He can, for example, make assumptions for practical 
purposes, or assumptions for the sake of argument. Once this has been noted, it is 
natural to ask how believing that p differs from merely assuming that p for practical 
purposes, or how judging that p differs from merely supposing that p for the sake of 
argument.16 These issues will be the focus of §§ 3–6. In effect, I will be arguing that 
the key to resolving the second issue lies in resolving the first. At least part of what 
distinguishes having the outright belief that p from merely assuming that p for 
practical purposes, I will suggest, is that a subject who has the outright belief that p 
is disposed to treat the proposition that p in a distinctive way in his conscious 
thinking—he is disposed to judge that p. The significance of this claim is not 
apparent at first sight, however, since it may be said that a subject who is merely 
assuming that p for practical purposes is also disposed to ‘judge’ that p. I will clarify 
what is distinctive of the kind of judging associated with believing by considering 
the difference between judging that p in one’s reasoning and merely supposing that p 
for the sake of argument. (The distinctive nature of judging will continue to concern 
us in the next chapter, where I will be concerned with the question of how judging 
that p differs from merely guessing that p.) 
To begin with, how should we conceive of the relationship between believing that p 
and consciously judging that p, when the kind of believer we are concerned with is 
an enquirer?  
 
 
                                                 
16 Earlier discussions of this kind of issue include Cohen (1992), Velleman (2000), and Shah and 
Velleman (2005).  
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2. Belief and Judgement 
Believing that p is a mental state. As such, belief is distinct from the thoughts one 
has when one is consciously thinking about something—e.g. the thoughts one has 
when one attempts to calculate the product of 13 and 17 in one’s head. Such 
thoughts are events that occur at certain times, rather than states that obtain over 
intervals of time. Although believing that p is a state and not an event, it is 
commonly assumed that there is a type of occurrent thought that is closely associated 
with belief. Philosophers normally reserve the term ‘judgement’ or ‘conscious 
judgement’ to refer to this type of mental event. When you work out that the product 
of 13 and 17 is 221, you consciously judge, in this sense, that 13 x 17 = 221. 
Likewise, when I recall that I had Weetabix for breakfast this morning, I consciously 
judge that I had Weetabix for breakfast this morning. (I do not mean to imply by 
these examples that this kind of mental event occurs only when one succeeds in 
(e.g.) working out or remembering something. If I make a mistake in my 
calculations, I might falsely judge that 13 x 17 = 227; likewise, if I misremember 
what I had for breakfast, I might falsely judge that I had Shreddies.) 
What is the relationship between believing that p and consciously judging that p, in 
this sense? Clearly, one can believe that p at a time when one is not judging that p. 
My belief that Madrid is the capital of Spain does not go out of existence when I stop 
consciously thinking that Madrid is the capital of Spain, and it continues to obtain 
even when I am in a state of dreamless sleep, and am thus not consciously thinking 
about anything. However, it is consistent with this that believing that p at least 
requires being disposed to judge that p, when, for example, the question of whether p 
arises. I am disposed to judge that Madrid is the capital of Spain in response to the 
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question, ‘What is the capital of Spain?’ Should we then accept this more modest 
proposal?  
Quassim Cassam identifies two common objections to this suggestion in the 
following passage: 
[I]t might be suggested that someone who believes that p must at least be 
disposed to judge that p. This has some plausibility, but is still not obviously 
correct. One can imagine someone who finds it psychologically impossible 
mentally to affirm to herself that p but who nevertheless believes that p. She 
has no disposition to judge that p, even when explicitly asked whether p, but 
she does in fact believe that p. If some non-human animals are capable of 
belief but not judgement then that would be another reason not to regard the 
belief that p as a disposition to judge that p, or as requiring the disposition to 
judge that p. (2010: 83) 
Do these objections show that we should reject the claim that believing that p 
involves being disposed to judge that p? In particular, do they show that we should 
reject this claim even when the kind of believer we are concerned with is an 
enquirer? It should be clear that concerns about the possibility that animals have 
beliefs despite being incapable of making judgements are irrelevant in the present 
context. The kind of believer we are concerned with is an enquirer, and an enquirer 
is a subject with the capacity for judgement. Even if it is possible for an animal 
without the capacity for judgement to believe that p without being disposed to judge 
that p, it does not follow that it is possible for an enquirer to believe that p without 
being disposed to judge that p. However, this still leaves the other kind of objection 
identified by Cassam, that of a person who believes that p but nevertheless find it 
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psychologically impossible to judge that p. This subject does have the capacity for 
judgement, and more generally (we may presume) the capacity to engage in enquiry, 
so we cannot duck this objection by pointing out that we are presently only 
interested in the conditions under which an enquirer believes that p. 
Cassam does not go on to explain, in more detail, the type of case he has in mind 
here, but presumably he is thinking of examples of so-called ‘repressed belief’. Here 
is an example of this possibility. The manager of an engineering firm might profess 
to think that female engineers are just as capable as their male counterparts. 
Nevertheless, it might be glaringly obvious, from the way he assigns tasks to his 
employees, that he does not really believe this. Whenever a particularly challenging 
or important job comes up, he assigns it to one of the men, and the more basic, 
menial tasks are generally delegated to the women. His actions make it clear that his 
actual belief about the competence of female engineers is the very opposite of his 
professed belief, and that what he really thinks is that female engineers are less 
capable than male ones. The manager needn’t be being intentionally dishonest about 
what he believes; he is not merely pay lip service to gender equality in the workplace 
whilst secretly thinking that it is obvious that male engineers are better, and that 
everyone would be able to see this were it not for the undue influence of feminism. It 
is rather that his decisions are influenced by an unconscious prejudice that he has. 
Thus, although the manager is not disposed to judge that male engineers are better 
than their female counterparts, and would indeed find it psychologically impossible 
to do so, there is nevertheless a sense in which he believes this to be the case.  
As Soteriou observes (2013: 349), examples like this one draw our attention to the 
fact that the psychological state of belief can be manifested in different ways, of 
which consciously judging that p is only one. Someone can also manifest the belief 
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that p in his actions and decisions. This being the case, it appears to be conceivable 
that the best explanation of someone’s actions and decisions might be one that 
attributes him the belief that p, even though he is not disposed to judge that p, and is 
perhaps even disposed to judge that not-p.  
I do not wish to dispute the claim that cases like the one I have just described are 
cases of belief. What such cases should prompt us to do, however, is mark 
distinctions between different kinds of belief. Cases of repressed belief are clearly 
importantly different from cases of ordinary factual belief—e.g. the belief that 
Madrid is in Spain, or the belief that it rained on Monday. Plausibly, the difference 
between ordinary factual belief (or ‘outright belief’) and repressed belief is that the 
former but not the latter involves a disposition to make the corresponding judgement. 
Having marked the distinction between outright and repressed belief, a question we 
might go on to consider is what kind of belief is at issue in the problematic 
reasoning. In Chapter 1 I introduced the reasoning using the general notion of belief, 
but it might be thought that the reasoning is in fact only plausible in relation to a 
particular kind of belief. This is what I now want to suggest. 
When a subject attempts to find out or work out the answer to a question, his aim is 
clearly to arrive at explicit knowledge of the answer to that question. Thus, in 
thinking about whether he should not really go after some ‘lesser’ state, which is 
allegedly just as good but easier to attain, what we should be considering is whether 
this lesser state is just as good but easier to attain than the state of having explicit 
knowledge of the answer to some question. Having a repressed true belief about the 
answer to some question is obviously not as good as having explicit knowledge of 
the answer to that question. Although repressed beliefs influence the behaviour of 
the agent, they do not dispose the agent to treat their contents as reasons for belief 
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and action. Repressed beliefs do not dispose the agent to treat their contents as 
premises in his practical reasoning and theoretical deliberation. Consequently, they 
are significantly less useful to the agent. They are not available to guide his planning 
and decision making, or to guide further enquiry. It is really only outright belief that 
may be claimed, with some credibility, to be as good as explicit knowledge. Thus, 
the first premise of the problematic reasoning is plausible only if ‘belief’ is 
understood to mean outright belief.  
Once the problematic reasoning is understood to concern outright belief, an issue it 
is relevant to consider in relation to that reasoning is the conditions under which 
someone will acquire an outright belief about whether p as a consequence of 
engaging in enquiry into whether p. Since having the outright belief that p involves 
being disposed to consciously judge that p, acquiring an outright belief about 
whether p involves acquiring a disposition to consciously judge whether p. Thus, in 
considering the conditions under which someone will acquire an outright belief by 
engaging in enquiry, one thing that is relevant is the nature of conscious judgement 
itself. This issue will be central to the rest of this chapter.  
The nature of judgement is not a straightforward matter to determine. However, an 
apparently secure starting point is the thought that judging that p contrasts with other 
ways of consciously affirming the proposition that p, such as supposing that p for the 
sake of argument. What is the difference between the situation in which one judges 
that p in one’s reasoning and the situation in which one merely supposes that p for 
the sake of argument? Matthew Soteriou discusses this question in Chapter 11 of The 
Mind’s Construction. There, he argues that a significant difference between the 
situation in which one supposes that p for the sake of argument and the situation in 
which one judges that p in one’s reasoning is that, in the case of the former but not 
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the latter, the constraint of treating p as true is a self-imposed constraint on one’s 
reasoning. I shall consider Soteriou’s proposal in more detail in a moment. Before I 
do so, however, I want to consider some more simple proposals that might be made 
about the difference between judgement and supposition. Doing so helps to bring out 
the motivation for Soteriou’s view.  
3. Judging, Supposing and the Acquisition/Manifestation of Belief 
An obvious way of attempting to capture the difference between judging that p and 
supposing that p for the sake of argument is to appeal to a difference in the way in 
which these cognitive mental events are related to the subject’s cognitive mental 
states. It is sometimes suggested, for example, that judging that p involves the 
acquisition of the belief that p. One certainly doesn’t acquire the belief that p in 
merely supposing that p for the sake of argument. This proposal is incompatible with 
the idea that a subject can judge that p when she already believes that p, however. 
When I recall that Madrid is in Spain I consciously judge that Madrid is in Spain, but 
I obviously do not acquire the belief that Madrid is in Spain; I can recall that this is 
so only if I already believe it. We can deal with this problem by refining the original 
proposal about how we are to distinguish between judgement and supposition, in the 
following way: when a subject judges that p he acquires or manifests the belief that 
p, but he does not acquire or manifest the belief that p merely in supposing that p for 
the sake of argument. It can now be said that although I do not acquire the belief that 
Madrid is in Spain when I recall that Madrid is in Spain, I do manifest this belief.  
Arguably, this proposal succeeds in identifying a genuine difference between the 
situation in which one judges that p in one’s reasoning and the situation in which one 
merely supposes that p for the sake of argument. What I wish to deny, however, is 
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that we can provide a complete account of the difference between judgement and 
supposition simply by appealing to the idea that the former, but not the latter, 
involves the acquisition/manifestation of the corresponding state of belief. The 
problem with this view is that it cannot explain a certain feature of the subject’s 
awareness of the nature of his own conscious thinking. Before I go on to develop this 
objection, however, I want to briefly consider a more basic concern one might about 
the acquisition/manifestation proposal.  
The claim that one cannot form or manifest the belief that p merely in supposing that 
p for the sake of argument seems unobjectionable. The more controversial aspect of 
the current proposal is that judging that p invariably involves the formation or 
manifestation of the belief that p. A number of prominent authors have argued that it 
is possible for a subject to judge that p even if she does not believe that p. The 
following example, due to Christopher Peacocke, is frequently cited as a justification 
for this claim: 
Someone may judge that undergraduate degrees from countries other than her 
own are of an equal standard to her own, and excellent reasons may be 
operative in her assertions to that effect.  All the same, it may be quite clear, 
in decisions she makes on hiring, or in making recommendations, that she 
does not really have this belief at all. (1999: 242–243) 
If it is possible to judge that p when one does not even believe that p, then it is 
certainly possible to judge that p without forming or manifesting the belief that p. 
Peacocke’s example is not decisive, however. One might think that the subject he 
describes holds both the belief that undergraduate degrees from countries other than 
her own are of an equal standard to her own and the repressed belief that 
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undergraduate degrees from countries other than her own are not of an equal 
standard to her own. Admittedly, this stance implies that it is possible to 
simultaneously believe that p and to believe that not-p, but then again it is not 
obvious that we should deny this possibility. It seems to me, therefore, that one 
might defensibly maintain the view that an important difference between judging 
that p in one’s reasoning and supposing that p for the sake of argument is that, in the 
case of the former but not the latter, the subject acquires or manifests the belief that 
p. 
A more serious reservation about the proposal, I think, is that even if it succeeds in 
identifying a genuine difference between judgement and supposition, in an 
unsupplemented form it cannot explain certain features of judgement and 
supposition that a philosophical account of these cognitive mental events should be 
able to explain. Obviously, this general complaint might be developed in a number 
of different ways. Here I will focus on issues to do with the thinker’s awareness of 
the nature of her own conscious thinking. It is hard to make sense of the idea, I 
suggest, that a thinker might mistakenly take himself to be supposing that p for the 
sake of argument when he is really judging that p in his reasoning. Likewise, it is 
difficult to make sense of the idea that a thinker might mistakenly take himself to be 
judging that p in his reasoning when he is really only supposing that p for the sake of 
argument. How are we to account for these facts? Can we explain them if all we 
have at our disposal is the idea that one act, but not the other, involves the 
acquisition/manifestation of the corresponding belief? 
Before we go any further, a qualification is in order. I have just suggested that it is 
difficult to make sense of the idea that a thinker might mistakenly take himself to be 
supposing that p for the sake of argument when he is really judging that p in his 
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reasoning. It is important that this claim is limited to the mental act of supposing that 
p for the sake of argument. It might be held that, in addition to the mental act of 
supposing that p for the sake of argument, we should also acknowledge the existence 
of a linguistic act of supposing that p for the sake of argument, in something like the 
way we acknowledge both the mental act of judging that p and the speech act of 
asserting that p. One performs this linguistic act when one begins one’s utterance by 
saying, ‘Suppose…’ There appear to be good reasons for allowing the possibility 
that a speaker might be mistaken about the character of his act where the linguistic 
act of supposition is concerned. Whether a speaker has performed the linguistic act 
of supposing that p for the sake of argument depends on the conventional 
significance of the words he has uttered, and the speaker might have mistaken beliefs 
about the conventional significance of his words, or unwittingly fail to utter the 
words he intends to. For example, if the speaker mistakenly believes that beginning 
his utterance with the words ‘I believe…’ is a way of conveying that the force of his 
utterance is to be taken as that of mere supposition, he might take himself to have 
supposed that p when he has really made a (qualified) assertion that p. But this 
possibility does not appear to arise in the case of the mental act of supposing that p 
for the sake of argument. It seems odd to suggest that I can be mistaken about what I 
am up to in introducing and treating p as a premise in my reasoning, where the 
reasoning is in question is a conscious mental activity.  
Can the proposal that supposing that p for the sake of argument is merely a matter of 
introducing and treating p as a premise in one’s reasoning without 
acquiring/manifesting the belief that p explain why it is difficult to make sense of the 
idea that a subject might mistakenly take himself to be supposing that p for the sake 
of argument when he is really judging that p in his reasoning? It is hard to see how it 
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can do so. In general, it seems possible for a subject to manifest the belief that p in 
φ-ing without realizing that he is doing so. Furthermore, it appears to be possible for 
a subject to take himself not to be manifesting the belief that p in φ-ing, even though 
his φ-ing is in fact a manifestation of his belief that p. Think again of the subject in 
Peacocke’s example. In her hiring decisions and the recommendations she makes, 
she manifests the belief that undergraduate degrees from countries other than her 
own are not of an equal standard to her own, but she is not aware that she is doing 
so. Presumably, if the subject were challenged over her biased hiring decisions and 
recommendations, she would deny that they were due to a prejudiced belief she held. 
This suggests that, in general, whether one is manifesting the belief that p in φ-ing is 
not constitutively dependent on one’s higher-order beliefs. This, in turn, suggests 
that whether one is manifesting the belief that p in introducing and treating p as a 
premise in one’s reasoning does not constitutively depend on whether one believes 
that one is performing the mental act supposing that p for the sake of argument. If 
there is no constitutive dependence here, it is difficult to see why one cannot 
mistakenly take oneself to be merely supposing that p for the sake of argument when 
one is, in fact, manifesting the belief that p in reasoning on the assumption that p.  
A philosophical account of the distinction between judgement and supposition for 
the sake of argument that merely appeals to the idea that the former, but not the 
latter, involves the acquisition/manifestation of the belief that p cannot explain why 
it is hard to make sense of the idea that a subject might mistakenly take himself to be 
supposing that p when he is really judging that p in his reasoning. What other 
potential differences are there, then, between judging that p and supposing that p? 
And how might these differences help to explain why this kind of mistake appears to 
be impossible? 
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4. The Teleological Conception of Cognitive Mental Acts 
David Velleman (2000) proposes that belief is distinguished from other cognitive 
attitudes by its possession of a distinctive aim. Belief aims at truth. When one 
believes that p, one accepts that p with the aim of accepting that p only if p. One 
does not have this aim when one accepts that p merely by (e.g.) imagining that p. 
Shah and Velleman (2005) extend this proposal to cognitive mental events: 
[W]hy can’t one arbitrarily affirm that p in such a way as to make a 
judgment?  The reason is that an affirmation that p qualifies as a judgment, 
rather than a mental fiction or hypothesis, only when it is aimed at getting the 
truth value of p right – aimed, that is, at presenting p as true only if it really is 
true. (2005: 504) 
Shah and Velleman go on to make it clear that they regard the presence of a truth-
aim as sufficient for a mental affirmation of p to qualify as a judgement that p. This 
aim is absent when one merely supposes that p for the sake of argument. When one 
supposes that p, one’s aim is to determine or indicate the consequences of p—
perhaps, more specifically, to show that p implies a contradiction, and therefore must 
be false—not to affirm that p only if p is true.  
The proposal that judgement aims at the truth raises many questions, but I want to 
focus, to begin with, on the question of how it might help us to account for the 
subject’s awareness of the nature of her own cognitive mental acts. Relevant here, I 
think, is Shah and Velleman’s further claim that the aims of the subject’s cognitive 
mental acts, unlike the aims of his cognitive mental states, are always realized 
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intentionally.17 Thus, for example, they are committed to the more specific view that 
when one judges that p, one does so with the intention of affirming that p only if p is 
true. This claim might be thought to be relevant to explaining why it is hard to make 
sense of the idea that a subject might mistakenly take himself to be judging that p 
when he is really only supposing that p for the sake of argument in his reasoning. It 
is plausible that agents have privileged access to the intentions with which they act. 
At least normally, when you ask someone why they are acting in a certain way, 
where that question is understood as a request to be told what their purpose or 
intention is in so acting, they are in a position to tell you what their intention is. The 
awareness we have of the character of our conscious thinking might be thought to be 
a consequence of this. In consciously affirming a proposition, a thinker is aware of 
the intention with which he is affirming that proposition, and this is what gives him 
access to the nature of his own conscious thinking—e.g. to whether he is judging 
that a certain proposition is true in his reasoning, or is instead merely supposing that 
it is true for the sake of argument. It is difficult to make sense of the idea (e.g.) that a 
subject might mistakenly take himself to be supposing that p for the sake of 
argument when he is really judging that p in his reasoning because it is difficult to 
make sense of the idea that a subject might be mistaken about the intention with 
which he is affirming that p in his reasoning. On the face of it, then, a teleological 
account of the distinctions between the cognitive acts that constitute our conscious 
thinking is well-positioned to explain why, on the face of it, a subject cannot make 
certain kinds of mistake about what he is up to in his own conscious thinking.  
                                                 
17 They presuppose this view in the following footnote: ‘Because judgement is an act, it differs from 
belief in that it necessarily has a literal aim. Hence, there is no problem accounting for judgment’s 
standard of correctness: its standard of correctness is just the criterion of success associated with the 
intention with which it is made.’ (Shah and Velleman 2005: 531, note 21) 
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If this kind of account of our awareness of the nature of our own conscious cognitive 
acts is to explain why it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a subject might 
mistakenly take himself to be performing some other type of cognitive act when he 
judges that p or supposes that p for the sake of argument, it must be the case that 
when a subject judges that p or supposes that p he affirms that p with a distinctive 
type of intention. If a subject can affirm that p with the same intention both when he 
(e.g.) supposes that p and when he affirms that p in some other way, it cannot be his 
awareness that he is affirming that p with that intention that accounts for his 
knowledge that he is supposing that p rather than affirming that p in that other way. 
As I pointed out earlier, in the case of the act of supposing that p for the sake of 
argument, the most obvious proposal is that the subject affirms that p with the aim of 
determining the consequences of p. A concern one might have here is that it also 
appears to be possible for a subject to judge that p in his reasoning with this 
intention. However, it might be argued here, as Shah and Velleman in effect suggest, 
that when the subject judges that p in his reasoning he affirms that p with an 
additional intention that is absent when he supposes that p for the sake of argument. 
When the subject judges that p in his reasoning he affirms that p with the aim of 
affirming that p only if p is true, but he does not affirm that p with this intention 
when he merely supposes that p for the sake of argument.  
A concern one might have at this point is that there appears to be another type of 
cognitive act, distinct from judgement, that also aims at the truth. According to 
Owens (2003), when one guesses that p one does so with the purpose of guessing 
that p only if p is true. Whether the guesser necessarily guesses with the intention of 
guessing truly is a question I will be considering in more detail in the next chapter. 
For the purposes of the present objection, however, it is sufficient that on at least 
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some occasions on which a subject guesses that p he does so with the intention of 
guessing truly. This much seems undeniable. If this is right, then Shah and Velleman 
are wrong that it suffices for an affirmation that p to constitute a judgement that p 
that the subject affirms that p with the truth-aim. On some occasions on which a 
subject affirms that p with the aim of affirming that p only if p is true, he merely 
guesses, and does not judge, that p. Furthermore, it cannot be just in virtue of my 
awareness that I am affirming that p with the truth-aim that I am aware that I am 
judging that p; this aim can also be present when I am merely guessing that p, and 
not judging that p. 
One response to this difficulty would be to appeal to the idea that judging aims, not 
just at truth, but at knowledge: that is to say, when I judge that p I affirm that p with 
the intention of affirming that p only if I know that p. Guessing certainly doesn’t aim 
at knowledge: guessing is what I resort to when I don’t know the answer to a 
question, or at least take myself not to know the answer.  
In any case, I think that there is a more serious objection to the idea that, when a 
subject judges that p, he does so with a characteristic kind of intention. Suppose, for 
the purposes of argument, that the proposal on the table is that when a subject judges 
that p he affirms that p with the intention of affirming that p only if he knows that p. 
Is this plausible? Hardly. Typically, a subject who judges that p does not intend to 
affirm that p only if he knows that p. This would imply that, when one judges that p, 
the content that p must already have occurred to one, upon which one adopts the 
attention of affirming that p only if one knows that p. But this leaves us with a 
picture upon which one’s conscious thinking is, as it were, pre-empted by a further 
underlying process of thought. This seems absurd.  
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It might be replied to this that rather than claiming that the subject forms an intention 
to affirm a particular proposition only if it is one that he knows each time he makes a 
conscious judgement, which is implausible, we should instead regard the subject as 
having a general intention to judge as true only those propositions that he knows. 
One concern about this proposal is that it appears to result in circularity. How should 
we specify the content of the subject’s general intention? It might be suggested that 
it is an intention each subject has, for any proposition, p, to affirm that p only if he 
knows that p. However, this clearly won’t do. Subjects often affirm propositions in 
their conscious thinking that they are fully aware that they don’t know, and in doing 
so they do not violate any general intention that they have. For this proposal to work, 
therefore, the scope of the general intention must be restricted so that it includes all 
and only those conscious affirmations that constitute judgements. The obvious way 
to do this is to specify its content by saying that each subject has an intention, for 
any proposition, p, to judge that p only if p is true. A problem now, however, is that 
the account is circular: in giving an account of what it is to judge that p, we have had 
to appeal to an intention whose content includes the target notion of judgement.  
Another concern about this proposal is that it is not clear how it can contribute 
towards an account of a subject’s awareness that he is judging that p when he does 
so. This concern is especially pressing in the present context, given that our original 
reason for considering the teleological account was that it appears to be well placed 
to explain why it is hard to make sense of the idea that a subject might make certain 
kinds of error about what he is up to in his own conscious thinking. It appears to be 
well placed to explain this because it seems plausible that agents have privileged 
access to the intentions with which they act. However, if the proponent of the 
teleological account retreats to the view that there is merely a general intention to 
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judge as true only those propositions that one knows, then the view is no longer one 
upon which the subject affirms that p with a particular intention when he judges that 
p. Therefore, we can no longer account for the subject’s awareness that he is judging 
that p by appealing to his awareness that he is affirming that p with a certain 
intention. This is not to deny that the subject has privileged knowledge of his own 
intentions, general or otherwise. It is merely to point out that it is unclear how 
awareness that I have a general intention to judge as true only those propositions that 
I know can account for my awareness that a particular affirmation of mine is a 
judgement rather than, say, a mere supposition.  
Contrary to our initial impression, then, it is not clear that a teleological account of 
cognitive mental events can explain why it is difficult to make sense of the idea that 
a subject might mistakenly take himself to be supposing that p for the sake of 
argument when he is really judging that p in his reasoning, or mistakenly take 
himself to be judging that p when he is really only supposing that p for the sake of 
argument. It is implausible that, when I judge that p, I do so with the intention of 
affirming that p only if I know that p, and it is unclear how a general intention to 
judge as true only those propositions that I know can contribute towards an 
explanation of my awareness that a particular affirmation of mine is a judgement, 
rather than, say, a mere supposition. The suggestion that when I suppose that p for 
the sake of argument I do so with the intention of determining or demonstrating the 
consequences of p is more plausible, but it seems that I might also judge that p in my 
reasoning with this intention. Hence, simply being aware that I am affirming that p 
with this intention cannot be what accounts for my knowledge that I supposing that p 
for the sake of argument, rather than judging that p, in my reasoning.  
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5. Supposition, Judgement and Self-Imposed Constraints 
An account of the nature of the conscious mental acts that occur in conscious 
thinking must be able to explain why it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a 
subject might be mistaken about what he is up to in his own conscious thinking. In 
particular, it must have the resources to explain why it is hard to make sense of the 
idea that a subject might mistakenly take himself to be supposing that p for the sake 
of argument when he is really judging that p in his reasoning, or mistakenly take 
himself to be judging that p when he is really only supposing that p for the sake of 
argument. There is reason to think that the accounts we have considered so far of the 
difference between judgement and supposition for the sake of argument—the 
acquisition/manifestation of belief account, and the teleological approach advocated 
by Shah and Velleman—cannot meet this requirement. Earlier on, I mentioned an 
account of the difference between judgement and this kind of supposition that has 
recently been proposed by Soteriou. In this section, I shall outline this account and 
show how it meets this explanatory requirement.  
Soteriou points out that, both when I judge that p in my reasoning and when merely I 
suppose that p for the sake of argument, I reason on the assumption that p. When I 
reason on the assumption that p, one of the constraints that is operative in my 
reasoning is that of treating p as true in my reasoning. I treat p as true in my 
reasoning by, for example, drawing inferences from the proposition that p, and/or by 
introducing other propositions as a premises in my reasoning that are not 
inconsistent with p (unless they are entailed by p).18 According to Soteriou, when the 
subject supposes that p for the sake of argument, unlike when she judges that p in her 
reasoning, the constraint of treating p as true is a self-imposed constraint on her 
                                                 
18 For this point, see Soteriou (2013: 263). (My wording here follows Soteriou’s own.) 
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reasoning. The subject imposes the constraint on her reasoning by reasoning in 
recognition of that self-imposed constraint. The subject manifests her recognition 
that the constraint of treating p as true in her reasoning is self-imposed in the way in 
which she treats the assumption that p in her reasoning: in particular, she treats the 
assumption that p as an assumption that is to be discharged by, for example, a 
conditional judgement or assertion that is outside the scope of the supposition.  
How does this proposal help us to understand the subject’s awareness of the nature 
of her own conscious thinking? How, in particular, does it help us to understand why 
it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a subject might, for example, mistakenly 
believe himself to be judging that p in his reasoning when he is really supposing that 
p for the sake of argument? Well, suppose that the subject does believe himself to be 
supposing that p for the sake of argument in introducing and treating p as a premise 
in his reasoning. Presumably, this belief will influence the way in which he treats the 
assumption that p in his reasoning. In particular, he will treat the assumption that p 
as an assumption that is to be discharged in the manner of a supposition, and in 
doing so he will manifest his recognition that the constraint of treating p as true is a 
self-imposed constraint on his reasoning. In doing so, the subject makes it the case 
that the constraint of treating p as true in his reasoning is a self-imposed constraint: 
in order to be a source of constraints over his own thinking, it is sufficient for a 
subject to treat himself as such. But supposing that p for the sake of argument just is 
a matter of so treating the assumption that p in one’s reasoning. Hence, on Soteriou’s 
account, there is plausibly a constitutive connection between the belief that one is 
supposing that p for the sake of argument and whether one is supposing that p for the 
sake of argument in introducing and treating p as a premise in one’s reasoning. 
Soteriou’s account is therefore well placed to explain why it hard to make sense of 
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the idea that a subject might mistakenly believe himself to be performing the mental 
act of supposing that p for the sake of argument. 
A similar point can be made about the mental act of judging that p. Whether one is 
judging that p in one’s reasoning depends on how one treats the assumption that p in 
one’s reasoning. There is a sense in which, when one judges that p in one’s 
reasoning, one regards p as something that really is the case. According to Soteriou, 
this is to be captured, at least in part, in terms of the idea that one does not regard the 
constraint of treating p as true as a constraint that is self-imposed. (Soteriou makes a 
further proposal here: that when one judges that p in one’s reasoning, one regards the 
constraint of treating p as true as a constraint that is imposed on one by a fact that 
one acknowledges to obtain. The idea that we need to invoke the notion of 
knowledge in giving a philosophical account of the act of judgement is one that I 
will be considering in detail in the next two chapters.) Presumably, therefore, if the 
subject believes that he is judging that p in his reasoning, he will not treat the 
constraint of treating p as a self-imposed constraint on his reasoning, or treat the 
assumption that p as one that is to be discharged in the manner of a supposition. 
There is therefore a constitutive connection between the belief that one is judging 
that p and whether one is judging that p in one’s reasoning. This explains why it is 
difficult to make sense of the idea that a subject might mistakenly take himself to be 
judging that p in his reasoning when he is really supposing that p for the sake of 
argument.  
Earlier on, I pointed out that a subject who has the capacity to engage in enquiry is 
plausibly a subject who has the capacity to engage in forms of acceptance besides 
belief. Such a subject has the capacity for higher-order attitudes—e.g. to recognize 
that he does not know, or have a belief about, the answer to a certain question. One 
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might think that the capacity to recognize ‘gaps’ in one’s knowledge, or in one’s 
beliefs, goes along with the capacity to ‘fill those gaps’ (at least temporarily) by 
engaging in other forms of acceptance—e.g. by making assumptions for practical 
purposes, or assumptions for the sake of argument. So far, I have been concerned 
with marking distinctions between different types of cognitive mental event— 
specifically, between judgement and supposition for the sake of argument—but there 
are also issues about how to mark distinctions between cognitive mental states. 
Believing that p is a mental state, but it is plausible that we should also think of 
assuming that p for practical purposes as a matter of acquiring a state that plays a 
certain role in one’s reasoning and action. How, then, should we explain the 
difference between the state one is in when one believes that p and the state one is in 
when one is merely assuming that p for practical purposes? This is the issue I want 
to address in the next section. In doing so, I shall once again be drawing on 
Soteriou’s idea of self-imposed constraints on one’s reasoning.  
6. Believing that p and Assuming that p for Practical Purposes 
It is sometimes suggested that we can provide an adequate account of what it is to 
believe that p in simple motivational terms. To believe that p is to be disposed to 
behave as if p is true. How are we to understand the notion of a subject being 
disposed to behave as if p is true? It is well known that we cannot say, for example, 
that to believe that it is raining is a matter of being disposed to assert that it is raining 
in response to a query about the weather, being disposed to take one’s umbrella 
when one leaves the house, and so on; someone who wants to conceal the state of the 
weather from others, and who enjoys getting wet, can believe that it is raining 
without being disposed to do either of these things. What one is disposed to do is 
determined by what one desires as well as by what one believes. However, this does 
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not preclude a more sophisticated general motivational account of belief that takes 
into account the role of the subject’s desires in fixing her dispositions. For example, 
it might be held that ‘all that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a belief is that it 
dispose the subject to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of his 
desires if its content were true’ (Velleman 2000: 255).19 Velleman calls this view the 
‘purely motivational conception’ of belief. The fact that a subject who believes that 
it is raining and who wants to get wet is not disposed to take their umbrella with 
them when they leave the house does not refute the purely motivational conception 
of belief, because in being disposed not to take an umbrella with them they are 
disposed to behave in a way that is conducive to the satisfaction of their desires, 
provided that it is actually raining.   
In § 2 I considered the proposal that believing that p involves being disposed to 
judge that p. One objection to this proposal was that some animals appear to be 
capable of belief but not judgement. Although this was not a good objection to the 
proposal that an enquirer believes that p only if he is disposed to judge that p, it is 
interesting to consider such believers again in the context of the purely motivational 
conception of belief. When we are dealing with a believer of this kind—i.e. a 
believer who is incapable of judgement—it is plausible that the kind of state we 
report when we say that the subject ‘believes’ that p can be accounted for in purely 
motivational terms. For a dog, say, to ‘believe’ that you have thrown the ball in a 
certain direction is a matter of the dog being in a state that disposes it to behave in 
ways that would be conducive to the satisfaction of its desires if it were true that you 
had thrown the ball in that direction. We should not assume, however, that when we 
                                                 
19 For a classic statement of this view, see Braithwaite 1932–1933. I do not mean to suggest by 
quoting his statement of view that Velleman endorses this thesis; as we will see in more detail in a 
moment, he emphatically rejects it.    
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speak of belief in relation to enquirers we are reporting the same kind of 
psychological state that we are reporting when we speak of belief in relation to more 
primitive subjects. An enquirer is capable of engaging in forms of acceptance that 
are beyond the capacities of non-judging animals. An enquirer can assume for 
practical purposes that p, but, despite all the ‘anthropomorphic apparatus’ we project 
onto dogs,20 the idea that dogs are capable of making assumptions of this kind seems 
absurd. As I shall argue in a moment, the state of assuming that p for practical 
purposes also plays the motivational role identified above—i.e. that of disposing the 
subject to behave in ways that would be conducive to the satisfaction of his desires if 
it were true that p—but when we speak of belief in relation to enquirers, I think that 
we normally intend to refer to a kind of psychological state that contrasts with 
merely assuming that p for practical purposes. It follows that we cannot give an 
account of this kind of psychological state, which I referred to earlier as ‘outright 
belief’, in terms of the purely motivational conception of belief. That conception 
seems fitted only to the ‘beliefs’ of more primitive subjects.  
Velleman (2000) also objects to the purely motivational conception of belief on the 
basis that there are other attitudes that play the relevant motivational role. However, 
there are two respects in which my view is weaker than Velleman’s. Firstly, as I 
have just indicated, I am sympathetic to the view that the purely motivational 
conception may provide an adequate account of the ‘beliefs’ of more primitive 
subjects. Secondly, Velleman argues that the motivational role that the purely 
motivational conception asserts to be distinctive of belief is in fact common to all of 
the cognitive attitudes. (Since he holds that the cognitive attitudes include supposing 
that p and imagining that p, it follows that, on his view, a subject who merely 
                                                 
20 The phrase comes from Williams (1973: 138).  
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imagines that p is disposed to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of 
her desires if p were true.)21 I shall not commit to this further claim here. To object 
to the purely motivational conception on the grounds that it fails to distinguish belief 
from other propositional attitudes, it is not necessary to make the strong claim that 
the relevant motivational role is common to all of the cognitive attitudes; it is 
necessary only to identify one propositional attitude, distinct from belief, that 
motivates the subject in the appropriate way. I will now argue that assuming that p 
for practical purposes is just such an attitude.  
Sometimes one recognizes that one ought to do in a particular practical situation 
depends on the answer to a question one is uncertain about. One way of dealing with 
this problem is to try to determine the answer to the question before one acts, but 
sometimes this is impossible, or at least impractical. In such a situation, it is still 
possible to make an assumption about the answer to the relevant question. Having 
done so, one is disposed to behave to ways that would promote the satisfaction of 
one’s desires if the assumption one has made were true. But making the assumption 
that p in these circumstances does not amount to forming the belief that p; one is 
merely assuming that p for practical purposes. An example, due to Bratman, helps to 
clarify and reinforce the general argument: 
 Building Costs22 
I am planning for a major construction project to begin next month. I need to 
decide now whether to do the entire project at once or instead to break the 
project into two parts, to be executed separately. The rationale for the second 
                                                 
21 Velleman in fact spends the bulk of his paper arguing that imagining that p is an attitude that 
disposes the subject to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of her desires if p were 
true. For further critical discussion of this claim, see O’Brien (2005). 
22 This name for the case is my own.  
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strategy is that I am unsure whether I presently have the financial resources 
to do the whole thing at once. I know that in the case of each sub-
contractor—carpenter, plumber, and on on—it is only possible at present to 
get an estimate of the range of potential costs. In the face of this uncertainty I 
proceed in a cautious way: In the case of each sub-contractor I take it for 
granted that the total costs will be at the top of the estimated range. On the 
basis of these assumptions I determine whether I have at present enough 
money to do the whole project at once. In contrast, if you offered me a bet on 
the actual total cost of the project—the winner being the person whose guess 
is closest to the actual total—I would reason differently. (Bratman 1992: 6) 
In this case the agent assumes, in the face of uncertainty, that the total costs for each 
sub-contractor will be at the top of the estimated range. Having done so, the agent is 
disposed to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction of his desires if it 
were true that the total costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of the 
estimated range. But the agent does not believe that the total costs for each sub-
contractor will be at the top of the estimated range; he is merely assuming that this is 
so for practical purposes. Hence, a mental state with the content that p may fail to be 
the belief that p even if it plays the motivational role identified by the purely 
motivational conception of belief. It follows that the condition identified by that 
conception is at most necessary, but not sufficient, for an attitude to qualify as a 
belief.  
Is there any way for the proponent of the purely motivational conception to respond 
to this objection? He has two options here: he can argue either that, contrary to 
appearances, the agent of building costs is not a mental state, with the content that 
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the total costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of the estimated range, that 
disposes him to act in ways that would be conducive to the satisfaction of his desires 
if its content were true, or else he can acknowledge that the agent is in such a state, 
but argue that, contrary to appearances, the state in question is one of belief. The first 
option seems to me a non-starter. Once the agent has assumed that the building costs 
for each sub-contractor will be at the top of the estimated range, the assumption 
guides the agent’s conduct in a way that would promote the satisfaction of his 
desires if its content were to be true. For example, if the agent calculates that if the 
cost for each sub-contractor is at the top of estimated range then he will not be able 
to afford to do the whole project in one go, he will break the project into two parts. 
This course of action is the one that would promote the satisfaction of his desires 
were it to be true that the cost for each sub-contractor will be at the top of the 
estimated range.  
What of the second option of arguing that the agent of building costs does actually 
believe that the costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of estimated range? In 
support of this contention, it might be pointed out that it is not wholly unnatural to 
say that, in the face of uncertainty about the costs of the project, the agent decides to 
believe that the costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of estimated range. 
Why shouldn’t we take this belief-ascription at face value? One problem with doing 
so is that it seems to lead to the conclusion that the agent of building costs, on a 
certain way developing the case, has beliefs that violate rationality constraints on 
belief. It is conceivable that the agent actually believes that the costs for each sub-
contractor are likely to be in the middle of the estimated range. After all, he assumes 
that they will be at the top of the estimated range not because he thinks this is the 
most likely outcome, but because he wants to guard against the possibility of trying 
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to do the whole project in one go if it is beyond his means to do so. In relation to this 
version of the case, the objector is apparently committed to the claim that the agent 
believes both that the costs for each sub-contractor are likely to be in the middle of 
the estimated range, and that the costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of 
the estimated range. Surely the agent shouldn’t hold both of these beliefs at once. On 
the face of it, however, it isn’t appropriate to criticize the attitudes of the agent of 
building costs on this basis. (Perhaps he is being overly cautious or paranoid in 
assuming that the costs for each sub-contractor will be at the top of the estimated 
range, but then the criticism is not that his beliefs are in tension with one another.) 
We should therefore reject the claim that the agent believes that the costs for each 
sub-contractor will be at the top of the estimated range. Rather, this is something that 
he is merely assuming for practical purposes. 
Such examples should lead us to reject the idea that the purely motivational 
conception of belief succeeds in explaining how believing that p differs from other 
stative propositional attitudes. An agent who is merely assuming that p for practical 
purposes is also in a state that plays the relevant motivational role. How, then, does 
believing that p differ from the state one acquires when one assumes that p for 
practical purposes?  
An enquirer who has the outright belief that p is disposed to judge that p. Merely 
saying this fails to identify a respect in which believing that p differs from the state 
one is in when one is assuming that p for practical purposes. Someone who is 
assuming that p for practical purposes is disposed to plan on the assumption that p, 
and when such a subject plans on the assumption that p because he is assuming that 
p for practical purposes, it may legitimately be said that he ‘judges’ that p in his 
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reasoning. (In ordinary language, we do not appear to reserve a special term to report 
the way in which a subject affirms that p when he plans on the assumption that p 
because he is assuming that p for practical purposes.) However, the notion of 
judgement in play in the present discussion is a refined philosophical one. Judging in 
this sense contrasts with merely supposing that p for the sake of argument. I argued 
earlier, following Soteriou, that part of the difference between such judgement and 
supposition for the sake of argument is that when the subject judges that p in his 
reasoning the constraint of treating p as true is not a self-imposed constraint on his 
reasoning. What I now want to suggest, again following Soteriou (2013: 351), is that 
when a subject plans on the assumption that p because she is assuming that p for 
practical purposes, the constraint of treating p as true is likewise a constraint on his 
reasoning that is self-imposed. Thus, the fact that believing that p involves a 
disposition to judge that p, in this sense, does identify a distinctive feature of belief 
vis-à-vis the attitude of assuming that p for practical purposes.  
We should not advocate the claim that when a subject plans on the assumption that p 
because he is assuming that p for practical purposes, the constraint of treating p as 
true is self-imposed, on the basis of the premise that when a subject plans on the 
assumption that p because he is assuming that p for practical purposes, he merely 
supposes that p for the sake of argument. When you plan on the assumption that p 
because you are assuming that p for practical purposes, you do not merely suppose 
that p for the sake of argument in your planning.23 You can suppose that p for the 
sake of argument in your planning, but when you do so you will be prepared to make 
at most conditional decisions on the basis of the assumption that p—i.e. decisions of 
the form: if p, then I will φ. By contrast, when you plan on the assumption that p 
                                                 
23 This point is noted by Bratman (1992). 
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because you are assuming that p for practical purposes, you are prepared to make 
unconditional decisions on the basis of the assumption that p. So in accepting the 
claim that when a subject reasons (e.g. plans) on the assumption that p because she is 
assuming that p for practical purposes, the constraint of treating p as true is self-
imposed, we commit ourselves to the idea that there are further ways of introducing 
and treating p as a premise in one’s reasoning, besides supposition, that involve self-
imposed constraints on one’s reasoning.  
In the case of supposition, the subject manifests her recognition that the constraint of 
treating p as true is self-imposed by treating the assumption that p as an assumption 
that is to be discharged by (e.g.) a conditional judgement or assertion. But when a 
subject reasons on the assumption that p because she is assuming that p for practical 
purposes, she does not regard the assumption that p as an assumption that is to be 
discharged in this way. How, then, does she manifest her recognition that the 
constraint of treating p as true is self-imposed? A natural proposal is that she 
manifests her recognition that the constraint is self-imposed by treating the 
assumption that p as one that she is making at least partly for practical reasons, 
relative to some project that she has. For example, she may recognize that she is 
assuming that p in a certain context because of an asymmetry in the cost of errors; if 
she were to plan on p when not-p, the consequences would be manageable, but were 
she to plan on not-p when p, the consequences would be disastrous. By contrast, 
when the subject judges that p in her reasoning, she does not regard the assumption 
that p as one that she is making at least partly for practical reasons.   
To summarize, my aim in this section has been to explain how believing that p 
differs from merely assuming that p for practical purposes. I began by considering 
the proposal that belief is marked out from other forms of acceptance by its 
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distinctive motivational role: a subject who believes that p is disposed to act in ways 
that would be conducive to the satisfaction of his desires if p were true. Although the 
purely motivational conception of belief may be adequate as an account of the 
‘beliefs’ of primitive subjects who aren’t capable of engaging in sophisticated forms 
of conscious thinking and alternative forms of acceptance, it is inadequate as an 
account of the beliefs of enquirers. When we speak of belief in relation to enquirers, 
I think that we normally intend to refer to a kind of psychological state, which I 
earlier referred to as ‘outright belief’, that contrasts with merely assuming that p for 
practical purposes. However, as I argued, the state of assuming that p for practical 
purposes also plays the motivational role that the purely motivational conception 
asserts to be distinctive of belief. In order to mark what is distinctive of outright 
belief, we can appeal to the idea that a subject who has the outright belief that p is 
disposed to consciously judge that p. However, more needs to be said here, because 
it may also be said that a subject who is merely assuming that p for practical 
purposes is disposed to ‘judge’ that p in his planning. I appealed at this point to ideas 
I introduced earlier on when I was discussing the difference between judging that p 
in one’s reasoning and merely supposing that p for the sake of argument. When one 
supposes that p for the sake of argument the constraint of treating p as true in one’s 
reasoning is self-imposed, and one regards it as such. This is not the case when one 
judges that p in one’s reasoning. I suggested that, when a subject plans on the 
assumption that p because he is assuming that p for practical purposes, he likewise 
regards the constraint of treating p as true as self-imposed, although we should be 
careful to note that this is not because he is supposing that p for the sake of 
argument. Thus, although a subject who is assuming that p for practical purposes 
may be said to have ‘judged’ that p in his planning, he has not judged that p in the 
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sense that involves not treating the constraint of treating p as true as a self-imposed 
constraint on his reasoning.  
7. Summary 
My focus in this chapter has been on the question of the conditions under which an 
enquirer believes that p. I have advanced three main claims. The first is that, when 
an enquirer has the outright (as opposed to the repressed) belief that p, he is disposed 
to judge that p. We should understand the problematic reasoning to concern outright 
belief, since the claim that truly believing that p is just as good as knowing that p is 
plausible only in relation to outright belief. Secondly, when it comes to giving an 
account of what is distinctive of judging that p, part of what we should be appealing 
to is the idea that, when a subject judges that p in his reasoning, the constraint of 
treating p as true in his reasoning is not self-imposed, and neither does the subject 
regard it as such. Finally, at least part of what is distinctive of believing that p, as 
opposed to merely assuming that p for practical purposes, is that it involves a 
disposition to judge that p in this sense.  
In the next chapter, I will be investigating the nature of another kind of mental act 
which, like supposition for the sake of argument, is distinct from judgement. The act 
I have in mind is that of guessing. What is the difference between guessing that p 
and consciously judging that p? Is it right to think that, when a subject guesses that 
p, he necessarily does so with a characteristic type of purpose or intention—e.g. that 
of guessing that p only if p is true? These are some of the issues, amongst others, that 
I will be investigating. I will ultimately be arguing, in Chapter 4, that considerations 
about the difference between guessing and judging can be used to motivate the claim 
that, when a subject judges that p, he takes himself to know that p. Given the 
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dispositional link between outright belief and judgement, this claim is relevant to 
how we ought to respond to the problematic reasoning.  
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Chapter 3 
Guessing 
Although philosophers often use the term ‘guess’ and its inflections in their writings, 
they rarely pay explicit attention to the question of what guessing is. Perhaps this is 
because it is assumed that guessing is not a particularly interesting propositional 
attitude in comparison to attitudes such as knowing that p or believing that p. I think 
this assumption is mistaken.  Closer inspection of guessing reveals it to be a 
surprisingly complex phenomenon that can only be understood through sustained 
philosophical reflection: in particular, it is not entirely straightforward to provide an 
adequate account of the conditions under which a subject is guessing that p in 
answering that p to some question. A consequence of this is that the claims 
philosophers have made about guessing often turn out to contain significant errors 
when they are subjected to careful scrutiny. My main aim in this chapter is to correct 
these errors by providing a more nuanced account of the conditions under which a 
subject is guessing that p.  
In § 1, I delineate the kind of guessing that is my concern by distinguishing some 
different ways in which the term ‘guess’ is ordinarily used. § 2 outlines the account 
of guessing proposed by Roy Sorensen (1984). In § 3 I argue that it is possible for a 
person’s answer to a question to satisfy the conditions identified by Sorensen 
without being a guess about the answer to that question, because an answer to a 
question can satisfy Sorensen’s conditions without being subject to the standard of 
success constitutive of guessing. I go on to consider (and reject) the proposal that 
guessing necessarily aims at the truth, and that this is why truth is the constitutive 
standard of success for guessing. § 4 discusses the relationship between guessing, 
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believing and knowing. I argue, contrary to Sorensen, that guessing that p is not 
incompatible with knowing that p or believing that p, and that we should instead 
conceive of the relationship between guessing and knowing at least partly in higher-
order terms.  
1. Uses of ‘Guess’ 
The term ‘guess’ can be used in a variety of ways. Sometimes, for instance, we 
characterize a subject’s belief that p as a guess. In philosophy this use of the term 
‘guess’ is frequently invoked in discussions of the analysis of propositional 
knowledge. The following passage from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
which I quoted in Chapter 1, provides an illustration: 
Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes on no particular 
basis that it will land tails. If by chance the coin does land tails, then 
William’s belief was true; but a lucky guess such as this one is no 
knowledge. (Ichikawa and Steup 2013: Section 1.3) 
As the passage makes clear, by describing a subject’s belief that p as a guess one 
conveys that the subject’s belief, if true, is true by luck, and therefore does not 
constitute knowledge. It should also be noted that we can use the term ‘guess’ to 
report doxastic states of mind aside from the outright belief that p. For example, the 
sentence ‘Tim’s guess is that it will rain’ is naturally understood to report the fact 
that Tim estimates that it will rain, and ‘Tim estimates that it will rain’ can be used 
to report Tim’s belief that rain is more likely than not.   
My concern in this paper is not with the varieties of doxastic state that are reported 
or characterized by such uses of ‘guess’, for the kind of guessing that interests me is 
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an event and not a state. Relevant here is the use of ‘guess’ as a success verb. 
‘Guess’ and its inflections are naturally understood to function as success verbs in 
sentences like the following: 
 Olly guessed that the defendant was guilty; 
 Molly guessed who was at the door; 
 Maggie managed to guess where the key was hidden. 
In such sentences ‘guess’ is naturally understood to report an event that occurred at a 
certain time, rather than some state that obtained over an internal of time. We can 
think of that event as the event of a subject answering a question, at least in her own 
mind. In the first example above, for instance, we can think of the event reported as 
the event of Olly answering the question of whether the defendant was guilty. 
Furthermore, when ‘guess’ is used as a success verb, it not only implies that the 
subject answered the relevant question, but also that she answered the relevant 
question successfully. What does success consist in here? It is not sufficient for 
guessing the answer to a question that one merely manages to give an answer to the 
question. Rather, one has to give the answer—i.e. the true answer, or at least a true 
answer, if the question has more than one true answer. Notice, however, that the 
understanding of ‘guess’ as a success verb in these sentences is not compulsory; I 
can say, without contradiction, ‘Olly guessed that the defendant was guilty, but 
actually he was innocent’.24 More generally, we can use the term ‘guess’ to report an 
event of a subject answering a question that will count as a success just in case the 
                                                 
24 Admittedly, it is more difficult to conceive of circumstances in which one could say, without 
contradiction, ‘Maggie managed to guess where the key was hidden, but she was mistaken’.  The 
reason is that ‘managed’ suggests that there was at least a chance that Maggie would fail; and whilst it 
is readily intelligible that she might have failed to successfully guess where the key was hidden, it is 
not so readily intelligible that she might have failed to make any guess at all.   
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answer she gave is true, but also indicate that the subject was unsuccessful, or at 
least leave it open whether her attempt to answer the question truly was successful. 
This is the kind of guessing that I shall be concerned with in this chapter. 
It is not sufficient for a subject to guess that p, in this sense, that she answers p to a 
question in conditions in which her answer will count as a success if and only if it is 
true. If you enquire after my father’s middle name and I tell you that it is ‘Evan’, 
then the relevant criterion of success applies to my answer, but I am clearly not 
guessing that my father’s middle name is ‘Evan’. One question that needs to be 
addressed, then, is what further conditions need to obtain in order for a subject’s 
answer to constitute a guess. We should also try to say something about the 
conditions under which a subject’s answers to questions are regulated by the 
standard of success constitutive of guessing.  In the next section I lay the 
groundwork for approaching these issues by outlining the account of guessing 
proposed by Sorensen (1984). 
2. Sorensen’s Account of Guessing 
Strictly speaking, Sorensen does not attempt to specify necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any subject to guess that P, but rather necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a rational subject to make what Sorensen calls a unique alternative 
guess. A guess is a unique alternative guess ‘just in case the guess is a direct answer 
to a question which the guesser believes has exactly one correct answer’ (1984: 80). 
(In discussing the sense in which making a guess involves answering a question, 
Sorensen claims that the question needn’t be ‘explicitly posed’ to the guesser, but 
‘need only express his puzzlement’ (ibid.).) Since someone who guesses the answer 
to a question might (correctly) believe that the question has more than one correct 
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answer, not all guesses are unique alternative guesses. On Sorensen’s view, a 
rational subject S makes a unique alternative guess that p1 iff: 
(1) There is no answer to the question, p2, such that S believes that p2 is more 
likely than p1. 
(2) For any answer to the question, p3, if S picks p3, then p3 = p1. 
(3) S does not believe that p1. (1984: 83) 
Sorensen refers to (1) as the nondomination condition for guessing, (2) as the 
uniqueness condition for guessing, and (3) as the condition that believing is 
incompatible with guessing (BIG). As seems reasonable, I shall understand 
Sorensen’s account as an attempt to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the kind of guessing I am interested in.   
I wish to make two comments about Sorensen’s third condition, BIG.  The first is 
that BIG is intuitively plausible. If I have a sincerely held false belief that the Battle 
of Hastings was fought in 1266—perhaps one I picked up as a result of a 
typographical error in a history book—then intuitively I am not guessing that the 
Battle of Hastings was fought in 1266 when I answer ‘1266’ to the question ‘When 
was the Battle of Hastings?’. The second is that Sorensen observes that the 
incompatibility of guessing that p with knowing that p (KIG) follows from the 
conjunction of BIG with the popular thesis that one knows that p only if one believes 
that p. This consequence speaks in favour of KIG, in Sorensen’s view, because one 
of the most striking features of our ordinary thinking about guessing is the contrast 
we recognize between guessing and knowing. A natural response to a contestant 
getting an esoteric question right is to ask, ‘Did she know that that was the answer, 
or was she only guessing?’ Relatedly, Sorensen argues that we should accept KIG 
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because it ‘explains why it is so natural to infer ‘John did not know that p’ from 
‘John guessed that p’’ (p. 82). Such mundane facts make it plausible that there is an 
important relationship between guessing that p and knowing that p, and also that this 
relationship can be captured in terms of KIG, i.e., the simple claim that S guesses 
that p, at some time t, only if S does not know that p at t. Although Sorensen does 
not include KIG in his account of guessing, since it would be redundant, he both 
endorses KIG and takes his account to be supported by the fact that it entails KIG. 
As I said earlier, Sorensen explicitly states that his claims about guessing ‘should be 
understood as claims limited to unique alternative guesses’ (1984: 80). Since, 
however, none of the objections I wish to make to his account can be avoided by 
taking note of this limitation, from now on I will simplify matters by ignoring it. 
Furthermore, Sorensen limits his analysis to rational subjects, by which he appears 
to mean subjects who always act rationally. By contrast, I wish to arrive at an 
account of the conditions under which any subject guesses that p, so I will also 
usually ignore Sorensen’s limitation of his account to rational subjects.   
3. Guessing and its Standard of Success 
It is, I think, fairly straightforward to come up circumstances in which a subject 
would not be guessing that p in answering that p to some question, even though he 
satisfies Sorensen’s conditions for doing so. I shall begin this section by stating a 
counterexample of this kind—i.e. a counterexample to the sufficiency of Sorensen’s 
conditions for guessing. I shall then consider how we should respond to this 
difficulty.  
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Imagine that you are taking part in a multiple-choice test with the following twist: 
you are rewarded for giving false answers, and punished for giving true ones. You 
are asked to identify the capital of Nigeria out of the following four options: Accra, 
Abuja, Alofi and Apia. Let us suppose that your knowledge of African capitals is 
poor, so that you are forced to pick one of the possible answers at random. Under 
such conditions, in picking the answer ‘Abuja’ you clearly satisfy the conditions 
Sorensen lays down as necessary and sufficient for guessing that Abuja is the capital 
of Nigeria: in particular, (1) there is no answer to the question that you believe to be 
more likely than Abuja, (2) there is no other answer you pick, and (3) you do not 
believe that Abuja is the capital of Abuja. The problem is that it seems very 
counterintuitive to describe you as guessing that Abuja is the capital of Nigeria in the 
envisaged circumstances. If this is right, then satisfying the conditions identified by 
Sorensen is not sufficient for you to guess that p in answering that p.   
When it comes to explaining why you weren’t guessing that Abuja is the capital of 
Nigeria, the obvious thing to say is that you weren’t guessing because your answer 
wasn’t subject to the standard of success constitutive of guessing. In the envisaged 
scenario you are rewarded for giving false answers, not true ones; thus, the standard 
of success for your answers is falsity, not truth.25 It is not sufficient for a person’s 
answer to a question to be subject to the standard of success constitutive of guessing 
that the person satisfies the conditions identified by Sorensen in answering as she 
does; in particular, a person’s answer to a question can fail to be subject to this 
standard of correctness even if there is no answer to the question that he believes to 
be more likely than the one that he gives.  
                                                 
25 Notice that, considered as an answer to the question ‘Which of these cities is not the capital of 
Nigeria?’, your answer does count as a success just in case it is true that Abuja is not the capital of 
Nigeria. This is why it is natural to say that, in the envisaged circumstances, you are guessing that 
Abuja is not the capital of Nigeria.   
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The proposal that truth is the standard of success for guessing is related to the 
proposal that guessing aims at the truth. As Shah and Velleman point out, one’s 
goals or purposes ‘establish criteria of success for the activities they regulate’ (2005: 
498). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the view that it is constitutive of 
guessing that one guesses with the aim or purpose of guessing truly is advocated by 
David Owens (2003). Owens provides the following general account of what it is for 
a propositional attitude to aim at the truth: 
Φ-ing that p aims at the truth if and only if someone who Φs that p does so 
with the purpose of Φ-ing that p only if p is true. (2003: 289) 
Having introduced this general account of what it is for a propositional attitude to 
aim at the truth, Owens goes on to claim that ‘[g]uessing aims at the truth in the 
sense just defined’ (2003: 290). So, on Owens’s view, S guesses that p only if S does 
so with the purpose of guessing that p only if p is true. The proponent of the view 
that guessing aims at the truth can now explain why truth is the standard of success 
for guessing by appealing to the idea that the guesser necessarily guesses with the 
purpose of guessing truly. The criterion of success for guessing is established by the 
guesser’s own aim.   
Attractive as this idea seems, it cannot be quite right. The problem is that there 
appear to be cases in which a subject’s answers to questions are regulated by the 
relevant standard of success, and thus may constitute guesses about the answers to 
those questions, despite the fact that the subject is indifferent to whether she guesses 
successfully.26 Imagine, for instance, that you ask me to guess the winning numbers 
                                                 
26 Thanks to Quassim Cassam for drawing my attention to cases of this kind. The example that 
follows is his own. 
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in last night’s national lottery draw. Neither of us bought a ticket, and I don’t stand 
to gain anything by guessing correctly; it’s just a game. Since I didn’t see the draw, I 
don’t know what the winning numbers were. After several unsuccessful attempts to 
guess the winning numbers in last night’s draw, you ask me to guess the winning 
numbers in last week’s draw. By now I’m getting tired of playing, but you insist that 
I carry on making guesses, and I do so. Suppose that the next answer I give is that 
the winning numbers in last week’s draw were 2, 9, 18, 27, 33, and 46. It is 
intuitively plausible that in giving this answer I am guessing that the winning 
numbers in last week’s draw were 2, 9, 18, 27, 33, and 46. But do I guess with the 
purpose of guessing that the winning numbers were 2, 9, 18, 27, 33, and 46 only if 
those were, in fact, the winning numbers? It seems not. I don’t guess with the 
purpose of guessing truly if I don’t care whether I guess truly or not, and in the 
envisaged circumstances I don’t care; all I want to do is keep you happy by 
continuing to play your tedious game. If this is right then it’s false that guessing aims 
at the truth in the sense defined by Owens: someone who guesses that p does not 
necessarily do so with the purpose of guessing that p only if p is true. But if we 
cannot appeal to the purpose of the guesser in accounting for guessing’s standard of 
success in such cases of ‘indifferent guessing’, what are we to say about them? 
The obvious thing to say is that what cases of indifferent guessing draw our attention 
to is the fact that a person’s answers to questions may be subject to the standard of 
success constitutive of guessing in virtue of features of the situation besides the 
purpose with which he answers. It is plausible in example above, for instance, that 
my answers are subject to the standard of success constitutive of guessing because I 
am participating in a guessing game. One of the rules of the guessing game you and I 
tacitly acknowledge is that I win the game by giving the true answer to the question 
119 
 
asked. Winning the game is a form of success, so the criterion for winning the game 
establishes a standard of success for my answers. My answers are subject to this 
standard of success not because I answer with the purpose of answering truly, then, 
but because I knowingly participate in a game in which success consists in giving the 
true answer to the question asked. This is not to say, of course, that whenever a 
subject makes a guess about the answer to a question her answer is regulated by the 
standard of success constitutive of guessing in virtue of the fact that she is a witting 
participant in a guessing game. One can take this line about this kind of case of 
indifferent guessing consistently with holding that, in cases in which the subject is 
not indifferent, her answers to questions may be regulated by guessing’s standard of 
success in virtue of the fact that she answers with the purpose of answering truly. 
One concern about an account of guessing that gives up on the idea that the guesser 
necessarily guesses with the purpose of guessing truly is whether it can adequately 
account for certain doxastic constraints on guessing. It is intuitive that S cannot be 
guessing that p if S knows or believes that p is false.27 For example, since I know 
that 2 is the only even prime number, I cannot guess that 4 is the only even prime. It 
is not difficult to explain why guessing is subject to this doxastic constraint if we 
accept the view that the guesser necessarily guesses with the purpose of guessing 
truly. One cannot do something with a certain purpose if one believes that one 
cannot achieve that purpose by doing that thing.28 So the purpose that ensures that 
                                                 
27 For reasons given in § 4, this claim cannot be strictly correct. However, it is false for reasons that 
needn’t detain us here. 
28 Admittedly, I may open the curtains with the purpose of cleaning the windows despite the fact that I 
know that I cannot clean the windows simply by opening the curtains. But, in Michael Bratman’s 
terms, this is a case in which I open the curtains with the further purpose or intention of cleaning the 
windows (see Bratman 1987: 128–130). I see my action of opening the curtains as part of a plan that 
includes a distinct subsequent action of cleaning the windows. Thus, I do not open the curtains with 
the purpose of thereby cleaning the windows. But when I answer a question with the purpose of 
answering the question truly, I do answer with the purpose of thereby answering truly; I don’t merely 
see my act of answering as part of a plan that includes a subsequent action of answering the question 
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the subject’s answer is regulated by guessing’s standard of success also ensures that 
the doxastic constraint applies. But what about cases in which a subject’s answer is 
regulated by the relevant standard of success not in virtue of the purpose with which 
she answers, but rather in virtue of the fact that she is participating in a guessing 
game? Here we cannot explain why her answers are subject to the doxastic constraint 
by appealing to the purpose with which she answers. It also seems clear the relevant 
doxastic constraint still applies: no matter how indifferent I am about whether I 
guess correctly, I am not guessing that the winning numbers were 2, 9, 18, 27, 33, 
and 46 if I know that these were not the winning numbers.  
It might be argued that I would not be guessing in naming these numbers because I 
cannot continue to participate in a game consistently with deliberately trying to lose 
it. Since I am no longer participating in the game, and do not myself have the 
purpose of answering truly, my answers are no longer regulated by the standard of 
success constitutive of guessing, and thus do not constitute guesses. However, it’s 
not clear that deliberately losing a game is always inconsistent with playing it: if it 
were, there would be no such thing as letting your opponent win, as opposed to 
terminating the game but pretending to play on in order to trick your opponent into 
thinking that he had won.   
One way of explaining why one’s guesses are subject to the doxastic constraint even 
in cases of indifferent guessing is to acknowledge that cases in which the subject 
answers a question with the purpose of answering truly enjoy a primary status in 
relation to our concept of guessing.29 The thought here is this. In central or paradigm 
cases, a subject is guessing that p only if the subject answers that p with the purpose 
                                                                                                                                          
truly. And, in general, it seems that I cannot do something with the purpose of thereby -ing if I 
believe that I cannot  by doing that thing.   
29 My thinking here is indebted to Steglich-Petersen (2006). 
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of answering truly.  In more general terms, our concept of guessing is most basically 
the concept of a ‘goal-oriented action-type’ (Steglich-Petersen 2006: 511). This 
purpose or goal generates a standard of success for guessing, and it is also the source 
of the doxastic constraint that a subject cannot be guessing that p if he know or 
believes p to be false. But a subject may satisfy the doxastic constraint, and his 
answer be subject to the relevant standard of success, despite the fact that he does 
not answer with the purpose of answering truly. If he satisfies these conditions, and 
any others required for guessing aside from having the aforementioned purpose, then 
there’s a derivative manner in which he counts as guessing that p despite the fact that 
he lacks the purpose present in paradigm cases of guessing. To advocate this line of 
thought is to acknowledge that there’s something importantly right about Owens’s 
proposal that guessing aims at the truth: one cannot understand our concept of 
guessing without understanding that guessing paradigmatically involves answering a 
question with the purpose of answering truly.  However, we are prepared to apply 
the concept in cases where the relevant goal or purpose is absent provided that the 
subject meets other conditions on performing an action of the relevant type. Thus, it 
would be a mistake to regard satisfying the truth-aim condition, as construed by 
Owens, as strictly necessary for guessing that p. 
Does Sorensen’s proposal that a person cannot be guessing that p in answering that p 
if he believes that some alternative answer to the question is more likely than p 
express another genuine doxastic constraint on guessing that p? I think we have good 
reasons for rejecting the claim that guesses must conform to this nondomination 
condition. Suppose, for example, that you ask me to guess whether a tossed coin will 
land heads or tails. I know, and thus believe, that the coin is biased towards landing 
heads, but I also have a hunch that this is one of those occasions on which events 
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will defy the balance of probabilities, so I answer that the coin will land tails. Even 
supposing that I’m not so naïve as to think that my hunch is, or implies the existence 
of, evidence that increases the likelihood that the coin will land tails, it seems 
difficult to deny that in answering ‘tails’ I am guessing that the coin will land tails. 
After all, I do not know or believe that the coin will land tails, and my answer will be 
considered successful just in case the coin does in fact land tails. But if this right 
then satisfying the nondomination condition is not even a necessary condition for 
guessing that p, because in the envisaged circumstances I guess that the coin will 
land tails despite the fact that I believe it is more likely to land heads.30    
4. Guessing, Believing and Knowing 
In the previous chapter I noted that the term ‘judgement’ is often used to refer to a 
type of occurrent thought that is closely associated with belief. You make a 
judgement in this sense when, for example, you work out that the product of 13 and 
17 is 221, or at least take yourself to have done so. Although the conditions under 
which a judging occurs are far from obvious, an apparently secure starting point in 
investigating what these conditions are is that judging that p contrasts with other 
ways of consciously affirming that p, such as supposing that p for the sake of 
argument or guessing that p. When one supposes that p for the sake of argument, one 
does not judge that p in one’s reasoning, and when one judges that p in one’s 
reasoning, one does not suppose that p for the sake of argument; likewise, when one 
judges that p, one does not guess that p, and when one guesses that p, one does not 
judge that p. It is tempting to try to provide a deeper philosophical explanation of 
why these different ways of consciously affirming a proposition are incompatible 
                                                 
30 Note that this case may not be counterexample to Sorensen’s analysis taken on its own terms, since 
in this case it might be maintained that my guess is not rational, so that I don’t qualify as a rational 
subject in Sorensen’s sense. 
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with one another. Such an explanation will take the following form: it will identify 
some condition, C, that is satisfied when one judges that p, but which is not satisfied 
when one merely (e.g.) guesses that p.  
Sorensen’s proposal that guessing that p is straightforwardly incompatible with both 
knowing that p and believing that p is relevant here. We saw in the previous chapter 
that the view that judging that p essentially involves the acquisition/manifestation of 
the belief that p, though not obviously correct, is at least a defensible proposal. This 
view implies that if S judges that p, then S believes that p. If, as Sorensen claims, 
guessing that p is incompatible with believing that p, then we have an explanation of 
why it is impossible for a conscious affirmation that p to simultaneously constitute 
both a guessing and a judging that p: on pain of contradiction, a subject cannot both 
believe that p and not believe that p when she affirms that p.  
It is natural to think that guessing that p is straightforwardly incompatible with both 
knowing that p and believing that p.  This led Sorensen to include BIG in his account 
of guessing.  However, I believe that the existence of counterexamples to both BIG 
and KIG is a consequence of a mundane fact about knowledge, belief and 
propositional memory: namely, that it is possible for a subject to know that p at t, 
and/or to believe that p at t, despite the fact that she is unable to recall that p at t.  I 
will focus below on showing how this possibility can be used to refute KIG.   
One illustration of the general possibility of knowing p despite being unable to recall 
that p is provided by cases in which the subject is in a state that precludes her 
recalling that anything is the case, consistently with states of knowing continuing to 
obtain in her—for example, when she is in a state of dreamless sleep, or comatose. 
But we also ordinarily acknowledge the possibility of a subject being unable to recall 
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that p despite the fact that she knows that p and is awake and attending to a question 
to which p is the answer. Indeed, it is a common experience to be aware of such a 
situation from the first-person perspective: to know that one has learnt the answer to 
some question, and that the information is likely still ‘in there somewhere’, despite 
the fact that (frustratingly, embarrassingly) one is unable to bring the answer to 
mind. Suppose that you are in the situation described: you know that p, despite the 
fact that you are awake and unable to recall that p. Someone puts to you a question 
to which p is the answer. You cannot remember the answer. In the end, you pick one 
of the possible answers at random, and say ‘p’. My claim is that the envisaged 
scenario is one in which you have guessed that p, despite the fact that you knew that 
p. If this is right, then KIG is false. I think that the counterexample stands even if we 
allow that at the time at which you answered that p you knew yourself to know the 
answer to the question, despite your present inability to recall it. Furthermore, since 
the scenario does not seem to be one in which you are necessarily guilty of any form 
of irrationality—intuitively, failures of memory are not failures of rationality—it 
also apparently refutes Sorensen’s version of KIG, upon which it is restricted to 
rational subjects. 
The counterexample rests on the claim that the envisaged circumstances are ones in 
which (a) the subject guesses that p and (b) the subject knows that p. Someone who 
wishes to defend KIG therefore has to deny at least one of (a) and (b). Is it at all 
plausible to deny either of these claims?   
It seems to me difficult to deny (a). There is, however, a point that might cause some 
confusion about the matter. When a subject knows that she knows the answer to a 
question, despite her inability to recall it, she will often not be able to make a guess 
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about the answer to the question. This is because all the answers that do come to 
mind will be ones she recognizes to be incorrect, and, as we saw in § 3, she cannot 
give an answer that she recognizes to be incorrect if her answer is to constitute a 
guess. However, it certainly doesn’t follow from this that a subject can never guess 
that p under these circumstances. Sometimes, even when one knows oneself to know 
the answer, one may be unsure whether the answer that comes to mind is correct, and 
it seems to me that in such circumstances one may still be guessing in giving that 
answer. Moreover, it is inessential to the counterexample that the subject should 
realize that she knows the answer to the question. When she does not realize this, it 
is less likely that she will recognize answers that come to mind to be incorrect.   
What about the option of denying (b), that the envisaged circumstances are ones in 
which the subject genuinely knows that p? Presumably, someone who wishes to 
deny (b) will be motivated by the idea that, if a subject is unable to recall that p 
despite the fact that she is attending to a question to which p is the answer, then she 
doesn’t know that p. This idea clearly contradicts our commonsensical understanding 
of the psychology of recall. Part of that common sense understanding is the idea that 
a subject might be unable to recall that p at a certain time because she is in a state 
that impairs her ability to access her stored knowledge that p. For example, she 
might be unable to recall that p, even though she is awake and attending to a 
question to which p is the answer, because she is tired, or drunk. She knows that p, 
but she is temporarily unable to retrieve her knowledge. Denying this aspect of 
common sense psychology has unattractive consequences. Suppose that our subject, 
who was previously drunk and unable to recall that p, has now sobered up. Someone 
puts to her a question to which p is the answer, and, recalling that p is the case 
(‘Now I remember!’), she confidently asserts that p. How are we to account for the 
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fact that the subject is now able to recall that p? If we think that when she was drunk 
and unable to recall that p, she didn’t know that p, we will have to appeal to the idea 
that at some time since she was drunk, she has acquired the knowledge that p. But 
we do not normally think of sobering up as a way of acquiring knowledge. 
Furthermore, it may well be the case that she was not in a position to learn that p in 
any other way between being drunk and sobering up. The option of denying that the 
envisaged circumstances are ones in which the subject knows that p therefore 
appears highly implausible.  
Are the circumstances described above also ones in which the subject may be 
guessing that p, despite the fact that she believes that p? This follows 
straightforwardly if we assume that knowing p entails believing p.  But notice that 
we do not need to rely on anything as strong as the entailment thesis here: all we 
need is the more minimal idea that it is at least consistent with a subject knowing 
that p, despite the fact that she is unable to recall that p, that she also believes that p. 
KIG and BIG fail to provide a correct account of the relationship between guessing, 
believing, and knowing. Consequently, we cannot appeal to BIG to explain why 
guessing that p is incompatible with judging that p. The idea that judging involves 
the acquisition/manifestation of belief suggests a simple fix for this problem, 
however: guessing is not incompatible with believing/knowing per se, but only with 
the acquisition/manifestation of belief/knowledge. This condition does not deliver 
the incorrect verdict that the subject isn’t guessing in cases of impaired recall. When 
a subject knows that p but is unable to recall that p he may still guess that p, because 
he will not be manifesting his knowledge that p in affirming that p; likewise, when a 
subject is not able to access in memory a stored false belief that p, he may still guess 
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that p because he will not be manifesting his belief that p in affirming that p. The 
modified version of BIG can be used to explain why guessing that p is incompatible 
with judging that p: on pain of contradiction, a subject cannot simultaneously 
form/manifest the belief that p in affirming that p and not form/manifest the belief 
that p in affirming that p.  
As I noted in the previous chapter, the claim that judging that p essentially involves 
the acquisition/manifestation of the belief that p is not obviously correct. Some 
authors have suggested that it is possible for a subject who does not believe that p to 
judge that p, and thus to judge that p without forming/manifesting the belief that p. 
The examples cited to support this claim are hardly conclusive, however. A better 
objection, I think, is that it is not clear that the acquisition/manifestation account can 
accommodate the typical incompatibility of guessing that p with believing that p 
without collapsing into a higher-order account. The following case can be used to 
raise the concern I have here.  Suppose we’re listening to a politics show on the 
radio, and that one of the pundits on the show – a well-known Labour supporter – 
predicts that Labour will win next year’s general election. The confident manner in 
which he makes his prediction suggests that he genuinely believes it, and there is no 
reason to think he is being insincere, but the evidence he is able to cite in support of 
his prediction (opinion polls that marginally favour Labour, the alleged popularity of 
the leader amongst the general public) is far from convincing. Is the pundit, or is he 
not, guessing that Labour will win next year’s election? It seems to me that he is 
obviously only guessing what the outcome of the election will be, for he certainly 
doesn’t know that Labour are going to win. However, this verdict sits ill with the 
thought that believing is typically incompatible with guessing. Isn’t this a case in 
which a subject is guessing that p despite the fact that he believes that p, and is 
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perfectly well aware that he believes that p? How are we to square this with the 
intuition that, in the Battle of Hastings case, I am not guessing that the Battle of 
Hastings occurred in 1266 because, as a result of a typographical error, this is what I 
believe? One thought is that this confusion is a consequence of the fact that in 
ordinary language we do not use the term ‘believes’ in an entirely uniform way. 
There is a sense in which the pundit ‘believes’ that Labour will win—after all, this is 
the line he takes in his newspaper columns and on radio shows, and he feels pretty 
confident that it is right. But we might also want to say that the pundit does not 
believe, outright, that Labour will win, in the way in which he believes that 7 + 5 = 
12, or believes that Labour won by a landslide majority in 1997. The manifestation 
theorist can take this point on board by holding that it is only the outright belief that 
P that is typically incompatible with guessing that p. Thus, despite the fact that the 
pundit’s prediction in some sense manifests his belief that Labour will win, it can 
still constitute a guess, because the ‘belief’ it manifests is not an outright belief but 
only a fairly high degree of confidence that Labour will win. However, if the 
manifestation theorist takes this line, then he owes us some account of how having 
the outright belief that p differs from having only a high degree of confidence that p. 
A plausible approach to this distinction is to connect it with the subject’s higher-
order attitudes about what he knows. For example, we might say that the pundit does 
not hold the outright belief that Labour will win because he is well aware that the 
evidence he has is not sufficient for him to know that this is the case. But if the 
manifestation theorist pursues this line, then it’s not clear why we should prefer his 
account of guessing over the apparently simpler account that instead appeals directly 
to the subject’s higher-order attitudes about what he knows, especially given that this 
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account avoids commitment to the controversial idea that judging that p essentially 
involves the manifestation of the belief that p. 
In my view, we can adequately explain why guessing that p is typically incompatible 
with believing that p, and strictly incompatible with judging that p, if we hold that 
the relationship between guessing that p and knowing that p is to be accounted for in 
higher-order terms. The most obvious suggestions about the nature of the higher-
order relationship between guessing that p and knowing that p are these: 
(a) In answering that p at t, S is guessing that p only if S believes that he does 
not know that p at t. 
(b) In answering that p at t, S is guessing that p only if S does not believe that he 
knows that p at t.  
Unfortunately, it follows from points already made that neither (a) nor (b) identifies 
a genuine necessary condition of guessing that p. (a) is refuted by the observation 
that it is possible for you to guess that p despite the fact you know that p, and are 
aware, when you make your guess that p, that you know the answer to the question, 
despite your inability to recall it. In such a scenario, I think, you may have guessed 
that p despite the fact that you did not believe that you did not know that p. You did 
not believe that you did not know that p because you knew that you knew the answer 
to the question and, from your present perspective, p may well be the answer. Since 
p may well be the answer, from your present perspective, and you know that you 
know the answer, it may well be the case from your present perspective that you 
know that p, so you don’t believe that you don’t know that p. Thus, (a) fails to 
identify a genuine higher-order necessary condition of guessing that p. (b) is refuted 
by iterated application of the point that it is possible for you to know that p despite 
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the fact that you are unable to recall that p. Suppose that you know p and also 
believe yourself to know p, but that neither your knowledge nor your belief is 
presently accessible. In appropriate circumstances such a condition is one in which 
you could be led to guess that p, in line with the kind of example described above, 
despite the fact that you believe yourself to know that p. Consequently, (b) also fails 
to identify a genuine higher-order necessary condition of guessing that p.   
How should we respond to the failure of (a) and (b) to correctly articulate necessary 
conditions of guessing that p? One suggestion is that what is necessary for guessing 
p is not the presence (or absence) of higher-order attitudes about whether one is in a 
certain epistemic state of mind—viz. knowing that p—but rather the presence (or 
absence) of higher-order attitudes about the epistemic status of a particular mental 
event, viz. one’s act of answering that p. Once again, there are two obvious ways of 
implementing this proposal, corresponding to the higher-order conditions (a) and (b) 
we have already considered: 
(c) In answering that p at t, S is guessing that p at t only if S believes that he is 
not answering that p knowledgeably at t. 
(d) In answering that p at t, S is guessing that p at t only if S does not believe that 
he is answering that p knowledgeably at t 
Does either of these conditions identify a genuine necessary condition of guessing 
that p?  Condition (c) seems too strong. Someone who is asked to name the year of 
the Russian Revolution might have a rather weak apparent memory that it took place 
in 1915, and consequently be unsure about whether he is answering knowledgeably 
in answering that it occurred in 1915. If (c) is right, then he is not guessing in 
answering 1915, because he does not positively believe that he is not answering 
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knowledgeably. Yet, it seems to me natural to say that he may still be making a 
guess about the answer. This might lead us to reject (c) in favour of (d), but (d) 
seems to face the opposite problem, that of being too weak to exclude certain cases 
as instances of guessing. For example, consider a case in which a subject 
unreflectively asserts that p in response to the question of whether p. There seems to 
be no good reason to think that such a subject must have a higher-order belief to the 
effect that he is answering that p knowledgeably. But if he lacks this belief then, for 
all (d) says, his assertion may constitute a guess that p. If we want the higher-order 
condition linking guessing with knowing to exclude such cases, we need a stronger 
higher-order condition than (d).   
The following condition steers a middle course between (c) and (d): 
(e) In answering that p at t, S is guessing that p at t only if either (i) S believes 
that he is not answering that p knowledgeably at t, or (ii) S suspends 
judgement about whether he is answering that p knowledgeably at t. 
This condition does not preclude the possibility that the subject is guessing in the 
Russian Revolution case, because a subject who is unsure about whether he can 
remember the answer to a question suspends judgement about whether his answer to 
the question is knowledgeable.  But the condition is also strong enough to explain 
why cases of unreflective assertion are not instances of guessing, because an 
unreflective subject neither believes himself not to be answering knowledgeably nor 
suspends judgement about whether he is answering knowledgeably.31 
                                                 
31 For a discussion of the nature of suspended judgement that includes the point that neither believing 
p nor believing not-p is insufficient for suspending judgement about whether p, see Friedman (2013). 
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How can the proponent of the higher-order account of the relationship between 
guessing p and knowing p account for the fact that believing p is typically 
incompatible with guessing p?  Recall that (e) says that S is guessing that p only if 
either (i) S believes that he is not answering that p knowledgeably, or (ii) S suspends 
judgement about whether he is answering that p knowledgeably. The proponent of 
(e) can accordingly explain why a subject who believes that p typically won’t be 
guessing that p in answering that p by appealing to the idea that a subject who 
believes that p will typically neither believe that he is not answering that p 
knowledgeably nor suspend judgement about whether he is answering that p 
knowledgeably. For, typically, someone who believes that p will either answer that p 
unreflectively, i.e. without considering whether he is answering knowledgeably, or 
will believe himself to be answering knowledgeably. Thus, the typical 
incompatibility of believing p with guessing p is a consequence of (e). An advantage 
of this way of explaining why believing p is typically incompatible with guessing p 
is that it explains why having a hunch, feeling or suspicion that p is compatible with 
guessing p, because someone who only has a hunch, feeling or suspicion that p will 
often satisfy condition (e) in answering that p. Indeed, even a subject who feels 
confident that p may admit, on reflection, that he does not (or at least may not) know 
that p.  That we normally allow this possibility is suggested by our reaction to the 
political pundit case discussed above. 
It follows from this account of the difference between judging that p and guessing 
that p that there is a constitutive connection between whether S is judging that p, in 
affirming that p, and S’s higher-order attitudes concerning the epistemic status of his 
affirmation that p. In particular, when S judges that p, S neither believes himself not 
to be affirming that p knowledgeably nor suspends judgement about whether he is 
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affirming that p knowledgeably. It should be noted, however, that this claim about 
the relationship between judging and the subject’s higher-order epistemic attitudes is 
purely negative: all that is required for a subject’s affirmation that p to constitute a 
judging that p is the absence of certain higher-order epistemic attitudes. I have not 
argued that there is any positive respect in which a subject takes himself to know that 
p when he judges that p. Whether a further positive claim might be made here is an 
issue I will be considering in the next chapter.   
5. Summary 
In this chapter I have considered the conditions under which a subject is guessing 
that p in answering that p to some question. Some of the claims I have made are 
purely negative. Contrary to Sorensen, I have argued that a subject may be guessing 
that p even if believes that some alternative answer to the relevant question is more 
probable, and that he may be guessing that p even if he believes and, indeed, knows, 
that p. I have also argued that satisfying Sorensen’s conditions is not sufficient for a 
subject to guess that p. Contrary to Owens, I have argued that it is not necessary for a 
subject to guess that p that he guesses with the intention of guessing that p only if p 
is true. In cases of indifferent guessing, a subject’s answers to questions are subject 
to the standard of correctness constitute of guessing in virtue of features of the 
situation that are independent of the aim with which he answers those questions—
e.g. in virtue of the fact that he is participating in a quiz, or a guessing game. 
Although I have not attempted to provide an alternative set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for guessing that p, I have emphasised two necessary conditions 
of guessing that seem to me to express particularly important features of this kind of 
mental act. The first is that truth is the constitutive standard of success for guesses. 
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The second is that there is a higher-order connection between guessing that p and 
knowing that p: when S guesses that p, S either (a) believes himself not to be 
answering that p knowledgeably or (b) at least suspends judgement about whether he 
is answering that p knowledgeably. Such higher-order attitudes are absent when S 
judges that p. In the next chapter, I will be considering the significance of this 
conception of judgement for the question of the conditions under which a subject 
will acquire a belief about whether p as a consequence of engaging in enquiry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Chapter 4 
How to Answer the Activity Question 
The previous two chapters were dedicated to questions about the nature of belief, 
judgement, and other mental events, such as guessing and supposing. Although these 
questions seem to me interesting in themselves, a further reason for pursuing these 
issues is that they may be relevant to responding to the problematic reasoning that I 
presented in Chapter 1. They may, therefore, be relevant to answering the activity 
question—‘Why do we seek knowledge, and not merely true beliefs, given that true 
belief is just as true, and just as useful, as knowledge?’—for insofar as there is an 
interesting challenge to the rationality of seeking knowledge embodied in that 
question, it seems to amount to the challenge expressed by the problematic 
reasoning. If this is right, then issues about the nature of belief, judgement, and other 
mental acts may be significant in a further way that is not usually appreciated. I 
argued in the Introduction that the activity question raises a more basic issue about 
the value of knowledge than the comparative state question (‘Why is someone who 
knows that p in a better position, other things being equal, than someone who merely 
truly believes that p?’) that is traditionally pursued in philosophical discussions of 
the value of knowledge, and that tackling the comparative state question is only one 
way (and not a very promising way) of tackling the activity question. If it is possible 
to answer the activity question by drawing on considerations about the nature of 
belief and judgement, without presupposing an answer to the comparative state 
question, then the obvious motivation for pressing the comparative state question 
lapses. Ultimately, therefore, issues about the nature of belief, judgement, and other 
mental acts may be integral to the resolution of philosophical puzzles about the value 
of knowledge. My aim in this chapter is advance the case for this claim by showing 
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how the proposals I have advanced about belief and judgement can be used to 
undermine the problematic reasoning.  
Here is the plan. § 1 recapitulates the problematic reasoning and the main critical 
points I made about it in Chapter 1. § 2 argues for the thesis that the enquirer will not 
have arrived at so much as an outright belief about whether p until he takes himself 
to have found out whether p. I indicate how the claims I have made about belief and 
judgement can be used to construct an argument for this thesis, and explain why 
certain examples in epistemology and philosophy of mind that might be thought to 
refute it actually fail to do so. In § 3 I explain how the thesis can be used to 
undermine the problematic reasoning. Since it is not obvious what other challenge 
someone might have in mind in pressing the activity question (aside from the 
challenge raised by Williams, which I have already dismissed), it is reasonable to 
conclude, at least provisionally, that the activity question can be resolved without 
appealing to an answer to the comparative state question. I also briefly consider an 
alternative version of the activity question. Although I have focussed on the issue of 
why it is not rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to seek knowledge of whether p, 
given the possibility of merely seeking a true belief about whether p, one might also 
ask why it is not rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to seek knowledge of whether 
p, given the possibility of merely attempting to arrive at an accurate assumption 
about whether p for practical purposes. § 4 briefly indicates how the claims I have 
made about the acquisition of belief might be taken to bear on the impossibility of 
acquiring beliefs at will.  
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1. The Problematic Reasoning Again 
In Chapter 1 I introduced the problematic reasoning, which poses a challenge to the 
rationality of seeking knowledge. The reasoning went as follows: 
1. Having a true belief about whether p is just as good for the enquirer as 
knowing whether p, because true belief is just as true, and just as useful, as 
knowledge. 
2. Having a true belief about whether p is necessary but insufficient for 
knowing whether p. 
3. Therefore, it is more difficult for the enquirer to arrive at knowledge of 
whether p than it is for the enquirer to arrive at a true belief about whether p. 
4. If objective X is just as good as objective Y, but it is more difficult for the 
agent to achieve objective Y than objective X, then it is rationally sub-optimal 
for the agent to adopt objective Y as his aim; he should, at most, adopt 
objective X. 
5. Given (1), (3) and (4), it is rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to adopt the 
aim of arriving at knowledge of whether p; he should, at most, adopt the aim 
of arriving at a true belief about whether p.  
I suggested that this reasoning is one source of motivation for pressing the activity 
question. I argued that we cannot adequately respond to the reasoning by denying 
premise (1) or the validity of the inference from (2) to (3). The problem is that such 
denials provide at best a partial response to the reasoning; in response to these 
objections, the proponent of the reasoning can restrict the premises so that they avoid 
the objections but nevertheless entail a restricted form of the conclusion—e.g. that, 
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in circumstances in which the persistence of true belief does not matter, it is 
rationally sub-optimal for an enquirer to adopt the aim of arriving at knowledge of 
whether p. Neither can we adequately respond to the reasoning by rejecting premise 
(2), the claim that truly believing that p is necessary but insufficient for knowing that 
p. Merely denying that true belief is necessary for knowledge is of little help, 
because in that case it can be argued that having a true belief about whether p or 
knowing whether p is necessary but insufficient for knowing whether p, and 
therefore that it is rationally sub-optimal to seek knowledge given that one could set 
oneself the disjunctive objective instead. Furthermore, Sartwell’s attempts to cast 
doubt on the insufficiency of true belief for knowledge are unconvincing. If we wish 
to defend the rationality of seeking knowledge across a broader range of cases, we 
will have to respond to the reasoning by rejecting the maxim of rationality expressed 
by premise (4). The issue, of course, is how to do this in a non-dogmatic way.  
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that the cases in which we appeal to principle (4) (or 
something like it) to justify the claim that the agent should pursue only some more 
modest objective are ones in which certain further conditions are met. One of these 
conditions, for example, is that the agent must be capable of recognizing that there 
are ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more modest objective that are not 
ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more ambitious one. It is not obvious 
that these further conditions are met in the case of true belief and knowledge. For 
example, one might think that an enquirer cannot even attempt to arrive at a true 
belief about whether p using some method unless he regards that method as a 
potential way of finding out whether p. In fact, as I shall argue, this claim is 
incorrect, but highlighting it helps us to see how we might challenge the fourth 
premise of the problematic reasoning.  
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In the next section, I shall argue for a claim that is similar to the claim that an 
enquirer cannot even attempt to arrive at a true belief about whether p using some 
method unless he regards that method as a potential way of finding out whether p. 
The claim I shall be arguing for is that an enquirer who is seeking the truth about 
whether p will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p by engaging 
in enquiry until he takes himself to have found out whether p. In § 3 I will explain 
how it follows from this claim that conditions whose satisfaction we take for granted 
in appealing to (4) cannot be satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge. It 
follows that it is illegitimate to appeal to that principle in this case. The problematic 
reasoning fails.  
2. Thesis (T) 
Chapters 2 and 3 advanced two proposals about the nature of belief and judgement 
that are significant in the present context. The first was that having the outright belief 
that p involves having a disposition to judge that p. I went on to argue that the 
problematic reasoning should be understood to concern outright belief. (From now 
on, I will use ‘belief’ to refer to the state of outright belief.) The second was that 
judging that p is to be distinguished from guessing that p, at least in part, in higher-
order epistemic terms: when S guesses that p, S believes himself not to be affirming 
that p knowledgeably, or at least suspends judgement about whether he is affirming 
that p knowledgeably, but neither of these higher-order epistemic attitudes is present 
when S judges that p. What I want to do now is to indicate how these proposals can 
be used to defend the claim that an enquirer who is seeking the truth about whether p 
will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p by engaging in enquiry 
until he takes himself to have found out whether p. For the sake of convenience, I 
shall refer to this claim as ‘(T)’.  
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I want to begin by considering the conditions under which an enquirer judges that p. 
The proposal I made about how we are to distinguish judging from guessing in the 
previous chapter was, in a certain respect, purely negative: for an affirmation that p 
to qualify as a judging that p, the subject does not have to take himself to be 
affirming that p knowledgeably: all that is required is the absence of certain higher-
order attitudes concerning the epistemic status of his affirmation. It would be overly 
hasty to infer from this, however, that an enquirer doesn’t take himself to know that 
p when he judges that p. A subject who has the capacity to engage in enquiry is a 
subject who has the capacity to seek the truth about the answers to questions in a 
variety of different ways. Recognizing that he does not know the answer to a certain 
question, he can, for example, seek to find out the answer to that question, but he can 
also hazard a guess about the answer to that question, or aim to arrive at an accurate 
working assumption about the answer. It follows that a subject who has the capacity 
to engage in enquiry is a subject who has the capacity for higher-order beliefs about 
his epistemic condition, and also for higher-order beliefs about the epistemic statuses 
of his own cognitive mental acts. Arguably, when such a subject affirms that p, the 
absence of the belief that he is not affirming that p knowledgeably, and also of the 
attitude of suspended judgement about whether he is affirming that p 
knowledgeably, suffices for the subject to take himself to be affirming that p in a 
knowledgeable way. In other words, the absence of certain negative higher-order 
epistemic attitudes is sufficient for an enquirer to manifest a positive higher-order 
attitude concerning his epistemic standing with respect to the proposition he has 
affirmed.  
More would need to be said to provide a full defence of this claim, but for now I just 
want to consider its implications for (T). Believing that p involves a disposition to 
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judge that p, and when an enquirer judges that p he takes himself to be affirming that 
p knowledgeably. Under what conditions will an enquirer enter into a state, as a 
consequence of engaging in enquiry, that involves a disposition to affirm that p in 
such a way that he takes himself to be affirming that p knowledgeably? Whether the 
enquirer acquires such a state will depend, I think, on what he takes himself to have 
done as a consequence of engaging in his activity: in particular, he will not acquire 
such a state unless he takes himself to have found out whether p. If the enquirer does 
not take himself to have succeeded in finding out whether p—and to have succeeded 
in finding out that p, in particular—then he will not regard himself as knowing that 
p, and hence he will not be disposed to affirm that p in such a way that he takes 
himself to be affirming that p knowledgeably. But having such a disposition is a 
necessary condition of having the outright belief that p. Clearly, parallel reasoning 
could also be applied to the acquisition of the belief that not-p in enquiry. Given that 
acquiring a belief about whether p is a matter of acquiring either the belief that p or 
the belief that not-p, it follows that the enquirer will not have arrived at so much as a 
belief about whether p, as a consequence of engaging in enquiry, unless he takes 
himself to have found out whether p. But this just is thesis (T).  
At this point, I imagine, some will want to object that there are obvious 
counterexamples to (T), and therefore that the grounds I have presented for accepting 
(T) must be flawed. My response to this objection is that simply asserting, in the 
abstract, that counterexamples to (T) exist, is unpersuasive; the objector needs to 
describe a specific case in which a subject who is considering the question of 
whether p acquires a belief about whether p without taking himself to have found out 
whether p. Obviously, I cannot anticipate every case that might be presented here. I 
shall merely consider two examples that might be offered as demonstrations of this 
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possibility, both of which are familiar from debates in epistemology and philosophy 
of mind. The first case is that of a subject who ‘believes’ that his ticket will not win 
the jackpot in a lottery. The second case is one of the examples presented by Ginet 
(2001) in support of his contention that it is possible to acquire beliefs ‘at will’. 
Unsurprisingly, I shall be arguing that neither example refutes (T).   
Suppose that A has bought a ticket for the UK National Lottery. Calculating that the 
odds of all six of his numbers being drawn are approximately one in 14 million, A 
comes to believe that his ticket won’t win the jackpot, but A does not take himself to 
have found out that his ticket won’t win; like most of us, A thinks that he can’t come 
to know that his ticket won’t win just on the basis of the fact that it is extremely 
unlikely to do so. If this is right, (T) is false: an enquirer can arrive at a belief about 
whether p without taking himself to have found out whether p, for A can arrive at a 
belief about whether his ticket will win the jackpot without taking himself to have 
found out whether his ticket will win the jackpot. To arrive at a belief about whether 
p by engaging in enquiry, an enquirer at most has to take himself to have evidence 
that it is highly probable that p.  
It is undeniable that there is a sense in which A has arrived at a belief about whether 
his ticket will win. He takes himself to have calculated that the odds of his ticket 
winning the jackpot are roughly 1 in 14 million, and therefore believes that these are 
the odds of his ticket winning, and there is a clear sense in which the belief that the 
odds of his ticket winning the jackpot are roughly 1 in 14 million is a belief about 
whether his ticket will win. However, in the sense in which I am using the 
expression here, a subject has a belief about whether p just in case he either believes 
that p or believes that not-p. It is much less clear that A believes, simpliciter, that his 
ticket won’t win the jackpot, and therefore has a belief about whether his ticket will 
143 
 
win in this sense. Here it will be no doubt be pointed out that it is quite natural to say 
that A believes that his ticket won’t win the jackpot, and not only that A believes that 
it is overwhelmingly likely that his ticket won’t win the jackpot. However, sentences 
of the form ‘S believes/thinks that p’ are often used as shorthand to report the fact 
that S believes that p is more likely than not, or even (more minimally) that S 
believes that the most probable answer to a certain question is that p. Imagine, for 
example, that a football pundit is asked to predict who will win the Premier League 
next season. She suggests that Chelsea are most likely to win, given their 
performance last season and the pre-eminence of their manager, although it is 
possible that they will be overwhelmed by a resurgent Manchester City. It is natural 
to describe the pundit as believing/thinking that Chelsea will win, although strictly 
speaking her words indicate only that she believes that Chelsea are more likely than 
any other team to win the Premier League next season. The same might be held to be 
true of A. It is natural to say that A believes that his ticket won’t win the jackpot 
because A believes that it is overwhelmingly likely that his ticket won’t win, and we 
often use simple belief ascriptions to convey more complex facts about the subject’s 
take on the balance of probabilities. A more careful characterisation of A’s beliefs 
would attribute him only the belief that his ticket is very unlikely to win the jackpot. 
If this is right, the example does not refute (T).  
In ‘Deciding to Believe’ Carl Ginet provides four examples ‘of the sorts of cases that 
seem to me good candidates for being described as someone’s deciding to believe 
something’ (2001: 64). His aim in doing so is to justify the claim, rejected as a 
metaphysically impossibility by Williams in his paper of the same name, that ‘a 
person might come to believe something simply by deciding to do so’ (2001: 63). 
Ginet’s cases are relevant here because the examples he describes are ones in which 
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the subject has what he regards as inconclusive evidence concerning the answer to 
some question, and are thus ones in which the subject does not take himself to be in 
a position to know the answer to the relevant question. If the subject can nevertheless 
form a belief about the answer to the question just by deciding to do so, they will be 
cases in which a subject acquires a belief about the answer to a question without 
taking himself to have found out the answer to the question. This, of course, is 
exactly what is required for a case to constitute a counterexample to (T). But are 
Ginet’s examples compelling? Here is the fourth case that Ginet describes: 
We have started on a trip by car, and 50 miles from home my wife asks me if 
I locked the front door. I seem to remember that I did, but I don’t have a 
clear, detailed, confident memory impression of locking that door (and I am 
aware that my unclear, unconfident memory impressions have sometimes 
been mistaken). But, given the great inconvenience of turning back to make 
sure and the undesirability of worrying about it while continuing on, I decide 
to continue on and believe that I did lock it. (2001: 64) 
Many people, I think, are intuitively suspicious of the idea that this belief ascription 
is to be taken literally. Strictly speaking, they want to say, I decide only to assume 
that I did lock the door, in a sense of ‘assume’ that does not entail believing that I did 
lock it. It is a familiar fact, after all, that one can use the term ‘belief’, in a loose 
way, to refer to other ways of accepting a proposition. Thus, I might ask someone to 
suppose for the sake of argument that the witness is telling the truth by saying, 
‘Believe, for a moment, that she is telling the truth’. The mere fact that it is quite 
natural to describe me as ‘deciding to believe’ that I locked the door is not a good 
reason to think that I genuinely do decide to believe that I locked the door in this 
case. Furthermore, I have a good reason to deny that this is a case in which I form 
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the outright belief that I locked the door. I argued that belief of this kind involves a 
disposition to judge that p, and that one of the things that distinguishes judgement, in 
subjects like myself who have the capacity for higher-order epistemic attitudes, is 
that it involves the subject taking himself to know the proposition that he has judged 
to be so. In the case described by Ginet, however, I clearly do not take myself to 
know that I locked the door; I only seem to remember doing so, and I am aware that 
‘my unclear, unconfident memory impressions have sometimes been mistaken’. 
Thus, if the current account of belief is correct, Ginet’s example is not one in which I 
acquire the belief that I locked the door.  
What, then, should we say about the nature of the attitude that I decide to adopt in 
this case? A plausible proposal is that, strictly speaking, what I decide to do is 
assume for practical purposes that I locked the door. My attitude resembles that of 
belief, because I am disposed to act as though I locked the door. However, it is not a 
belief because I regard the constraint of treating as true the proposition that I locked 
the door as a self-imposed constraint. I am treating this proposition as true partly for 
practical reasons—it would be very inconvenient to turn back to make sure I locked 
it, and I do not wish to worry about it—and I am aware that I am doing so.  
This completes my defence of (T). I have done two things. Firstly, I have indicated 
how the account of belief and judgement I proposed earlier might be used to 
construct an argument in favour of (T). Secondly, I have argued that (T) is not 
refuted by familiar examples from epistemology and philosophy of mind. I want now 
to consider how (T) bears on the problematic reasoning. In particular, can we use (T) 
to show that conditions that have to be included in the antecedent of any version of 
(4) that is a plausible consequence of the principle that rational agents conserve their 
resources cannot be satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge? 
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3. Why Principle (4) Doesn’t Apply in the Case of True Belief and Knowledge 
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that we appeal to principle (4) (or something like it) to 
justify the idea that an agent ought to adopt a more modest objective only in cases in 
which certain conditions are met. One such condition is that the agent must be 
capable of recognizing that there are ways in which he can attempt to achieve the 
more modest objective that are not ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more 
ambitious objective. This condition is clearly met in the archery example that I used 
to illustrate the intuitive appeal of (4). If the only way in which the agent can attempt 
to achieve a more modest objective is by using methods that he regards as ways of 
achieving a more ambitious one, he cannot make life easier for himself by adopting 
only the more modest aim. I observed in Chapter 1 that it is not clear that this 
condition is met in the case of true belief and knowledge. As I put it there, there 
appears to be something in the thought that I can use a certain procedure to attempt 
to arrive at a true belief about whether p only if I regard that procedure as a potential 
way of finding out whether p. Is the truth of this thought a consequence of the 
conception of belief and judgement I have advocated? In particular, is it a 
consequence of thesis (T)? 
To begin with, it should be pointed out that (T) is clearly distinct from the claim that 
an enquirer can attempt to arrive at a true belief about whether p using some 
procedure only if he regards that procedure as a potential way of finding out whether 
p. What (T) says is that an enquirer who is seeking the truth about whether p will not 
have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p by engaging in enquiry until he 
takes himself to have found out whether p. As such, (T) makes no direct claim about 
the kinds of procedure an enquirer can use in attempting to arrive at a true belief 
about whether p; it makes a claim only about the enquirer must take himself to have 
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done if he is to have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p, and thus, a 
fortiori, a true belief about whether p. Still, this claim about what the enquirer must 
take himself to have done if he is to have succeeded in arriving at a true belief about 
whether p might be thought to entail (in conjunction with further assumptions) that 
an enquirer can attempt to arrive at a true belief about whether p using some 
procedure only if he regards that procedure as a potential way of finding out whether 
p. Here is one line of argument that might be proposed at this point. Suppose that the 
enquirer recognizes that (T) is true. He recognizes, that is to say, that he will not 
have arrived at so much as an outright belief about whether p by engaging in enquiry 
until he takes himself to have found out or determined whether p. (Such recognition 
needn’t take the form of explicit knowledge that (T) is true—if it did, this claim 
would obviously be implausible.) Given that this is so, what kinds of procedure can 
the enquirer adopt with the aim of arriving at a true belief about whether p? It might 
be thought that the only kind of procedure he can adopt are procedures that he 
regards as potential ways of finding out or determining whether p. If he does not 
regard a procedure in this way, then he will take there to be no chance of him 
arriving at so much as a belief about whether p by putting it into operation, because 
there is no chance that he will take himself to have found out whether p by doing so. 
Provided, then, that the enquirer recognizes that (T) is true, it might be argued that 
we can also establish the claim that an enquirer can attempt to arrive at a true belief 
about whether p using some procedure only if he regards it as a potential way of 
finding out whether p. And this is just to say that one of the conditions that must be 
met for (4) to be applicable isn’t satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge.  
There is, however, a flaw in this argument. It relies on the assumption that if an 
enquirer does not regard a procedure as a potential way of finding out whether p, he 
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will take there to be no chance of him arriving at a belief about whether p using that 
procedure, given his recognition that he will not have arrived at a belief until he 
takes himself to have found out whether p. However, it appears to be possible, in 
principle, for a subject to induce beliefs in himself using procedures that he does not 
regard as ways of finding things out. Williams identifies reasons for allowing this 
possibility in the following passage, from ‘Deciding to Believe’: 
[W]e all know that there are causal factors, unconnected with truth, which 
can produce belief: hypnotism, drugs, all sorts of things could bring it about 
that I believe that p. Suppose a man wanted to believe that p and knew that if 
he went to a hypnotist or a man who gave him certain drugs he would end up 
believing that p. Why could he not use this more roundabout method, granted 
that he cannot get himself into a state of believing just by lifting himself up 
by his own shoe straps [i.e. simply by deciding to hold the relevant belief]; 
why could he not bring it about that he believes that p by going to the 
hypnotist, the drug man or whatever? (1973: 149) 
Given that I know that there are causal factors, unconnected with truth, that can 
induce belief, it seems to be possible, at least in principle, for me to intentionally 
manipulate such factors to induce a particular belief in myself. This is consistent 
with (T), provided that causal factors unconnected with truth can bring it about that I 
take myself to know that a certain proposition is true. Thus, even if an enquirer does 
not regard a procedure (e.g. seeing the hypnotist) as a way in which he might find 
out whether p, he may nevertheless know that, were he to put that procedure into 
operation, he would take himself to have found out whether p.  
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It appears, therefore, that there are two kinds of procedure by which an enquirer can 
attempt to arrive at a belief about the answer to some question. The first are 
procedures that the enquirer regards as potential ways of finding out the answer to 
that question. The second kind are procedures such that, although the enquirer does 
not regard them as ways of finding out the answer to the question, he nevertheless 
believes that, were he to put them into operation, he would take himself to have 
found out the answer to the question. In effect, what has been argued so far is that 
the possibility of procedures of the first type that issue in true belief but not in 
knowledge cannot be used to show that it is rationally sub-optimal for the enquirer to 
adopt the aim of acquiring knowledge of whether p, given that he could merely adopt 
the aim of acquiring a true belief about whether p. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the possibility of procedures of the second type can be used to show this.  
Here it might be objected that although an enquirer could use a procedure of the 
second type to arrive at a belief about whether p, he could not use such a procedure 
with the aim of arriving at a true belief about whether p. If this is right, then the only 
procedures an enquirer can employ with the aim of arriving at a true belief about 
whether p are procedures that he regards as ways of finding out whether p; thus, he 
cannot avail himself of more efficient methods by adopting only the more modest 
aim of true belief. However, what is the basis for the allegation that an enquirer 
could not use a procedure that he does not regard as a way of finding out whether p 
with the aim of arriving at a true belief about whether p? In order to φ with the aim 
of ψ-ing, it might be argued, the agent must believe that he will ψ by φ-ing, but the 
agent cannot believe that he will arrive at a true belief about whether p by going to 
see the brain surgeon, or the drug man; at most, he can believe that there is a chance 
that he will acquire a true belief about whether p in this way. In general, however, it 
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is false that in order to φ with the aim of ψ-ing the agent must believe that he will ψ 
by φ-ing. Guessing provides a clear illustration of this. When a subject guesses that p 
with the aim of guessing truly, he does not believe that he will guess truly by 
guessing that p; he merely desires to guess truly, and believes that there is a chance 
of him doing so by guessing that p. Thus, it seems that, in general, in order to φ with 
the aim of ψ-ing, the agent must at most believe that there is a chance that he will ψ 
by φ-ing. A subject who goes to see the brain surgeon can surely satisfy this more 
minimal doxastic constraint with respect to the objective of acquiring a true belief 
about whether p. Hence, it seems consistent with the general doxastic constraints that 
apply to cases in which a subject φs with the aim of ψ-ing that an enquirer could pay 
a surgeon to induce in him the belief that p with the aim of acquiring a true belief 
about whether p. Perhaps it will be responded that special doxastic constraints apply 
in the case in which the agent’s objective is to arrive at a true belief that rule out the 
possibility of using such a procedure with this aim, but then the onus is on the 
objector to specify what these constraints are, and why their application is limited to 
a subset of cases that includes that of an enquirer whose aim is to arrive at a true 
belief about whether p.  
We must concede that it is possible, in principle, for an enquirer to set out to deceive 
himself into thinking that he has found out whether p with the aim of acquiring a true 
belief about whether p. Thus, it is not the case that the only way in which an enquirer 
can attempt to arrive at a true belief about whether p is by using a procedure that he 
regards as a way of finding out whether p. But, even conceding that it is possible for 
an enquirer to pursue a true belief about whether p using such a procedure, it remains 
implausible that this can be used to show that, in cases in which we are 
pretheoretically disposed to judge that the enquirer can adopt the aim of finding out 
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whether p without being subject to rational criticism, it is actually rationally sub-
optimal for him to do so.  
An initial point here is that, as far as I know, the hypnotists, drug men and brain 
surgeons who you can pay to make you believe that p exist only in the writings of 
philosophers. If this is right, then in practice the only way in which ordinary human 
enquirers can arrive at beliefs about the answers to questions is by using procedures 
that they regard as ways of finding out the answers to those questions. The 
problematic reasoning therefore fails to show that, in any actual case, it is rationally 
sub-optimal for an enquirer to adopt the aim of finding out whether p. Leaving 
matters here, however, might be taken to imply that seeking knowledge is not a 
rationally sub-optimal strategy for us only because of contingent limitations we have 
as human enquirers. In fact, I think, it is possible to argue for a stronger conclusion: 
even if we were able to induce particular beliefs in ourselves just, as it were, by the 
flick of a switch, I do not think it would follow that, in cases in which we now judge 
enquirers to be behaving entirely properly in seeking knowledge, they would be 
acting in a rationally sub-optimal manner.  
One point here is that, at least from my own point of view, I am far more likely to 
end up with a true belief about whether p by employing a procedure that I regard as a 
way of finding out whether p than I am by intentionally manipulating causal factors, 
unconnected with the truth, to induce in myself a belief about whether p. This 
reminds us of the basic point that, in selecting means to their ends, agents should be 
sensitive to considerations about how likely they are to achieve their end by a given 
means, as well as considerations about how efficient those means are. But this is not 
the only point that is relevant. Also significant is the fact that the alternative to using 
a method that I regard as a way of finding out whether p is to deceive myself into 
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thinking that I have found out whether p. It seems reasonable to assume that 
enquirers, as subjects who engage in the pursuit of truth, have a strong aversion to 
being deceived. This point is strengthened by the following observation. Although I 
can arrive at a belief about whether p by deceiving myself, so that I take myself to 
know whether p, such a belief will not be stable in the face of future evidence unless 
it is ‘backed up’, as it were, by further beliefs about how I know whether p. So to 
arrive at a stable belief about whether p, I will have to deceive myself, not only 
about whether I know whether p, but also about other related matters, e.g., by 
implanting in myself beliefs about how I know whether p. The cumulative effect of 
these observations is to make this alternative way of attempting to arrive at a true 
belief about whether p deeply unattractive. Not only is there a high chance of error, 
but I will also have to deceive myself about my epistemic standing with respect to a 
certain proposition, where this may involve not only taking myself to know it when I 
don’t, but also holding false beliefs about how I know it.  
But what if it is important for me to have the truth about whether p, and there is no 
way in which I can find out whether p, or it would at least be very difficult for me to 
do so? Isn’t it the case that, in these circumstances, I should adopt the aim of arriving 
at a true belief about whether p, and deceive myself into taking myself to know 
whether p? The first thing to say about this is that, in these circumstances, it may 
well be the case that I shouldn’t adopt the aim of finding out whether p. If I know 
that I cannot find out whether p, then I cannot even decide to try to find out whether 
p. If I know that it is very difficult for me to find out whether p then, even if it is 
important for me to have the truth about whether p, it may still be better for me to 
prioritise my other objectives and not attempt to find out whether p. Thus, the point 
that in such circumstances I ought at most to adopt some aim that falls short of 
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finding out whether p hardly calls into question the rationality of ordinary enquiry. 
We would not pretheoretically take it to be rational for an enquirer to seek 
knowledge in circumstances of this kind.  
It must also be noted, secondly, that if in these circumstances I should not adopt the 
aim of finding out whether p, then I should not adopt the aim of arriving at so much 
as a true belief about whether p. At most, I should adopt the aim of arriving at an 
accurate working assumption about whether p. If I shouldn’t adopt the aim of finding 
out whether p, this must be because the procedures by which I can attempt to find 
out whether p involve difficulties too great to justify their use. In principle, there are 
other procedures by which I can attempt to arrive at a true belief, as we saw, but I am 
unlikely to arrive at true beliefs by such procedures, and they involve self-deception. 
Even if such procedures were available to me, it would surely be better for me to 
adopt the aim of arriving at an accurate working assumption about whether p instead. 
Accurate working assumptions appear to be just as good, for the purposes of 
successful action, as true beliefs. Echoing Plato’s point, someone who has an 
accurate working assumption about the way to Larissa will get there just as well as 
someone who has a true belief about the way. I can arrive at working assumptions 
about the answers to questions, without using methods that I regard as ways of 
finding out the answers to those questions, without resorting to self-deception. So by 
adopting the more modest aim, I avoid a significant cost of pursuing the aim of true 
belief in the only way available. Furthermore, I am no more likely to arrive a true 
belief about whether p by such means than I am to arrive at an accurate working 
assumption. Paying a hypnotist to induce in me a belief about whether p is no better 
than making a pure guess about whether p; I am just as likely to end up with the truth 
by simply deciding to adopt, at random, a certain working assumption about whether 
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p. So it would seem that, when I shouldn’t adopt the aim of finding out the answer to 
some question, I should at most adopt the aim of arriving at an accurate working 
assumption about the answer.  
The point that an enquirer can merely adopt the aim of arriving at an accurate 
working assumption, or estimate, about the answer to a question may raise a further 
worry about the rationality of pursuing knowledge. Why should an enquirer who 
wants the truth about whether p ever want to know whether p, rather than merely to 
arrive at an accurate working assumption about whether p? If the enquirer simply 
adopts a working assumption about whether p at random, there is a high chance that 
the answer to the question he adopts as his assumption will be incorrect. It is surely 
sensible, therefore, for him to attempt to estimate which of p and not-p is more likely 
to be correct. Attempting to estimate whether p, in this sense, is a matter of working 
out which of p and not-p is more likely to be true. It is, therefore, to engage in a form 
of epistemic activity. Consequently, it is a mistake to think that merely attempting to 
arrive at accurate working assumptions represents a serious alternative to engaging 
in forms of epistemic activity; the need to minimise the risk of error brings with it a 
motivation to engage in just such activity. Now, in many cases it will be no easier for 
the enquirer to arrive at an accurate estimate about whether p than it would be for 
him to find out whether p. For example, it is no easier for me to determine whether it 
is more likely than not that Jane Austen was born in 1783 than it is for me to find out 
whether she was born in 1783. Furthermore, when it is important for practical 
purposes that the enquirer acts on an accurate assumption about whether p, the 
greater convenience that comes from lazily estimating whether p may be more than 
outweighed by the higher chance of error. It is only when knowledge is hard or 
impossible to come by, or the costs of error not too great, that the enquirer should 
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merely attempt to estimate and adopt accurate working assumptions, rather than find 
things out.  
To summarize, I have been arguing in this section that it follows from (T) that the 
fourth premise of the problematic reasoning does not apply in the case of true belief 
and knowledge. The fourth premise of the reasoning states that if objective X is just 
as good as objective Y, but it is more difficult for the agent to achieve objective Y 
than objective X, then it is rationally sub-optimal for the agent to adopt objective Y 
as his aim. In the face of the problematic reasoning, I have conceded that, at least in 
circumstances in which the stability of true belief does not matter, true belief is just 
as good as knowledge. I have also conceded that there is a sense in which true belief 
may be easier to come by than knowledge: sometimes, there is a procedure available 
to the enquirer such that (a) that procedure issues in a true belief about, but not 
knowledge of, whether p, and (b) that procedure is less taxing on the enquirer’s 
resources than any procedure he could use that would issue in knowledge of whether 
p. It seems to follow, given (4), that where the stability of true belief is unimportant, 
and there is some procedure available to an enquirer that satisfies conditions (a) and 
(b), the enquirer should at most adopt the aim of arriving at a true belief about 
whether p. However, I also noted, in Chapter 1, that when we appeal to principle (4) 
to justify the contention that an agent ought to adopt only some more modest aim, 
we presuppose that further conditions are met. Particularly relevant to the present 
issue is, I think, the following presupposed condition: the agent must be capable of 
recognizing that there are ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more modest 
objective that are not ways in which he can attempt to achieve the more ambitious 
objective. Is this condition satisfied in the case of true belief and knowledge? It 
might be thought to follow from (T) that it can’t be. According to (T), the enquirer 
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will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p until he takes himself to 
have found out whether p. However, I argued that, even given (T), it is possible for 
an enquirer to seek a true belief about whether p using a procedure that he does not 
regard as a way of finding out whether p: he can attempt to deceive himself into 
taking himself to have found out whether p. Once it is appreciated, though, that this 
is the only alternative to using a procedure that he regards as a way of finding out 
whether p, even supposing such procedures to be available, it is obvious why it 
would not be rational for enquirers to use them. They are unlikely to issue in true 
beliefs, and they involve self-deception. Even supposing, then, that the easiest way 
for an enquirer to arrive at a belief about whether p is by taking a pill or seeing a 
hypnotist, such methods are far less effective (i.e. more likely to issue in false 
beliefs, at least from the enquirer’s perspective), and involve unpleasant side effects 
(i.e. false beliefs about what I know, and how I know it). The idea, then, that an 
enquirer can avail himself of superior methods by merely adopting the aim of true 
belief is a chimera. This, I think, is the fundamental point that needs to be made in 
response to the problematic reasoning. Although it is legitimate to appeal to principle 
(4) in some cases, like the archery example, it is not legitimate in the case of true 
belief and knowledge.  
The claim that an enquirer will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether 
p until he takes himself to have found out whether p is relevant to how we should 
respond to the problematic reasoning. It is also relevant, I think, to the question of 
why it is impossible to acquire beliefs at will that Williams raises in ‘Deciding to 
Believe’. In the next section, I want to briefly indicate how (T) might be taken to be 
relevant to this issue.  
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4. Deciding to Believe 
What is the relationship between belief and decision? In ‘Deciding to Believe’, 
Williams contends that it is impossible to acquire beliefs simply by deciding to do 
so, or ‘at will’, and that this is not merely a contingent limitation of human beings 
but a necessary restriction of the will of any possible subject. As we saw earlier, the 
claim that it is impossible to form beliefs at will has not gone unchallenged. Ginet 
argues that ordinary human subjects form beliefs at will in deciding to act, or not to 
act, in certain ways. Others, whilst conceding that ordinary human subjects do not 
have capacity to form beliefs at will, nevertheless argue that we should regard this as 
only a contingent limitation of our wills.32 There is no reason to deny that other 
believers might, in principle, have this ability. According to this view, our inability 
to form beliefs at will is similar to our inability to blush at will, which plausibly is a 
merely contingent limitation of our wills.33 This view is motivated, in part, by the 
conviction that the explanation of the impossibility of forming beliefs at will that 
Williams offers in ‘Deciding to Believe’, based on the idea that belief aims at the 
truth, is inadequate.34 However, once we have thesis (T) on the table, an alternative 
kind of explanation becomes available. Briefly put, the impossibility of forming 
beliefs at will, just by deciding to do so, is a consequence of the subject’s awareness 
that he cannot know things at will.  
Let me spell this out a little. Suppose, in accordance with (T), that the subject will 
not have arrived at the belief that p until he takes himself to have found out that p. 
Suppose, furthermore, that the subject knows that he cannot find out that p simply by 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Alston (1988).  
33 Provided, at least, that what we mean by ‘blushing’ is simply going red in the face, and not showing 
shyness, embarrassment or shame by going red in the face. 
34 For a good critical discussion of Williams’ argument, see Winters (1979).   
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deciding to do so. If such a subject were to form the belief that p at will, in full 
consciousness, then he would know that he had just done so. But given that he 
knows that he cannot find out that p at will, he would not regard himself as having 
just found out that p. But if he does not regard himself as having found out that p, 
then he will not have acquired so much as the belief that p. Neither will he regard 
himself as having acquired the belief that p, provided we assume that the subject 
recognizes the connection between believing and taking oneself to know. It follows 
that the subject is unable to acquire beliefs at will, in full consciousness, and also 
that he recognizes that he is unable to do so.  
Naturally, this explanation of the impossibility of forming beliefs at will raises 
further questions. Many have the intuition that it is impossible for S to form the 
belief that p at will even if S knows that, were he to believe that p, then it would be 
true that p. An example that is often given as an illustration of this possibility is that 
someone trustworthy tells S that she will give him a million pounds if S believes that 
she will give S a million pounds. Does the above explanation apply in cases of self-
fulfilling belief? One might think that in such circumstances the subject can know 
that p at will. After all, if he believes that p then it will be true that p, and the subject 
knows this. Thus, the subject might know that he had acquired the belief that p at 
will and nevertheless regard himself as knowing that p. One might also wonder, 
more generally, about how the subject knows that he cannot acquire knowledge at 
will. For example, is this to be explained in terms of the subject’s grasp of some 
necessary condition for knowing that p, and his appreciation that this condition 
would be violated by a belief that p that was acquired at will? I will not attempt to 
resolve these questions here; my intention is just to highlight some further issues that 
are raised by the present explanation of the impossibility of forming beliefs at will. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
My central aim in this thesis has been to suggest an alternative approach to 
philosophical issues about the value of knowledge, one that brings issues about 
enquiry to the fore. The position I have advocated makes two key moves. Firstly, it 
argues that the comparative state question that usually receives attention in 
philosophical discussions of the value of knowledge is underwritten by a more basic 
activity question that concerns enquiry. Secondly, it argues that there is an important 
epistemic dimension to belief: an enquirer who has the outright belief that p is 
disposed to judge that p, and judging that p involves taking oneself to know that p. I 
have used this conception of belief to argue for a significant constraint on the 
acquisition of belief in enquiry, thesis (T). Once the idea that an enquirer will not 
have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p until he takes himself to know 
whether p is in play, it intelligible why merely seeking true beliefs does not represent 
a genuine alternative, from the enquirer’s perspective, to seeking knowledge. I have 
also indicated how (T) might be used to explain the impossibility of acquiring beliefs 
at will.  
One upshot of my view is that it is no longer clear that the comparative state 
question that usually receives attention in philosophical discussions of the value of 
knowledge is worthy of serious attention. If we can explain why enquirers seek 
knowledge without appealing to the idea that knowledge is a superior state, it is no 
longer clear why there should be a general presumption that we will be able to 
identify respects in which knowledge is superior to (e.g.) mere true belief. At the 
very least, philosophical discussion of the comparative state question ought to 
proceed more critically, with an eye on the broader purpose such discussions serve.  
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